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This dissertation studies indigenisation policy in 
Nigeria. It is a case study which is mainly concerned with 
the following questions: (1) What proportion of the owner¬ 
ship and control of firms in the various schedules have 
actually been transferred to Nigerians? (2) What has been 
the pattern of share acquisition in those firms in the 
various schedules in which foreign owned shares have been 
purchased by Nigerians? 
The method adopted for the study involves analysis 
of the instruments and measures used for the implementation 
of the policy which ostensibly aimed at replacing foreign 
entrepreneurs in all sectors of the Nigerian economy by 
Nigerians. A discussion of the political history and an 
outline of the history of Nigeria's economic nationalism 
provide the background to the analysis. 
The rest of the dissertation discusses: (1) the 
roles technocrats played in the indigenisation policy pro¬ 
cess, (2) the pattern of ownership of foreign businesses 
that were handed over to Nigerians, and the pattern of the 
distribution of share acquisition. Using a sample from the 
city of Lagos, the paper examines the social and political 
character of recipients of enterprises. The last part of 
the paper discusses the political, economic and social con¬ 
sequences and significance of the Nigerian Indigenisation 
policy. 
In conclusion, the thesis suggests that: (1) the 
bulk of shares were concentrated in the hands of the elite 
groups rather than the masses, (2) while dejure control and 
ownership of several foreign businesses were transferred to 
Nigerian nationals, in reality, foreigners still dominate 
the country's economic activities, especially in the highly 
sophisticated and lucrative areas. 
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Nigeria's move to bar foreign participation in 
certain categories of economic activities is only one of a 
series of moves by African countries to try to increase the 
indigenisation of business and industry. Countries like 
Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, to name but a few, have embarked on 
indigenisation of their economies in the recent past."*" 
In Kenya, indigenisation was mainly geared toward 
the agricultural sector. The reason for this was that be¬ 
fore independence, about 80 per cent of the best land in the 
country was reserved for Europeans. In Tanzania, a different 
indigenisation was carried out through a parastatal system, 
in which the government owns and runs the commercial enter¬ 
prises on a majority participation basis. The account of 
the enterprises are not however directly integrated into 
Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa 
(London: Zed Press, 1978), p. 39. 
1 
2 
government budgets. Ghana caused an upheaval, when in 1970, 
it promulgated an indigenisation policy which combined an 
alien compliance order with its Business Promotion Act. 
Under this legislation, foreigners, including fellow Africans 
were banned from owning any enterprise concerned with whole¬ 
sale or retail trade with an annual turnover of C500,000 or 
3 
less, as well as certain other trades and services. 
Indigenisation has ostensibly been a priority goal 
of most post-independent African countries. It has been 
viewed as a means to "salvage" the economy of the continent 
from further foreign exploitation. Teriba points out that: 
In the industrialising, less developed countries. . 
. , the major problem posed by the existing industrial 
structure is that of ownership and control of business 
enterprise. . . . Having only recently acquired politi¬ 
cal independence and the political power which comes in 
its trail, many of these countries are now turning their 
attention to the quest for economic independence. They 
not only desire rapid economic advancement, they also 
want increasingly to control their own economic destiny, 
to acquire a growing stake in the economy, to control and 
manage themselves the means of production and distri¬ 
bution .2 * 4 
2 
Ibid., p. 50. 
^West Africa, 9 July 1971, p. 152. 
40. Teriba, et al. , "Some Aspects of Ownership 
and Control Structure of Business Enterprise in a Developing 
Economy," Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, 
(September 1972), p. 4. 
3 
In Nigeria, the need to take effective measures to 
ensure that the economy is controlled and managed by Nigeri¬ 
ans themselves has been recognized by successive governments 
since independence. Official sanction was first given to 
this (indigenisation measures) in 1972 when it was specifi¬ 
cally stated that policies would be adopted so as "to enable 
Nigerians to participate to an ever increasing extent in the 
ownership, direction and management of Nigerian industry and 
5 
trade." This position was also reflected in the official 
statement by the Federal Government in its 1970-1974 Second 
Development Plan that "experience has shown through history 
that political independence without economic independence is 
but an empty shell," and that "to this end, the government 
will seek to acquire, by law if necessary, equity participa¬ 
tion in a number of strategic industries that will be speci¬ 
fied from time to time."^ 
As a result of the need to place the operation and 
control of the economy in the hands of the government 
agencies and citizens, two indigenisation decrees were 
5 
Federal Military Government of Nigeria: Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972, Ministry of Information 
Printing Division, Lagos, 1972. 
^Federal Republic of Nigeria, Second Development Plan, 
1970-1974. 
4 
promulgated. They were the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree 1972 and the Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977. In 
essence, the decrees state that Nigerians must be given the 
opportunity for meaningful participation in the running of 
their nation's economy. Nigerian shareholders should not 
merely control the equity share capital involved, but should 
also effectively control the running of the enterprises con¬ 
cerned. In order to achieve this, the decree also put great 
emphasis on majority representation, hence the stress on the 
sixty and forty percent figures. It may be true that 
majority representation on the board of a business concern 
could give local interests dejure control, but could such 
control be effectively exercised, given the fact that Ni¬ 
geria lacks enough trained manpower and, know-how, vital to 
the acquisition of economic independence. 
There is therefore the question as to whether indi- 
genisation contributes to the liberation of the Nigerian 
economy or, instead, strengthens the position of the indi¬ 
genous bourgeoisie who are agents of capitalism, and correla- 
tively make the economy vulnerable to a different form of 
foreign exploitation? Another important question is whether 
indigenisation produced widespread employment and occupa¬ 
tional opportunities for Nigerians? 
5 
It is the thesis of this study that the Nigerian 
Indigenisation policy ostensibly meant to enable indigenous 
Nigerians to participate more fully and be more involved in 
the management and control of all aspects of the country's 
economic activities was manipulated by the elite class to 
serve their economic and social interests only. Indigeni¬ 
sation objectives would not be considered accomplished until 
all the shares concentrated in a few hands have been turned 
over to the general public for open subscriptions. 
Scope of the Study 
This is a case study of indigenisation policy in 
Nigeria. Its aim is (1) to analyze Nigeria's indigenisation 
program; (2) to analyze the political and economic role 
technocrats play in the indigenisation policy process; and 
(3) to examine the effects of indigenisation on Nigeria's 
economy. 
The work is exploratory, designed to generate hypo¬ 
theses. It seeks to develop clarification on policies, 
processes, data and political direction to provide the bases 
for future research that will inform policy-makers in 
Nigeria and elsewhere. The central theme is indigenisation 
policy which is discussed and analyzed along the following 
lines: (1) motivation and rationale for the indigenisation 
6 
policy; (2) the people involved in the policy making; and 
(3) its economic and social impact generally, namely, employ¬ 
ment and occupational distribution, domestic production and 
pattern of consumption. 
More specifically, the study is concerned with the 
following questions: (1) What proportion of the ownership 
of firms in the various schedules have actually been trans¬ 
ferred to Nigerians?, and (2) What has been the pattern of 
share acquisition in those firms in the various schedules 
in which foreign owned shares have been purchased by 
Nigerians? 
Methodology 
The study involves a multifrontal strategy combin¬ 
ing historical and documentary analysis; formal as well as 
informal interviews and discussion with numerous people in 
Lagos and Port-Harcourt. 
Two approaches were used to gather data for the 
study. One involved searching documentary sources such as 
those found in the libraries of the Ministries of Economic 
Development, Commerce, Trade, and Industries. Documents 
were also sought in the archives of Nigerian newspapers. 
Other sources included books, magazines, journals, news¬ 
letters, published and unpublished papers, and speeches on 
7 
indigenisation in Nigeria. 
A second approach involved interviews with public 
officials of both the civilian and military administrations, 
especially those of the Ministries of Trade, Industries, and 
Finance, and the economic teams that were directly concerned 
with the indigenisation policy. Private individuals were 
also interviewed. The interviews were supplemented with 
informal discussions with some past and present officials of 
the various administrations. The purpose of the interviews 
and discussions was to discover the technocrats' views of 
their roles in the making of the indigenisation policy, 
their relationship with other officials and the impact of 
their decisions on the indigenisation program. The inter¬ 
views were also used to determine individual assessments of 
the indigenisation policy. 
The interview method included a set questionnaire 
which respondents were asked to complete and/or face-to-face 
question and answer sessions. A copy of the questionnaires 
is appendixed to this study. 
In order to make a close analysis of the type of 
businesses which were affected by the indigenisation policy, 
a list of businesses which had been acquired in the Lagos 
area was obtained. This was particularly useful because Lagos 
8 
has the largest number and the most lucrative businesses af¬ 
fected by the indigenisation measures. 
After obtaining the list of businesses, it became 
obvious that the initial aim of conducting interviews with 
the beneficiaries of the indigenisation measures was not 
feasible, since the process of acquisition of businesses had 
in many cases been followed with suspicion, under-the-counter 
manoeuvers and public recrimination. The majority of offi¬ 
cials were therefore reluctant to talk about the matter. 
As a result, a decision was made to seek informants 
who could provide information about the identities of the 
people in the Lagos sample as well as the general circum¬ 
stances of the application of the indigenisation measures. 
The following individuals agreed to provide information: 
(1) two employees of the Enterprises Promotion Board, (2) a 
senior official of a State Committee, (3) an employee of 
the Capital Issues Commission, (4) an employee of the Lagos 
Chamber of Commerce, (5) an official of the Ministry of 
Industry, (6) an official of the Ministry of Economic De¬ 
velopment, (7) a well-placed Lagos businessman, who is him¬ 
self a beneficiary, (8) an official of a trade union, and 
(9) an employee of a Lagos daily newspaper. 
Valuable information was also gathered from informal 
9 
discussions with different types of people in Lagos, partic- 
larly at the Lagos University campus. 
Concepts 
In recent times, most independent African countries 
have adopted various public policies aimed at creating indi¬ 
genous capitalist development or at least to ensure that 
foreign enterprises dominating economic activities are 
moulded to reflect the national interest. These policies 
have been christened different names at different times in 
different countries. The most popular term in use is "indi- 
genisation." Other concepts include "Africanisation," 
"Nationalisation," etc. Before we proceed further, a brief 
definition of these concepts would be in order. 
Indigenisation 
This is the process by which government limits 
participation in the economic activities to citizens of the 
country, thus making aliens sell their businesses to indi¬ 
genes, individually or collectively, or in some cases, to 
the government itself. Indigenisation differs from national¬ 
isation because the government does not itself take the 
property; or at least, that is not the objective of indi¬ 
genisation. However, it shares the nationalisation 
10 
objective of recovering control of the economy and promoting 
local enterprise. In other words, indigenisation and na¬ 
tionalisation overlap in some cases. For example, foreign 
businesses may be put up for sale to local citizens, but be¬ 
cause of shortage or lack of ready buyers, the whole exer¬ 
cise may end up with the government acquiring the businesses 
because it is the only one with the ready resources to do so. 
Nationalisation 
Nationalisation refers to a broad-scale government 
seizure of foreign- or domestic-owned private property and 
transferring of ownership to the state. Nationalisation may 
be massive/selective or massive/comprehensive. (a) Massive/ 
selective nationalisation has to do with a situation where 
the government takes over a large percentage (from more 
than 50 percent to 100 percent) of ownership, but a select 
number of properties is involved. For example, the 60 
7 
percent take-over of petroleum production in Nigeria, and 
Q 
Zaire's 100 percent ownership transfer was only in copper. 
(b) Massive/comprehensive nationalisation involves high per¬ 
centage of ownership and a very large number of property 
7 
Alan Hutchison, "Last Minute Rush to Nigerianise," 




acquisition. Such countries like Uganda, Tanzania, and 
Zambia, are examples of nations, which have at one time or 
another embarked upon massive/comprehensive nationalisation. 
Africanisation 
This is another concept that has been used variously 
to describe the process of replacing non-African employees 
by Africans. It is usually done through the government 
limiting the employment of foreigners in all categories of 
jobs in the country. It basically involves the transfer of 
jobs from foreigners to indigenes, rather than ownership of 
businesses. However, when used broadly, it covers indigeni- 
sation and nationalisation. This study is concerned with 
indigenisation and so the frame work of analysis discussed 
in the rest of this chapter contains definitions and expla¬ 
nation of the concept "Indigenisation." 
Review of Literature 
The analysis of the literature is divided into two 
g 
Frank Wooldridge and Vishnu D. Sharma, "Internation¬ 
al Law and the Expulsion of Asians," International Lawyer IX 
(1 January 1975): 30-31. 
■*-^Peter Neerso, "Tanzania's Policies on Private 
Foreign Investment," The African Review IV (1974) : 61. 
^Andrew A. Beveridge, "Economic Independence, Indi¬ 
genisation and the African Businessman: Some Effects of 
Sambia's Economic Reforms," African Studies Review XVII 
(3 December 1974): 477. 
12 
parts . Part one discusses general literature on policy¬ 
making and implementation, while part two discusses indigeni- 
sation in particular. This part of the analysis also con¬ 
tains definitions and explanations of the concepts to be 
used throughout the study. 
Policy-making and decision-making are sometimes used 
12 
interchangeably by writers. However, some have made 
13 
efforts to distinguish between the two. Anderson has 
defined policy as "a purposive course of action followed by 
an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter 
14 
of concern." The concept of policy, points out Anderson, 
focuses attention on what is actually done as against what 
is proposed or intended. The decision on the other hand is 
15 
a choice among competing alternatives. Policy making 
involves not only the decision to enact law on some topic 
but also subsequent decisions relating to its implementation 
and enforcement. 
Within the literature on policy making, there is a 
1 ? Richard Snyder et al, eds., Foreign Policy Making: 
An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: 
Free Press, 1963), p. 90. 
13 
James E. Anderson, Public Policy-Making (New York: 






group of works that focus on the participants in the policy 
process,^ which forms the discussion on chapter three of 
this paper. According to this literature, policy-making 
process consists of many elements including individuals who 
play central roles. Some of the studies deals with how 
personality, socialization process, and education affect 
policy makers' styles of decisions and stand in the process. 
17 
Thus, Nakamura and Smallwood point out that even after a 
policy has been formally adopted, its implementation "can be 
extremely lively, dynamic and complex." In the implementa¬ 
tion environment, there is a high degree of diversity, 
fluidity and complexity in relation to the actors, arenas, 
linkages, bureaucratic imperative and the compliance 
18 
mechanisms. Cochran observed that because of the 
■^Harold Lasswell, and Daniel Lerner, eds., The Policy 
Sciences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1951; 
M. Brewster Smith, "Opinion, Personality, and Political Be¬ 
havior, " American Political Science Review 52 (March 1958), 
1-17; Herbert Simon, "Theories of Decision Making in Econom¬ 
ic and Behavioral Science," American Economic Review 3 
(June 1959), 288-283; David Braybrooke, and Charles Lindblom, 
A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process 
(New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 249. 
17 Robert T. Nakamura, and Frank Smallwood, The Poli¬ 
tics of Policy Implementation (New York: St. Martins Press, 
1980), pp. 46-65. 
18 Ibid. 
14 
complexity, diversity and fluidity present in the implemen¬ 
tation process, even simple programs can be difficult to 
implement, especially if there are numerous participants 
19 
with differing perspectives. 
The above review implies that the concept of policy¬ 
making can be seen in the context of a series of related 
activities rather than a single discrete decision. In addi¬ 
tion, there is a sense of continuous activity and adjustment 
involved in policy making, and this is conveyed by describing 
it as a process rather than a single act. Policy making is 
seen as a complex analytical and political process in which 
20 
a combination of forces produce effects. 
The use of the concept indigenisation and its 
application to the analysis of contemporary African political 
economy have become increasingly common. However, academic 
differences exist over the meaning of economic nationalism 
in developing countries as characterized by indigenisation 
policies . 
Some writers have used the terms, nationalisation 
19 Clarke E. Cochran et al-, American Public Policy: 
An Introduction (New York: St. Martins Press, 1982), pp. 4-6. 
20 
Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, Mass.: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1967) 
15 
and indigenisation interchangeably but others distinguish 
21 
between the two. In the article "Foreign Investment in 
Africa," Leslie Rood defines indigenisation as the reserva¬ 
tion by the government of the ownership of a category of 
enterprises to the indigene exclusively. The government 
compels foreign owners of businesses to cease operation, or 
to sell a share or shares of their enterprises to local 
people, thus transferring ownership, control and jobs from 
22 
foreigners to indigenes. 
Rood believes that African governments have now as¬ 
sumed control of most economic activities in their respec¬ 
tive countries. He is however of the opinion that due to 
inexperience, Africans have not been able and cannot manage 
complicated business operations and as such, "efficiency has 
declined." For Rood, indigenisation exercises in Africa have 
been chiefly for status and political reasons. 
A different view point is raised by Ghai in his piece, 
23 
"Concepts and Strategies for Economic Independence." He 
21 Leslie L. Rood, "Foreign Investment in Africa," 
Journal of Modern African Studies XIII (March 1975): 19-34. 
22 Ibid. 
2 3 Dharam P. Ghai, "Concepts and Strategies of Economic 
Independence," The Journal of Modern African Studies 11 
(January 1973): 24-42. 
16 
argues that indigenisation in Africa is much more than the 
quest for status and political interest- He defines indi¬ 
genisation as a "localization of capitalism" which generally 
proceeds by replacing foreign capitalists with local ones . 
He contends that the failure of any indigenisation program 
in Africa can better be explained from capitalist orienta¬ 
tion and connections. 
Thus, while the indigenous bourgeoisie participate 
in managerial and entrepreneurial activities, actual owner¬ 
ship and control of the commanding heights of the national 
economy continue to be in the hands of foreigners . Because, 
in most cases, the major and highly sophisticated and lucra¬ 
tive businesses are not involved in the "transfer" to local 
hands. Key decisions regarding investment and distribution 
of profits and allocation of resources continue to be made 
24 
and taken by non-indigenes. 
25 
Douglas Rimmer, discussing Nigeria's indigenisation 
maintains that the major problem facing indigenisation policy 
in most African countries is corruption in high places. 
24 Ibid. 
25 
Douglas Rimmer, "Elements of the Political Economy," 
in Panter-Brick, ed.. Soldiers and Oil: The Political Trans¬ 
formation of Nigeria (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 
1978), pp. 141-160. 
17 
Noting that this makes it necessary for foreigners in busi¬ 
ness to look for influential local partners for purposes of 
making illegal and unofficial connections. But Arnol Rivkin 
26 
in Nation-Building m Africa, takes a different position. 
He points out that "The endemic political instability, wide¬ 
spread economic stagnation, and epidemic of military coups 
d'etat" better explain why African countries have problems 
of implementation in their economic programs. Rivkin sees a 
relationship between instability and poor performance in the 
implementation process in Africa's economic policies. 
27 In his Revolutionary Pressure in Africa, Claude Ake 
sees indigenisation as the African bourgeoisie ploy "calcu¬ 
lated to legitimize their rule and to consolidate their class 
2 8 
domination." He argues that as long as indigenisation re¬ 
flects the consolidation of the bourgeois class and promotes 
the maintenance of the status quo in the relations of produc¬ 
tion, it will be vigorously pursued. Indigenisation, he 
laments is a sham since existing capitalist relations are 
maintained. For Ake, indigenisation was not meant to succeed. 
2 6 
°Aruold Rivkin, Nation-Building in Africa (New Bruns¬ 
wick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1969) 
27 
Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressure in Africa 




If the examples of Nigeria and Tanzania are any 
guide to the strategies and policies which African 
countries are employing to deal with the problem of 
dependence, they are not effective. They are directed 
at the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of 
dependence. But these ineffective policies are not due 
to ignorance of the nature of the problem on the part 
of those who make policy. While these policies are not 
what they ought to be, they are nonetheless all that 
they can be, given the interests at play and the pre¬ 
vailing domestic and international social forces. To 
be more specific, the monopolistic distribution of 
power in the global economy makes it extremely dif¬ 
ficult for Africa to break out of economic dependence; 
class contradictions make it difficult for African 
leaders to get their priorities right and to engender 
the unity of purpose and the effort which is needed 
to tackle the problems of dependence .^9 
Teriba, Edozien and Kayode in "Some Aspects of Owner¬ 
ship and Control Structure of Business Enterprise in a 
Developing Economy: the Nigerian Case, question the 
utility of the concepts, ownership and control. They argue 
that the structure of ownership as measured by the number of 
shareholders, may not truly reflect the structure of control. 
The Nigerian case is one in point. The share-holding of 
expatriates either as a group, individuals or institutions 
reveals that expatriates and Nigerians are clearly not equal 
partners in business enterprising. It is therefore, in their 
2 9 
Claude Ake, The Political Economy of Africa, Long¬ 
man Nigeria, Limited, 1981. 
"^Teriba, Edozien and Kayode, The Nigerian Journal of 
Economic and Social Studies (September 1972): 4-19. 
19 
view that given the nature of share-holding attributable to 
Nigerians, a policy of indigenisation of ownership, except 
carefully planned and executed may not necessarily lead to 
31 
control at the same time. To this end, Omorotionmwan in 
"Over Indigenisation and Its Problems" contends that indigen¬ 
isation with its massive transfer of businesses from foreign 
to indigenes, generally works to the disadvantage of the 
country adopting it. He argues that all it does is help 
drive away foreign manufacturers already doing business in 
the country at a time when indigenes have not acquired enough 
technical and managerial knowhow to take over and effectively 
manage and control businesses left behind by departing 
aliens . 
Ono Osakwe has defined indigenisation as "the take 
32 
over of foreign businesses and firms by Nigerians." He 
states that the indigenisation exercise in Nigeria with all 
its irregularities amounts to nothing less than social in¬ 
justice. For Alan Hutchison, 
33 
indigenisation and investment 
31 
p . 2 . 
Josef Omorotionmwan, Daily Times, 16 January 1982, 
32 
Ono Osakwe, "Indigenisation: Probing the Irregulari¬ 
ties," African Development, December 1976, p. 439. 
33 
Alan Hutchison, "Tensions between Indigenisation and 
Foreign Investments," African Development, December 1976, 
p. 1283. 
20 
are interwined like two threads. Therefore, as long as 
foreign investment continues to be regarded and accepted as 
the only means to industrial growth, indigenisation would 
continue to make little or no sense. 
34 Indigenisation, according to Jan Jorgensen, has to 
do with "creating economy responsive to the human needs of 
the society and controlled by members of that society." He 
identifies three levels of the economy (structural, owner¬ 
ship and employment) that indigenisation involves. The 
structure of the economy, he maintains, reflects the relation¬ 
ship between the various sectors of the economy, and the re¬ 
lationship of the economy to the international division of 
labor. Therefore, to indigenise the economy, there must be, 
among other things, the integration of the various sectors 
of the economy in order to make it more self-reliant and less 
structurally dependent on imports of foreign technology, 
foreign machinery, foreign raw materials, foreign intermediate 
35 
goods, and foreign patterns of consumption. 
Suggesting Jorgensen's line of argument, Andrew 
Beveridge, in his work, "Economic Independence, Indigenisation 
Jan J. Jorgenson, "Multinational Corporation and the 
Indigenisation of the Kenyan Economy," The African Review, 





and the African Businessman," blames the shortcomings of 
indigenisation in Zambia in particular and Africa in general 
on the lack of coordination in policy implementation. He 
found in the case of Zambia that many "proclaimed or hoped- 
for consequences" did not take place. Instead, the growth 
of private African enterprises was stifled to some degree by 
the policy, while foreign businesses continue to grow despite 
the so called policy. Beveridge is of the opinion that any 
measure to indigenise control of an African economy may 
present dilemmas. For instance, he said that: 
If the state seizes control of large corporations, it 
must provide for technicians and others to manage them. 
Such managers may by virtue of a monopoly of expertise 
maintain effective control. ... If stopping alien 
businesses slows economic expansion, many may lose in 
order that a few indigenous businessmen will gain. If 
more equitable distribution of business ownership is 
the goal, then new and likely inefficient businessmen 
may give the people worse service. . . .37 
Expressing the same viewpoint, Ghai emphasizes the need to 
restructure Third World economies; to analyze the way Third 
World national states operate; and to re-examine the 
critical role of class in determining "for whom, from what, 
and for what" particular policies in dealing with foreign 
3 6 
°AndrewA. Beveridge, "Economic Independence, Indi¬ 
genisation and the African Businessman," African Studies 





domination of Third World economies are really designed. 
39 
Ali Mazrui, "Exit Visa from the World System," 
distinguishes between indigenisation and what he calls 
domestication. Indigenisation in his definition is the 
"greater utilization of indigenous human power, natural and 
mineral resources, technologies and techniques, and the 
principles of ownership and control." Domestication on the 
other hand involves "an effort to make what is foreign more 
relevant to local conditions and local needs." He argues 
that while efforts are being made to indigenise, little or 
nothing is being attempted in the direction of domestica¬ 
tion. An obvious example, he points out is the lack of 
development of curricula in the "imported colleges and uni¬ 
versities" to reflect traditional indigenous ways of living 
and training. In other words, as long as the education 
system is foreign in shape and content, it will continue to 
produce leaders and policy-makers whose minds and heads are 
full of foreign ideas and tastes. Any attempt at indigeni¬ 
sation and/or domestication can therefore only succeed, 
38 
D. P. Ghai, ed., Economic Independence in Africa 
(Nairobi: East Africa Literature Bureau, 1973) 
39 
Ali A. Mazrui, "Exit Visa From the World System: 
Dilemmas of Cultural and Economic Disengagement," Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1981): 71-72. 
23 
Mazrui argues, when there is a change in the educational 
system and other socialization agents to reflect local con¬ 
ditions and needs. 
Judd's piece, "Changing Face of Foreign Business in 
40 Africa: Participation and Integration," provides a broader 
discussion on indigenisation. He examines indigenisation at 
four levels. These are: 
1. Indigenisation of the management of company, that 
is, participation by indigenes in the policy-making 
and operational management. This, he points out, 
can be achieved through intensive and varied train¬ 
ing schemes, and then gradually replacing expatri¬ 
ates with indigenous hands. 
2. Indigenisation of the trading activities of a 
company beyond the wholesale warehouse or factory 
premises. This is concerned with participation by 
local businessmen in the domestic trade of the 
country. 
3. Indigenisation of profits, which refers to the 
levelling of taxes on companies to siphon off a con¬ 
siderable share of its profits to be applied as 
40 
E. C. Judd, "Changing Face of Foreign Business in 
Africa: Participation and Integration," African Affairs 
(June 1976) . 
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national revenue. This deals with company taxation. 
Taxes in every country are designed, in most part, 
to provide revenue for the administration of the 
country and to finance its program and projects for 
the greater development of its total potential in 
human and material terms. 
4. The acquisition of shares in the company by govern¬ 
ments, government agencies, state corporations and 
individuals. This is what he calls "participation 
in equity." Judd's points are based on the theory 
that indigenisation in its different components is 
not achieved strictly as a result of governmental 
actions. He points out that it is the third and 
fourth components that strictly call for governmen¬ 
tal actions. For instance, he argues that the ques¬ 
tion of corporate taxation (especially in African 
and other Third World countries) is very important 
because of the low contribution personal taxation 
make toward national revenue. Therefore it is from 
corporate taxes that the bulk of government revenue 
is obtained. 
After reviewing the different theories and views on 
indigenisation, this dissertation adopts Judd's suggestive 
25 
model as a frame of reference. His discussion on indigenisa- 
tion provides the basis from which we will analyze indigen- 
isation programs, in all ramifications. 
Given our framework, one of the aims of the disser¬ 
tation is to contribute to the growing body of literature on 
the study of indigenisation programs in Africa. The objec¬ 
tive is to begin to develop a typology of indigenisation 
programs by describing the issues relevant to the making of 
indigenisation policies, analyzing the evolution of the 
political and economic systems and specifically, instruments 
and legal measures with which indigenisation policies are 
made, and with which specific action implementing these 
policy decisions are taken. Where conflicts or consensus 
over rights and interests exist, what needs to be examined 
is the extent to which the distribution of economic wealth 
as a result of indigenisation affects the people generally. 
In the rest of this dissertation, indigenisation 
will be defined as a policy designed to promote local owner¬ 
ship of enterprises. Government interest in indigenisation 
is in promoting widespread ownership among nationals. For 
example, in Nigeria, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree of 1972 and 1977 represent a legal instrument of 
indigenisation. 
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Organization of the Paper 
The paper is organized into the following chapters: 
Chapter one contains an introduction and a discus¬ 
sion of the topic of indigenisation policy-making, including 
a review of the relevant literature. 
Chapter two discusses the political and economic 
history of Nigeria; the making of indigenisation policy, ex¬ 
plaining it in the context of Nigeria. 
Chapter three discusses the indigenisation policy 
with emphasis on an examination and analysis of the contents 
of the documents promulgating the policy, i.e., the 1972 and 
1977 Enterprises Promotion Decrees. 
Chapter four discusses the policy process as it in¬ 
volved technocrats. It also contains discussions on inter¬ 
views . 
Chapter five begins to address the instruments and 
problems of implementation of the indigenisation policy from 
the following stand points: (1) contradiction--though the 
decrees were meant to have Nigerians firmly in control of 
the country's economy, there are loopholes which still favor 
foreign investors; (2) the role of government administration; 
(3) indigenous skills and access to capital; (4) the poli¬ 
tics of the indigenisation measures, and (5) political 
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instability. 
Chapter six addresses the question of implementation 
measures of the indigenisation policy with reference to the 
various sectors of the economy: agriculture, manufacturing, 
petroleum, trade, etc. It then discusses problems of the 
implementation measures with reference to politics, private 
versus public acquisition of businesses, types of businesses, 
and categories of recipients. 
Chapter seven summarizes the paper and presents con¬ 
clusions based on the overall results of the study. 
CHAPTER II 
INDIGENISATION POLICY IN NIGERIA 
Since 1972 the Nigerian government has been pursuing 
a policy of promoting local ownership of business, otherwise 
known as indigenisation policy. The policy was furthered by 
two successive legal instruments: the Enterprises Promotion 
Decrees of 1972 and 1977. The 1977 decree was an amendment 
of the 1972 decree though the aim and objectives of both 
decrees remained the same. 
The decision to promulgate indigenisation policy in 
Nigeria was essentially the historic culmination of previous 
attempts by the Nigerian ruling classes as far back as the 
colonial period. Since this chapter is concerned in the 
main, with the making of indigenisation policy in Nigeria, 
a brief look at the political and economic history of the 
country would be appropriate. 
Historical Background 
The brief look into the history of Nigeria's economic 
development and the role of the Nigerian government and 
28 
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people in the process will be used to analyze the present 
economic setting in the light of the process of decoloniza¬ 
tion. Such analysis will help to form a framework for a 
more detailed description of the economic and post-indepen¬ 
dence political development that led to the indigenisation 
policy. 
Nigeria is a creature of Britain and as such, its 
history reflects British imperialistic concern. The struc¬ 
tures of its political and economic and to a large extent, 
social setting are related to colonial machination, colonial 
exploitation and post-independence political manoeuvering. 
Long before the Europeans landed on the coast of 
what is today known as the Federation of Nigeria, there had 
been a number of important kingdoms. These among others 
were the Bornu Empire, Hausa City State, Yoruba Kingdom of 
Oyo and Benin Empire.'*’ By the beginning of the 19th century, 
European explorers had moved from the coast into the interior. 
Closely followed by traders and missionaries; and subsequent¬ 
ly, the British established a consulate at Calabar. 
The political entity known as Nigeria came into formal 
existence in 1914 with the amalgamation of the Northern and 
^Michael Crowder, A Short History of Nigeria (New 
York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 150-209. 
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Southern British Protectorates. With the amalgamation, the 
colony and Protectorate of Nigeria came under a unitary 
administration presided over by a Governor-General. The 
2 
country's constitution of 1946 made provision for three 
administrative regions: Northern, Eastern and Western. Each 
of the regions had its own House of Assembly. The constitu¬ 
tional amendments of 1951 and 1954 not only further streng¬ 
thened regional autonomy but also helped to clarify the 
powers of the regional governments with respect to the 
central government in Lagos. 
Nigeria became independent in 1960, and the first 
government of an independent Nigeria headed by Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa took office. Nigeria's history as an indepen¬ 
dent country since 1960 has been an uneasy one. Besides a 
bloody civil war that lasted from 1967 to 1970, the country 
has experienced four military coups and more than a decade of 
military dictatorship. Of its four heads of state, from 
1960 to 1975, three were killed in office and one deposed 
and exiled. 
Nigeria's population of about 80 million people 
2Ibid. 
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belong to about 200 ethnic groups; of these, three predomi¬ 
nate. These are the Hausa-Fulani, making up about 27 per¬ 
cent of the population; the Yoruba in the Southwest, about 
20 percent of the population, and the Ibo in the Southeast, 
4 
about 17 percent. These groups have dominated the politi¬ 
cal history of Nigeria and have contributed to instability 
in the country. Political instability however, could be 
traced to the colonial experience. The British left Nigeria 
divided along tribal lines. The federal structure comprising 
three regions corresponded roughly to the boundaries of the 
three major tribes—Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba. Each of the 
three regions became the base for major political parties 
that largely reflected their own regional and tribal inter¬ 
ests. This trichotomy has shaped Nigerian politics to date. 
The threatening collapse of the federation began to 
take effect on the 15th of January 1966 when the army staged 
a coup during which the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar and some 
other leaders were killed. Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi, an 
Ibo army officer from the Eastern Region took over the 
3 
Karl W. Deutsch et al., Comparative Government: 
Politics of Industrialized and Developing Nations (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981), p. 395. 
4 
Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), pp. 165-167. 
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government, suspended the constitution and banned all poli¬ 
tical parties and tribal organizations. These measures of 
the Ironsi government, especially the introduction of a 
unitary state, were bitterly opposed by the regions, that 
with the exception of the East, feared dominance by the Ibos. 
A growing unrest and disturbances in the country led 
to another coup which brought General Yakubu Gowon to power 
on July 29, 1966. He immediately restored the federal sys¬ 
tem. In a desperate bid to (1) prevent the break-up of the 
federation as a result of the bloody clashes that claimed 
several lives, and (2) garner strong support from the minor¬ 
ity groups, General Gowon announced a drastic increase in 
the number of states in the federation from four (a Midwest 
region was created out of the West during the Balewa admin- 
5 
istration) to twelve. 
The Eastern Region which was to be partitioned into 
three states, ignored the central government in Lagos, and 
on the 30th of May 1967, its military governor, Col. 
Odumegwu Ojukwu declared an independent state of Biafra. 
This rebellion caused a civil war that lasted from 1967 to 
1970. When hostilities ended, General Gowon granted a 
general amnesty and embarked on a bold and ambitious 
Bulletin of the African Institute IV (1976): 154. 
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reconstruction program, which in turn quickly restored oil 
production and boosted the economy. 
General Gowon who promised to hold free elections 
for a return to civilian government in 1976, changed his 
mind and announced that civil government was to be postponed 
until 1979. With this postponement and growing charges that 
he led a corrupt government that lacked the drive to tackle 
the many social and economic problems in the country, Gowon 
was overthrown in a bloodless coup on the 29th of July 1975. 
His successor General Murtala Muhammed had started to face 
up to those problems, including the twin evils of corruption 
and mismanagement which had characterized the previous ad¬ 
ministration, when an assassin's bullet cut him down on the 
13th of February 1976. He was succeeded by General Obasanjo 
who had been his Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters. 
General Obasanjo went to work and drew up a program, includ¬ 
ing the drafting of a new constitution which would form the 
basis for the return to civilian rule. 
On September 21, 1978, Nigeria's new constitution 
was promulgated, and the ban on political parties was lifted. 
The new Constitution^ broke with Nigeria's inherited British 
^The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1979. 
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2. The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), with Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo as its presidential candidate. 
3. The Nigerian People's Party (NPP), with Dr. Nnamdi 
Azikiwe as its presidential candidate. 
4. The Great Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), with 
Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim as the presidential candi¬ 
date . 
5. The People's Redemption Party (PRP) , with Alhaji 
Aminu Kano as its presidential candidate. 
There were five elections that preceded the handover 
by the military to civilian rule. These were: Senatorial, 
Federal House of Representatives, State House of Assembly, 
State Gubernatorial, and Presidential Elections. All were 
carried out and at the end of the complicated system, Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari emerged the winner as Executive President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. On October 1, 1979, the 
military leaders handed over the government of Nigeria to a 
civilian administration headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, 
whose party, the Nigerian People's Party (NPN) had won the 
presidential election. 
Economic History 
As Barbara Gallaway has pointed out, the economic 
history of Nigeria can be linked to its colonial past. She 
34 
parliamentary system in favor of the United States presi¬ 
dential model, with a strong elected head of state and strict 
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches. The president is elected for four years on the 
same ticket with the vice-president. The ticket needs to 
win "the highest number of votes cast at the election; and 
he has not less than one-quarter of the votes cast ... in 
each of at least two-thirds of all of the States in the 
7 
Federation." 
A bicameral legislative was set up comprising a House 
of Representatives with 350 members and a Senate composed of 
95 members (five from each of the nineteen states). The 
lifting of the ban on political parties followed the forma¬ 
tion of various political parties all across the country. 
After a series of splits, reconciliations and mergers, only 
seventeen parties actually applied for registration before 
the date earmarked by the Federal Electoral Commission. 
On December 23, 1978, the Federal Electoral Commis¬ 
sion announced that only five parties were approved to con¬ 
test the federal elections. These were: 
1. The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), with Alhaji 
Shehu Shagari as its presidential candidate. 
^Ibid., Sect. 126, p. 50. 
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argues that "one outcome of British insistence that each 
colony pay for itself and produce profits for British com- 
8 
panies was the promotion of export trade." Thus in Nigeria, 
"this export economy centered on cocoa in the West, palm oil 
in the East and groundnut in the North was for British 
colonial interest designed ... to direct the export trade 
9 
of Nigeria. ... This brings one to the argument advanced 
by Nwankwo and Ifejika that "the principal motive of the 
British in creating Nigeria was not to advance the interest 
of the area, but to serve Britain's own economic interest." ^ 
Like other Third World countries, Nigeria's economy 
has been heavily dominated by foreign enterprises. As 
Richard Harris has aptly pointed out, foreign investors in 
the Third World have the- tendency to put their investment in 
areas of the economy that yield high profits. The lucrative 
profits they make, he argues, are sent back to their home 
countries, thereby stifling domestic capital formation which 
results in a net outflow of capital from underdeveloped 
8 
Barbara Gallaway, "The Political Economy of Nigeria," 
in The Political Economy of Africa, ed. Richard Harris (New 
York: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1975), p. 100. 
9 
*Ibid. 
"^Arthur Nwankwo and Samuel Ifejika, Biafra: The Making 
of a Nation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 10-34. 
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economies to the developed ones in the form of repatriated 
profits, royalties or interests.'*"'*’ Giovanni Arrighi asserts 
that such businesses like the multinational corporations 
create "labor aristocracy" of well paid employees (mostly 
those from their home countries), while restricting the 
growth of wage employment opportunities in the modern sec¬ 
tors of the economies of Third World countries for the large 
12 
number of unemployed and underemployed. 
When in the 1960s Nigeria embarked on an import 
13 
substitution program, most of the manufacturing enterprises 
with prior interest in the market turned to support it in 
order to meet rising competition. Import substitution 
lowered the cost of import commodities through processing, 
assembling, or packaging in Nigeria. The government granted 
tariffs to protect such finished products ("made in Nigeria") 
from "outside" competition. It was hence profitable for the 
foreign businesses to engage in this type of import substitu¬ 
tion . 
11 
Harris, The Political Economy, p. 14. 
12 
Giovanni Arrighi, "International Corporations, Labor 
Aristocracies, and Economic Development in Africa," in Im¬ 
perialism and Underdevelopment, ed. Robert T. Rhodes (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 255 . 
13 
Peter Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy: 
Nigeria 1945-1966 (Cambridge, Mass.: 1969), pp. 53-137. 
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Import substitution is a protectionist policy of 
industrialization through domestic production of consumer 
goods in substitution for imports. It may range from "final 
touches" stage to local production of intermediate goods to 
that of basic industrial materials production. In other 
words, the country may start off with importing semi-finished 
materials and perform the "final touches" of assembling the 
materials into finished products. Or with the growth in 
demand for the final products, the import demand for inter¬ 
mediate components and basic goods may be sufficiently high 
to warrant investments in the production at home. The motor 
vehicle assembling industry in Nigeria is a notable case. 
It has been argued that import substitution behind high 
tariff protection was an important factor responsible (es¬ 
pecially in the case of Nigeria) for the growth performance 
14 
of the manufacturing sector of the economy. 
However, the Nigerian government realized that real 
substitution can be achieved only when foreign personnel and 
capital are replaced by trained Nigerian personnel and capital. 
It was to this end that the Nigerian government embarked upon 
the process of indigenising the economy. It was not, however, 
14 
Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley: Uni¬ 
versity of California Press, 1977). 
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until 1972 that the government really embarked on an ambi¬ 
tious "Nigerianisation" program to indigenise the economy. 
The program otherwise known as the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Decree was officially promulgated in March, 1972. ^ 
Its motivating factors were the need to: (1) create opportun¬ 
ities for Nigerian indigenous businessmen; (2) maximize local 
retention of profits; and (3) raise the level of intermediate 
capital goods production. It also aimed at forcing foreign 
businesses to employ local personnel, except in cases where 
there are no qualified indigenes, and to inject local partic¬ 
ipation into foreign enterprises. 
The provisions of the Decree reserve for Nigerians 
certain types of businesses. Aliens are to be excluded 
entirely from some twenty-two businesses listed as Schedule 1, 
and thirty-three other businesses listed as Schedule 2, are 
to be reserved for Nigerians only if they are below certain 
size. 
The promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree 1972 could therefore be viewed as the highest water¬ 
mark of the long and unrelenting crusade to place the economic 
hopes and aspirations of Nigeria in the hands of Nigerians. 
i 5 
Federal Military Government of Nigeria, Supplement 
to Official Gazette (Extraordinary) 58 (February 28, 1972). 
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The opening paragraph of the section on indigenisation in 
the Second National Development Plan 1970-74 indicates that: 
One of the factors which tend to reduce the benefits 
of industrialisation to Nigeria is the employment of 
a large number of foreign nationals who receive con¬ 
siderable sums in the form of salaries and allowances. 
In order to reduce these 'earnings leakage,' government 
will intensify its efforts to ensure, not only that high- 
level Nigerian personnel are employed by private in¬ 
dustry, but also that they are given responsibilities 
commensurate with their training and experience. 
Hitherto, many firms have placed a good number of 
Nigerians in management positions but it is widely 
known that many of these indigenous 'managers' are not 
given management functions to perform and are in fact 
little more than glorified clerks put up for window 
dressing 
The provisions of the Decree may therefore be rightly 
regarded as the most comprehensive statement of the new 
policy orientation of the Nigerian government toward private 
foreign investment. They may be regarded as the military 
approach to dealing with the prolonged foreign domination of 
the Nigerian economy. They show clearly that the Nigerian 
government has come to attach very high priority to the 
objective of boosting indigenous entrepreneurship in the 
modern sector of the Nigerian economy. 
However, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
1972 contained many loopholes and was criticized bitterly by 
16 
Second National Development Plan, 1970-74. 
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many Nigerians. As a result, the military administration of 
General Obasanjo set up a commission of inquiry (The Indus¬ 
trial Enterprises Panel) to investigate the causes of the 
loopholes and to recommend what and how to plug them. 
The report of the findings of the panel included 
among other things, loopholes in the 1972 Decree, devices 
such as fronting application for naturalization, extended 
use of the definition of Nigerian citizenship, interpreta- 
tional problems of classification of enterprises, the gentle 
and crawling approach to implementation of the decree and 
frequent amendments providing for exemptions on flimsy 
17 
grounds. The panel blamed foreigners and "misguided 
Nigerians" for the problems. 
The federal government subsequently issued a white 
paper which raised a number of criticisms on the implementa¬ 
tion of the first phase of the indigenisation program. Ac¬ 
cording to the white paper, the "indigenisation program was 
not accomplished: for not only were the shares of most 
companies affected not transferred to Nigerians, in many of 
those that complied, shares were sold to only a few Nigerians, 
leading to a narrow and inequitable distribution of the 
17 
(Lagos) Daily Times of Nigeria, Saturday, 29 January 
1977, p. 3. 
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1B 
benefits of indigenisation." 
Following the government white paper, was a new 
decree, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977.^ 
The Making of Indigenisation Policy 
It was pointed out in the introductory chapter that 
indigenisation has ostensibly been a priority goal of most 
post-independent African countries. It is viewed as a means 
to prevent further foreign exploitation of the economy of 
the African continent. In other words, African countries do 
not have effective control of their economies. Foreign 
minority interests are still dominant in economic activities 
in African countries. To this end, many countries have pro¬ 
claimed policies and initiated programs to remedy the 
situation. Such policies and programs are seen as asser¬ 
tions of "economic independence." Or as one source put it, 
they represent at least, a "prerequisite to economic inde- 
20 
pendence, if not independence itself." 
18 Federal Ministry of Information: "Federal Military 
Government's Views on the Report of the Industrial Enter¬ 
prises Panel," Printing Division, Lagos, 1976. 
19 ... See The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1977. 
20 Dharan P. Ghai, "Concepts and Strategies of Economic 
Independence," The Journal of Modern African Studies 11:1 
(1973): 21-42. 
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Background and Objective of Indigenisation 
In the 1950s foreign capital and skilled overseas 
personnel had been officially welcomed and encouraged in 
every form of industrial and commercial enterprises. There 
was no rigid insistence on local participation, though 
partnership between overseas and local capital was favored. 
21 
The government had no plans for indigenising the economy. 
The development of the structure of the economy to 
reflect an independent one with the "commanding heights" in 
the hands of indigenous Nigerians is a subject that has 
generated analytic discussion among scholars and experts of 
various orientations for some time now. While some trace 
its origin from around the 1960s, others have attempted to 
extend the period a little back into the 1940s and 1950s 
when Nigeria was still a colony of Britain. Paul Collins 
wrote : 
Historically, indigenous businessmen have been keen to 
break expatriate dominance of certain sectors, partic¬ 
ularly retail trade, and pressures have been exerted 
on successive governments since the 1950s. Other 
factors include the civil war experience, the advent 
of military government, and the demonstration effect 
2 1 Joint Statement of Governments of the Federation 
of Nigeria on "Opportunities for Overseas Investment," 
reprinted as an appendix to the official Economic Survey of 
Nigeria 1959 (Lagos), pp. 119-121. 
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of other African States, all of which have contributed 
to the growth of economic nationalisation. Parallel 
indigenisation measures in the management of foreign 
owned or controlled enterprises had been started in 
1966-67 when the Expatriate Quota Allocation Board was es¬ 
tablished.^ 
And to quote Inyang Etang: 
This gradual movement toward the acquisition of 
Nigerians of more active and increasing entrepreneurial 
role in the economic life of the country apparently be¬ 
gan in the forties with the legislative establishment 
of produce marketing boards for the purposes of trans¬ 
ferring control over the marketing of the country's 
export commodities from expatriate firms to Nigerians 
and to the Nigerian governments. It took another eight 
years after independence to promulgate the Companies 
Decree of 1968 that compelled all alien enterprises to 
register as Nigerian entities for purposes of bringing 
local subsidiaries of multinational corporations under 
more efficient control and another twelve years to 
2 3 consider promulgating the indigenisation. . . 
However, a close examination of the situation reveals 
that while collectively and/or individually, Nigerians were 
very much eager as early as the forties and fifties to own 
and control economic activities in the country, the atti¬ 
tudes of the government had been that of "foot dragging" 
toward such a move. Panter-Brick points out that even 
political "independence produced no change in these 
22 
Paul Collins, "The Political Economy of Indigenisa¬ 
tion," The African Review 4:4 (1974): 492. 
2 3 Inyang Eteng, "Elements of the Political Economy," 
in Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria, 
ed. Keith Panter-Brick (London: Frank Cass Co., 1978), p. 156. 
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attitudes." He recollects how "a motion proposed in 1961 by 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo, as Leader of the Opposition in the 
Federal House of Representatives, approving the principle of 
'nationalisation of basic industries and commercial under¬ 
takings of vital importance to the economy of Nigeria' was 
24 
heavily defeated. The value of foreign economic inter¬ 
ests in Nigeria continued to be emphasized officially even 
though criticisms of these interests were popular. 
Thus, inconsistent with official policy, the Federal 
Minister for Economic Development told the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives in 1964 that "most of Nigeria's economic diffi¬ 
culties can only be solved when foreign business concerns 
operating in Nigeria are in the hands of Nigerians; until 
25 
then, all talk about economic progress would be useless." 
Demand for substitution of public for private ownership and 
control (nationalisation) ; private Nigerians for foreign 
ownership and control (indigenisation); and Nigerians for 
expatriate senior personnel (nigerianisation), were not as 
24 
David R. Mummery, The Protection of International 
Private Investment; Nigeria and the World Community (New 
York: 1968), pp. 22-29. 
25 Waziri Ibrahim, quoted m Paul 0. Proehl, Foreign 
Enterprise in Nigeria, Laws and Policies (Chapel Hill: 1965), 
p. 172. 
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a rule, clearly separated.^ 
By 1970, official attitudes had begun to change in 
favor of some sort of indigenous participation and control 
of the economy. As a result, the Second National Develop¬ 
ment Plan contained quotes like, "political independence 
without economic independence is but an empty shell," and 
therefore "a truly independent nation cannot allow its 
objectives and priorities to be distorted or frustrated by 
27 
the manipulations of powerful foreign investors." Accord¬ 
ing to the Plan, indigenous ownership and control in stra¬ 
tegic industrial areas were essential to maximize local 
retention of profit, and increase the net industrial contri¬ 
bution to the national economy. But more emphasis was put 
on government acquisition and control on behalf of the 
Nigerian society. Towards this end, government would 
acquire equity participation in "strategic industries" to be 
specified from time to time. Exploitation of strategic 
natural resources would be undertaken by government alone 
or with private concerns as partners, "provided in all 




Panter-Brick, Soldiers and Oil, 





Government participation in industries regarded as strategie 
proceeded from 1971. By 1975, the Nigerian National Petro¬ 
leum Corporation (a parastatal) had become the majority 
shareholder in all the companies extracting petroleum, as 
well as those in the refining and internal distribution of 
petroleum products. Substantial public shareholdings had 
also been acquired in the foreign-owned commercial banks 
and insurance companies, and in several newly established 
manufacturing firms. Majority public stakes were prescribed 
in the Second and Third National Development Plans for major 
projected industries including iron and steel making, petro¬ 
chemicals, fertilizers and liquefaction of natural gas. 
Substantial indigenous stakes were prescribed for other 
industries including food processing, forest products and 
29 
building materials, construction and plantation. 
Before 1972, all businesses in Nigeria were largely 
dominated by foreign enterprises. The Nigerian government 
and few private Nigerians entered only into partnership with 
these foreign enterprises. For example, in 1970 foreigners 
owned about 63 per cent of paid up capital while private 
Nigerians owned about 10 per cent and the remainder by the 
state. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES PROMOTION 
DECREES 1972 AND 1977 
Businessmen and women who keep up with opportunities 
in trade and investment are familiar with the increasingly 
important Nigerian market in the global economy. Being the 
1 2 
most populous and the richest of all black African nations 
and having an abundance of two resources (oil and gas) much 
valued and coveted by the industrialized world, Nigeria 
holds an important position in the world market. 
Nigeria has a history of amicable commercial rela¬ 
tions with the industrialized world, and the greatly 
increased volume of foreign exchange that became available 
■*"The last Census count in Nigeria (1974) placed the 
population at 79.76 million. See African Development (1976), 
p. 439. 
2 
Nigeria's Gross Domestic Production (GDP) was 
estimated to be 11.5 billion dollars in 1975 and 18.4 bil¬ 
lion dollars in 1980. Ministry of Economic Development 
(Central Planning Office), Guidelines for the Third National 




to Nigeria (overwhelmingly from oil revenue) permitted an 
even larger volume of trade and investment. Besides, 
Nigerians with their uncontrollable penchant for foreign 
goods and technology made Nigeria a bustling center for 
world businesses. 
Nonetheless, Nigerians were exceedingly wary about 
foreign businesses and investments. Nigeria's nationalist 
leaders became much preoccupied with the country's economic 
dependence. It was not, however, until the launching of the 
Second National Development Plan 1970-74 that a clear 
4 
strategy for reducing economic dependence emerged. The 
document argued that it was necessary to localize ownership 
and control of the economy. The Nigerian Enterprises Pro¬ 
motion Decree as a result, became the first bold and out¬ 
standing initiative to put the strategy for independence 
into practice. This chapter's focus is on the contents of 
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree otherwise known 
3 
Daily production of high-grade, low sulphur crude 
oil reached 2.2 billion barrels in 1973. This made Nigeria 
the 6th largest oil producing country in the world. The 
United States Department of Commerce (Investment Resources 
Division), Economic Trends Report from Nigeria, 10 December 
1973, p. 4; The New York Times, 23 November 1973, p. 55. 
4 
Claude Ake, "Explanatory Notes on the Political 
Economy of Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 14:1 
(1976) . 
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as the "Indigenisation Decree." 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
Early in 1972 the Federal Military Government of 
Nigeria issued the "Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree" 
which became effective in March of 1974. The purpose was to 
eliminate or restrict foreign ownership in all sectors of 
the country's economy.^ These sectors were divided into two 
schedules Schedule 1 comprised twenty-two relatively 
unsophisticated occupations that require minimum technical 
skill and for the most part were already dominated by 
7 
Nigerians. For example, bread and cake making, hairdress- 
8 9 ing and haulage of goods by road. Schedule 2 comprised 
thirty-three relatively more sophisticated businesses, 
example of which are furniture making"*"*"* manufacture of ce¬ 
ment, ^ book printing,^ etc. 
The 1977 Decree which was promulgated after a review 
5 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972. 
^Decree (1972) A18, Section 16 (3) . 
^Decree (1972), Schedule 1, A19, Item 6. 
®Ibid., Item 11. ^Ibid., Item 12. 
■'"^Ibid., A20, Item 13. "*""*" Ibid., Item 17. 
12 
Ibid., Item 27. 
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of the 1972 Decree, increased the number of business cate¬ 
gories for which foreign ownership was to be eliminated or 
restricted to one hundred and thirty-six. The sectors were 
divided into three schedules. 
Schedule 1 
1. Advertising and public relations business. 
2. All aspects of pool betting business and 
lotteries. 
3. Assembly of radios, radiograms, record changers, 
television sets, tape recorders and other elec¬ 
tric domestic appliances not combined with 
manufacture of components. 
4. Blending and bottling of alcoholic drinks. 
5. Blocks and ordinary tile manufacture for building 
and construction works. 
6. Bread and cake making. 
7. Candle manufacture. 
8. Casinos and gaming centres. 
9. Cinemas and other places of entertainment. 
10. Commercial transportation (wet and dry and fuel). 
11. Commission agents. 
12. Departmental stores and supermarkets having an 
annual turnover of less than N2,000,000. 
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13. Distribution agencies excluding motor vehicles, 
machinery and equipment and spare parts. 
14. Electrical repair shops other than repair shops 
associated with distribution of electrical goods. 
15. Establishments specializing in the repair of 
watches, clocks and jewelry, including imitation 
jewelery for the general public. 
16. Estate agency. 
17. Film distribution (including cinema films). 
18. Garment manufacture. 
19. Hairdressing. 
20. Ice-cream making when not associated with the 
manufacture of other dairy products. 
21. Indenting and confirming. 
22. Laundry and dry-cleaning. 
23. Manufacturers' representatives. 
24. Manufacture of jewelery and related articles, in¬ 
cluding imitation jewelery. 
25. Manufacture of suitcases, brief cases, hand-bags, 
purses, wallets, portfolios and shopping bags. 
26. Municipal bus services and taxis. 
27. Newspaper publishing and printing. 
28. Office cleaning. 
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29. Passenger bus services of any kind. 
30. Poultry farming. 
31. Printing of stationery (when not associated with 
printing of books). 
32 . Protective agencies. 
33. Radio and television broadcasting. 
34. Retail trade (except by or within departmental 
stores and supermarket). 
35. Rice milling. 
36. Singlet manufacture. 
37. Stevedoring and sharehandling. 
38. Tyre retreading. 
39. Travel agencies. 
40. Wholesale distribution of local manufactures and 
other locally produced goods. 
Schedule 2 
1. Banking-commercial, merchant and development 
banking. 
2. Basic iron and steel manufacture. 
3. Beer brewing. 
4. Boat building. 
5. Bottling of soft drinks. 
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6. Business services (other than machinery and equip¬ 
ment rental and leasing) such as business manage¬ 
ment and consulting services; fashion designing. 
7. Clearing and forwarding agencies. 
8. Canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables. 
9. Coastal and inland waterways shipping. 
10. Construction industry. 
11. Departmental stores and supermarkets having 
annual turnover of not less than N2,000,000. 
12. Distribution agencies for machines and technical 
equipment. 
13. Distribution and servicing of motor vehicles, 
tractors and spare parts thereof or similar 
objects . 
14. Fish and shrimp trawling and processing. 
15. Fertilizer production. 
16. Grain mill products except rice milling. 
17. Industrial cleaning. 
18. Insecticides, pesticides and fungicides. 
19. Internal air transport (scheduled and charter 
services) . 















Manufacture of biscuits and similar dry bakery 
products. 
Manufacture of bicycle. 
Manufacture of cement. 
Manufacture of cosmetics and perfumery. 
Manufacture of dairy products, butter, cheese, 
milk and other milk products. 
Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confec¬ 
tionery . 
Manufacture of food products like yeast, starch, 
baking powder, coffee roasting, processing of tea 
leaves into black tea. 
Manufacture of furniture and interior decoration. 
Manufacture of metal fixture for household, 
office and public building. 
Manufacture of leather footwear. 
Manufacture of matches. 
Manufacture of metal containers. 
Manufacture of plastic products such as plastic 
dinnerware, tableware, kitchenware, plastic mats, 
plastic machinery parts, bottles, tubes and 
cabinets. 
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34. Manufacture of paints, varnishes or other similar 
articles. 
35. Manufacture of rubber products, rubber footwear, 
industrial and mechanical rubber specialities 
such as gloves, mats, sponges and foam. 
36. Manufacture of tyres and tubes for bicycles and 
motorcycles, of tyres and tubes for motor 
vehicles. 
37. Manufacture of soap and detergents. 
38. Manufacture of wire, nails, washers, bolts, nuts, 
rivets and other similar articles. 
39. Other manufacturing industries such as non-rubber 
and non-plastic toys, pens, pencils, umbrellas, 
canes, buttons, brooms and brushes, lamp-shades, 
tobacco pipes and cigarette holders. 
40. Mining and quarrying. 
41. Oil milling, cotton ginning and crushing 
industries. 
42. Paper conversion industries. 
43. Plantation sugar and processing. 
44. Plantation agriculture for tree crops, grains and 
other cash crops. 
45 . Printing of books. 
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46. Production of sawn timber, plywood, veneers and 
other wood conversion industries. 
47. Petro-chemical feedstock industries. 
48. Publishing of books, periodicals and such like. 
49. Pulp and paper mills. 
50. Restaurants, cafes and other eating and drinking 
places. 
51. Salt refinery and packaging. 
52. Screen printing on cloth, dyeing. 
53. Inland and coastal shipping. 
54. Slaughtering, storage associated with industrial 
processing and distribution of meat. 
55. Tanneries and leather finishing. 
56. Wholesale distribution of imported goods. 
57. Photographic studios, including commercial and 
serial photography. 
Schedule 3 
1. Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 
such as ethyl alcohol, whisky brandy, gin and the 
like. 
2. Tobacco manufacture. 
3. Manufacture of basic industrial chemicals (organic 
and inorganic) except fertilizers. 
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4. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials 
and man-made fibres except glass. 
5. Manufacture of drugs and medicines. 
6. Manufacture of pottery, china and earthenware. 
7. Manufacture of glass and glass products. 
8. Manufacture of burnt bricks and structural clay 
products. 
9. Manufacture of miscellaneous non-metalic mineral 
products such as concrete, sypsum and plastering 
products, including ready mixed concrete, mineral 
wool, abrasive; asbestos products; graphite pro¬ 
ducts . 
10. Manufacture of primary non-ferrous metal pro¬ 
ducts such as ingots, bars and billets; sheets, 
strips, cirales, cecrous, rods, tubes, pipes and 
wire rods; casting and extrusions. 
11. Manufacture of (fabricated metal) cutlery, hand 
tools and general hardware. 
12. Manufacture of structural metal products—com¬ 
ponents of bridges, tanks, metal doors and screens, 
window frames. 
13. Manufacture of miscellaneous fabricated metal pro¬ 
ducts, except machinery and equipment, such as 
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safes and vaults; steel springs furnaces; stoves 
and the like. 
14. Manufacture of engines and turbines. 
15. Manufacture of agricultural machinery and equip¬ 
ment . 
16. Manufacture of metal and wood-working machinery. 
17. Manufacture of special industrial machinery and 
equipment such as textile and food machinery, 
paper industry machinery, oil refining machinery 
and equipment, and the like. 
18. Manufacture of office, computing and accounting 
machinery. 
19. Manufacture of other machinery and equipment 
except electrical equipment, pumps, air and gas 
compressors; blowers, air-conditioning and 
ventilating machinery; refrigerators, and the 
like. 
20. Manufacture of electrical industrial machinery 
and apparatus. 
21. Manufacture of radio, television and communica¬ 
tion equipment and apparatus. 
22. Manufacture of electrical appliances and house¬ 
ware . 
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23. Manufacture of electrical apparatus and supplies 
not elsewhere classified, such as insulated 
wires and cables, batteries, electric lamps and 
tubes, fixtures and lamp switches, sockets, 
switches, insulators, and the like. 
24. Ship building and repairing (excluding boat 
building). 
25. Manufacture of railway equipment. 
26. Manufacture of motor vehicles and motorcycles. 
27. Manufacture of aircraft. 
28. Manufacture of professional and scientific and 
measuring and controlling equipment, such as 
laboratory and scientific instruments, surgical, 
medical and dental equipment, instruments and 
supplies and orthopaedic and prosthetic appli¬ 
ances . 
29. Manufacture of photographic and optical goods. 
30. Manufacture of watches and clocks. 
31. Ocean transport/shipping. 
32. Oil servicing companies. 
33. Storage and warehousing—the operation of storage 
facilities and warehouses (including bonded and 
refrigerated warehouses) for hire by the 
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general public. 
34. Textile manufacturing industries. 
35. Hotels, rooming houses, camps and lodging places. 
36. Data processing and tabulating services (on a fee 
or contract basis). 
37. Production of cinema and television films (or 
motion picture production). 
38. Machinery and equipment rental and leasing. 
39. All other enterprises not included in Schedule 1 
or 2 not being public sector enterprises. 
Schedule 1 was made up of forty occupations, examples 
of which are department stores and supermarkets, garment 
manufacture, hairdressing, laundry, dry-cleaning, newspaper 
publishing, municipal bus service and taxis. Schedule 2 
comprised comparatively more sophisticated businesses. They 
are for example, banking, boat building, coastal and inland 
waterways shipping, fish and shrimp trawling, etc. Schedule 
3 comprised for example, such enterprises like manufacture 
of drugs and medicines, tobacco manufacture, ocean transport/ 
shipping, oil servicing companies. 
The Decree prohibits all foreign ownership of 
Schedule 1 enterprises. But under Schedule 2 enterprises, 
foreigners may own up to forty percent. Under Schedule 3, 
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foreigners may own up to sixty percent. However, despite 
the total prohibition in Schedule 1 and the forty and sixty 
percent figures in Schedules 2 and 3, respectively, the 
Decree made provision for "any alien who immediately before 
the commencement of the Decree was the owner or part-owner 
of any body corporate. . .to continue to be owner or part- 
owner of any such corporate if the annual turnover of the 
14 
body corporate was not less than 25 million naira." 
A close examination of the schedules shows that the 
inclusion in Schedule 1 of such businesses as blocks, bricks 
and ordinary tiles manufacture, bread and cake making, hair¬ 
dressing, laundry and dry-cleaning, retail trade, ordinary 
garment making, etc., created no new opportunities for 
indigenous entrepreneurs since these areas had enjoyed 
intensive Nigerian participation even before the Decree was 
promulgated. In other areas such as blending and bottling 
of alcoholic drinks, newspaper publishing, radio and tele¬ 
vision broadcasting, Nigerians were effectively discouraged 
from participation by the government's strong regulatory and 
monopolistic position in the areas. The transfer of haulage 
of goods by road and clearing and forwarding from Schedule 1 
13_ 
Decree (1977), A21, Section 5 . 
14 
Decree (1977), A28, Section 7 . 
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to Schedule 2 also caused a devastating set-back to the 
promise of entrepreneurial opportunities. 
For the purpose of implementation, the Decree estab- 
15 
lished the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board, with 
nationwide enforcement power. An Enterprises Promotion Com¬ 
mittee"*"^ was also established in each state to "assist and 
advise the Board on the implementation of the Decree; to 
ensure that the provisions of the Decree are complied with 
17 
by alien resident or carrying on business in the states." 
The Decree requires all companies with foreign ownership to 
inform the appropriate Enterprises Promotion Committee of 
the nature of their businesses, the nationalities of their 
owners, their capitalization, and their cash flows. The 
Committee, with the approval of the Board, then informs the 
companies of their classification, that is, whether they fall 
under Schedule 1, 2 or 3. Besides the Promotion Board (with 
nationwide enforcement power) and the Promotion Committee 
(state-wide power), the document created other machineries 
"to accelerate and smoothen the process of ownership trans¬ 
fers." These include the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and 
Industry (NBCI) to provide loan and finance to "a few 
^Decree (1977), A19, Section 1. 
16 17 
Ibid-, A20, Section 2. Ibid., Section 5. 
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deserving Nigerians who seek to assume full or partial 
ownership of existing foreign enterprises, or who wish to 
establish new ones"; the Capital Issues Commission (CIC) to 
regulate the issuing and sale of shares to the public; and 
the Center for Management, Education and Training (CMD) and 
a number of polythechnics located in various states to 
furnish the new entrepreneurs with management and technical 
advice. 
Penalty for Contravening the Decree 
The Decree provides that any company or companies 
that had obtained no exemptions and/or extension of the time 
limit within which to divest the required percentages of 
foreign ownership were subject to being seized and sold by 
the Board, and the proceeds remitted to the owners. 
Where, on or after the appointed day, any alien con¬ 
tinues to be the owner or part owner of any enterprise 
in contravention of section 4 of this Decree, it shall 
be lawful for the Board to take over, sell or other¬ 
wise dispose of the enterprise, and to distribute the 
proceeds of such sale or disposal (if any). . .to the 
proprietors of the enterprise duly registered under 
the Registration of Business Names Act 1961. . 
However, the document makes provision for the right 
to petition, namely that: 
18 
Decree (1977), A25, Section 14. 
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Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Board or 
by the exercise of any power under this Decree shall 
have the right to forward a petition on such grievance 
to the Commissioner who may notwithstanding anything 
to the contrary in this Decree and subject to the 
approval of the Federal Executive Council, confirm or 
reverse the decision of the Board or take such further 
measures in relation to the petition as he may think 
just and reasonable.-^ 
The right to petition does not include the "right to appeal 
against any act, matter or thing done or purported to be 
done by or under this Decree. . ."in any court of law. 
Comments on the Decree have been varied. Some saw 
the document promulgating the "Indigenisation" exercise as 
Nigeria's "economic Magna Carta." A. A. Ayida refers to it 
as one principal indicator of the revolutionary transforma- 
20 
tion of Nigeria into a "new political economy." V. I. 
Bello hailed the policy as one of the boldest achievements 
21 
of the military regime. 
Others have described it as a method of acquiring 
vested interests and wealth in the economy by comparador 
19 
Ibid., Section 21. 
20 
A. A. Ayida, "The Nigerian Revolution 1966-1970," 
Proceedings of the 1973 Annual Conference of the Nigerian 
Economic Society on Public Enterprises in Nigeria (Univer¬ 
sity of Ibadan, 1973), pp. 7-8. 
21 
V. I. Bello, "The Intentions, Implementation Pro¬ 
cesses, and Problems of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree 1972," Proceedings of the 1974 Symposium on Indigeni¬ 
sation, p. 18. 
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elements. Okwudiba Nnoli wrote: 
Indigenisation is the latest instrument of the privi¬ 
leged classes for acquiring more vested interests in 
the neo-colonial economy and increasing their power and 
wealth. With the indigenisation of the public services 
virtually complete, these classes have turned toward 
the indigenisation of foreign economic activities for 
the improvement of their financial position, but under 
the cloak of economic nationalism.^ 
And to quote Bayo Akerele: 
I am concerned with the Nigerian practice of the govern¬ 
ment being used by Nigerian institutions and groups to 
achieve their own goals. The controversy between the 
socialists and the capitalists is one between the fac¬ 
tions in the minority for control of the majority. . .^3 
The Decree as a Legal Document 
From a legal point of view, the Decree has also been 
the subject of critical comments. For example, with respect 
to the requirement of 40 percent equity participation for 
Nigerians in Schedule 2 enterprises, it has been pointed out 
that under certain circumstances, ordinary shareholders in 
this category might in practice lose out, say, where there 
is reduced company profit and what is left goes to alien 
24 
preference shareholders. In other words, it is argued that 
Okwudiba Nnoli, ed. Path to Nigerian Development 
(London: Zed Press, 1981), p. 75. 
23 
Bayo Akerele, Proceedings of 1974 Symposium, p. 75. 
24 
D. J. Cottrell, "A Legal Approach to Indigenisation 
Decree," New Nigerian, 23 March 1973. 
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40 percent of the share capital does not necessarily mean 
40 percent of the profits. Likewise, it is questionable how 
much of a voice the 40 percent Nigerian participation will 
have in the running of a company. 
In addition to the actual provision of the document, 
official statements made in clarification of its policy goals 
indicate the absence of any intention to alter the dependency 
situation. General Yakubu Gowon, the then Head of State, 
during his state visit to the United Kingdom in June of 1973 
made the following statement: 
We are consolidating our political independence by doing 
all we can to promote more participation by Nigerians 
in our economic life while attracting more investments 
in sectors of the economy where Nigerians are not yet 
able to rely on themselves 
On the same day in a reception at the Guild Hall, London, he 
elaborated further that the Decree was not a punitive mea¬ 
sure directed against any foreign enterprise. Nor was it 
a euphemism for partial or total nationalisation, but rather 
aimed solely at securing for Nigerians greater participation 
in their national economic and commercial life. The decree, 
he further explained, was intended to encourage genuine 
foreign investors whose contribution in terms of capital and 
^New Nigerian, 15 June 1973. 
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know-how "we still and shall continue to welcome most fer¬ 
vently."26 
A close analysis of the terms of the Decree supports 
such an interpretation. Large businesses are not affected, 
apart from 40 percent Nigerian equity participation. The 
Decree also requires transfer of ownership and control of 
specified industries within a given period and, moreover, to 
an indigenous private sector rather than to an expanded 
public sector. It looks like the Decree sought to establish 
a clear division of labor between foreign private capital 
and an emerging indigenous sector. In other words, indi- 
genisation is an attempt to secure a certain position for 
growing local elite of private entrepreneurs whilst at the 
same time preserving the dominant place for foreign capital 
elsewhere in the industrial sector. In fact it is argued 
that one of the effects of indigenisation is moving foreign 
private investors out of their traditional sectors into new 
27 
ventures with higher technology, management and risks. 
New Nigerian, 18 June 1973. 
27 
A statement by the Federal Commissioner for Indus¬ 
tries to the British Under-Secretary of State for Trade. 
Reported in The Renaissance, 1 March 1973. 
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The Decree as Economic and Political Document 
As an economic document, it exhibits that worldwide 
desire for national control of its economy which has led to 
the adoption of a range of policies and devices by multi¬ 
national corporations as well as national governments them¬ 
selves . Such policies include local equity participation in 
alien enterprises (as in Schedule 2 of the Nigerian Enter¬ 
prises Promotion Decree), the encouragement of complementary 
small-scale indigenous enterprises (as in Schedule 1 of the 
N.E.P.D.), joint ventures comprising local, state capital; 
private, national capital; and international capital (as in 
the case of the oil industry, banking, insurance, etc.). 
Politically, the Decree deals with the internal 
aspect of indigenisation, namely, the impact of operating 
policies on Nigeria's social structure and balance of 
political forces. Just as externally it implies modified 
but continued form of dependence, internally, it provides 
for minimal restructuring of economic institutions inherited 
from the colonial period. As a result, the implementation 
of the Decree gave rise to the articulation of conflicts of 
interests amongst various strata and sections of the Nigerian 
society. 
The conflicting interests that have been articulated 
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in the course of the indigenisation exercise have been sec¬ 
tional and geographical- Initially, public expressed re¬ 
actions to the Decree were directed to alien "saboteurs," 
but as the period of transition passed, debate has focused 
on public versus private sectors and distribution of bene¬ 
fits issues. The fierce debate on the issues of distribution 
of benefits led General Yakubu Gowon in his 1974 budget 
speech to declare that: 
It has never been and it cannot be, the intention of 
the Federal Military Government merely to create 
avenues for a few individuals to grow rich excessively 
and easily on account of the indigenisation decree. . 
Paul Collins identifies five areas of conflicting 
2 9 
interests occasioned by the Decree. These areas, according 
to him, are: 
1. The Public/Private Sector conflict, which is centered 
on any form of state intervention beyond the supply 
of loan capital to private sector. Controversy was 
triggered by hints that the Federal Government might 
take over businesses remaining unsold when the Decree 
deadline expired. 
O Q 
New Nigerian, 2 April 1974. 
29 
Paul Collins, "The Policy of Indigenisation: An 
Overall View, 11 Quarterly Journal of Administration IX, 2 
(1975): 145-147. 
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2. The conflicts within the indigenous business com¬ 
munity have been most pronounced between business 
organizations outside the Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (most notably the Nigerian Chamber of 
Indigenous Contractors) who have criticized the unre¬ 
presentative narrow base of the states 1 Enterprises 
Promotion Committees. 
3. The third conflict was between businessmen and civil 
servants who were all "beneficiaries of the indigen- 
isation exercise." Complaints about civil servants' 
position and roles on states' Enterprises Promotion 
Committees were numerous. Some public officers who 
had good standing even resigned their positions to 
30 
prepare for the mdigenisation decree. There were 
also alleged attempts of alien entrepreneurs to sell 
31 
their businesses to public officers. Central to 
the conflict is the fact that some businessmen who 
previously competed amongst themselves for state 
patronage find themselves competing with enterprising 
state officials, in a considerably disadvantageous 
"^An example was the Kano State Commissioner for Trade 
and Industries who relinquished his post in anticipation for 
the Decree. Reported in New Nigerian, 4 October 1972. 
31 
New Nigerian, 6 June 1974. 
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position. 
4. The fourth type of conflict has a geographical base. 
At the inter-state level, businessmen attempting to 
buy up alien enterprises affected by the decree en¬ 
countered opposition because they are "non-indigenes" 
of the states in which the enterprises were located. 
This was particularly the case in states which during 
the First Republic, were under the dominance of the 
32 
political and economic elites of former regions. 
Although the creation of states broke up the former 
regions and hopefully reduced threat of North-South 
polarization, there was still concern in the northern 
states about some form of industrial and commercial 
expansionism from the South. Consequently, some of 
the northern state governments bought up businesses 
and shares in order to fill a vacuum which might 
otherwise had been filled by non-indigenes. Some 
companies, for example, the United Africa Company set 
aside equal quota of shares for purchase by each state. 
5. The fifth type of conflict was a triangular one between 
the federal government, certain indigenous business 
32 The Rivers State was formerly a part of the former 
Eastern Region, where the business elites were mostly non- 
Rivers origin. See Nigerian Tide, 15 June, p. 9. 
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groups, and alien companies and their employees over 
amendments to the schedules of the Decree. For ex¬ 
ample, associations of indigenous transporters and 
clearing and forwarding agents complained against 
the federal government's decision to transfer the 
haulage of petroleum products and clearing and for- 
33 
warding from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2 of the Decree. 
Workers Unions in the affected industries also cam¬ 
paigned against possible loss of jobs should un- 
34 
bought alien enterprises have to close down. 
Commenting on the provisions of the Nigerian "Indi- 
genisation Decree," G. 0. Onosode said: 
When the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. . .was 
promulgated by the Federal Military Government in 1972, 
the intention of the government was primarily to ensure 
that Nigerian citizens and associations as defined, have 
the opportunity to participate fully in the ownership 
of business enterprises in this country. Regretably, 
none of its provisions expressly or impliedly concerned 
itself with the avowed egalitarian objectives of the 
Federal Military Government. . . .5 
The Decree, it is further argued has a number of loopholes, 
33 
Daily Times, 7 February 1974; also, New Nigerian, 
25 February 1974. 
34 
Daily Times, 30 March 1974. 
35 G. 0. Onosode, "Indigenisation Decree and Its Imple¬ 
mentation," 1974 Symposium on Indigenisation, p. 32. 
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for example, Onosode argued that leaving "the option of 
selling shares privately or to the public at large to the 
discretion of the companies concerned," opens the whole in- 
digenisation exercise to abuse. He points out that besides 
"structural built-in defects" in the decree, there exist 
several devices frequently employed by expatriates and 
Nigerians alike to circumvent the provisions of the decree. 
From the upsurge in the demand for shares, a new breed 
of 'professional shareholders' has emerged. In the 
bid to secure maximum allotment, varying tactics, all 
of a dubious and representative character, were employed, 
such as changing the profession as well as the order of 
one's names to produce incredible permutations and com¬ 
binations, and using the names of pet animals, and 
procuring domestic servants, night watchmen and 
secretaries as applicants with a view to consolidating 
holdings through private transfer which though strictly 
legal are, in my view, contrary to public policy.^ 
Enterprises Affected by the Decree 
Foreign enterprises affected by the Nigerian Enter¬ 
prises Promotion Decree have been estimated to be up to 3000 
37 companies. This figure however refers to the 1972 Decree, 
and it is also a conservative figure. The 1977 Decree even 
affected about double that figure because more schedules were 
36Ibid., p. 37. 
37 Paul Collins, "The Political Economy of Indigeni- 
sation," African Review IV (1974): 494. 
75 
created under the provisions of the Decree. For example, 
the 1972 decree had only two schedules made up of twenty-two 
enterprises (Schedule 1) exclusively reserved for Nigerian, 
and thirty-three enterprises (Schedule 2) barred to aliens 
under certain conditions. The 1977 decree on the other 
hand, did not only create more schedules but also brought 
in more enterprises under its provisions, namely under 
Schedule 1, thirty-nine enterprises were barred totally to 
aliens. Schedule 2, contained fifty-seven enterprises with 
a stipulation of Nigerian majority participation (at least 
60 percent); and Schedule 3 enterprises requring 40 percent 
Nigerian participation. 
The British are most involved in Nigerian business 
but it was the Lebanese who severely felt the initial impact 
of the indigenisation measures because of their entrenchment 
in retail and distributive trade activities which had for 
long been keenly sought for by Nigerians to get into. 
Foreign businesses are involved in a range of manufacturing, 
distributive and service activities. They include such 
long time established trading companies like the U.A.C., 
C.F.A.O., John Holt as well as such multinational ventures 
like I.C.I., Lever Brother and Dunlop. 
Under manufacturing, the following among others are 
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listed as companies that were affected by the decree: 
Aluminum Manufacturing Company of Nigeria, Associated 
Industries (Soap and Cosmetics), Bata Nigeria Ltd. (Shoes), 
Berec Nigeria Ltd. (Batteries), Berger Paints Nigeria Ltd., 
Dunlop Nigeria Ltd., Lever Brothers Ltd. (Margarine), 
Guiness Nigeria Ltd., Metal Box Company of Nigeria, Nigeria 
Bottling Company, Nigeria Breweries Ltd., Nigeria Cement 
Ltd., Nigeria Textile Mills Ltd., Nigerian Tobacco Company, 
Tate and Lyle (Nigeria) Ltd. (Sugar), Vono Products Ltd. 
(Mattress), Wiggin Teape (West Africa) (Paper), etc. Under 
distributive activities were listed such businesses like 
CFAO, Lennards (Lagos) Ltd., Leventis Motors, Paterson 
Zachonis and Company, R. T. Briscoe (Vehicles and printing 
machines), United Trading Company, etc. Under service 
enterprises the following among other businesses were listed 
Blackwood Hodge, Costain (West Africa) Ltd., Daily Times of 
38 Nigeria, several banks and investment companies, etc. 
The company that was most affected was the United 
Africa Company (UAC) because of its involvement in different 
areas of economic activities in the country. The UAC group 
include the following subsidiaries: West Africa Cold Storage 
38 Ibid., p. 495. 
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Company of Nigeria, Kingsway Stores of Nigeria, Kingsway 
Chemists of Nigeria, A. J. Steward (Manufacture of toile¬ 
tries and importation and wholesale marketing of patent 
medicines), G. Gottachalk and Company (wholesale of building 
materials), Finets Ltd. (properties), Pan Electric Ltd., 
African Timber and Plywood Ltd., Green ham Plant Hire Ltd., 
Bordpak Ltd. (production and sale of corrugated board cases), 
Premier Packaging Ltd., G. B. Ollivant (importers and whole¬ 
salers of general merchandise including office equipment, 
electronic data processing equipment, radios and domestic 
39 
electric equipment and menswear), and Niger Motors. The 
U.A.C. originally concerned with trade in export produce, 
importation and general merchandise, has in recent years 
moved into other areas including sales and service of 
technical goods and the provision of special services. 
In terms of location, most of the large foreign 
businesses affected are based in Lagos with branches in the 
states. Kano State, a large and growing industrial center, 




Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has been an analysis of Lne contents of 
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree. It indicated 
that the contents of the Decree made it possible for for¬ 
eigners and their Nigerian collaborators to circumvent the 
implementation process. It also discussed the conflict of 
interests that was engendered by the Decree. 
The next chapter will look into the problems of 
implementation. In order to fully grasp the problems, it 
will first look at the different agencies that were set up 
for the purpose of implementing the Decree. The rest of the 
chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part 
will discuss contradictions in the indigenisation measures. 
The second part will examine major government administrative 
problems in the implementation measures. The third part 
will discuss indigenous skills and access to capital as they 
represent a problem in the implementation exercise. Part 
four will address the problem of politics as it affect 
implementation. It will also discuss the question of in¬ 
stability and its impact on program implementation. 
CHAPTER IV 
TECHNOCRATS: DEFINITION AND ROLES IN 
THE INDIGENISATION PROCESS 
In the last chapter, we traced the background and 
objectives of the indigenisation policy in Nigeria. This 
chapter will look at the process of indigenisation as it 
involves technocrats. 
In every government, whether civilian or military, 
technocrats (the experts) have often been called upon in 
advisory capacities and have been placed on consultative 
committees or advisory groups in a policy-making situation. 
Sometimes formal arrangements have been made to institution¬ 
alize their input. 
Who are technocrats and what are their distinguish¬ 
ing characteristics? The term technocrat will be defined 
here as an expert who has acquired detailed understanding of 
some technical or professional field or subject through edu¬ 
cation and experience. These may be planning, economics, 
engineering or administration. Given the skill, capacity 
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and capability of technocrats in particular areas, they are 
able to propose specific solutions to concrete problems, 
thereby contributing to policy formation. As a group the 
term technocrat identifies a set of individuals who by and 
large are self-involved, and are perceived to be so by others, 
in the consideration of issues and the making of decisions 
affecting economic policy and issues of national development. 
Technocrats constitute a network of individuals with over¬ 
lapping and cross-cutting ties deriving from actual inter¬ 
action grounded in common interests, ideologies and shared 
values centered around a particular profession. Most tech¬ 
nocrats deal primarily (but not solely) with economic policy. 
Some studies on the role of technocrats have been 
made in the recent past. Two of such studies—Nathaniel 
1 2 
Left and Thomas Skidmore —constitute very important liter¬ 
ature on the subject. Left analyzes the effect of politics 
on economic policy and economic development in Brazil. In 
his discussion of the policy making process in Brazil, he 
■'"Nathaniel H. Left, Economic Policy Making and Devel¬ 
opment in Brazil (New York: John V7iley and Sons, Inc., 1968) . 
2 
Thomas E. Skidmore, "Politics and Economic Policy 
Making in Authoritarian Brazil," in Authoritarian Brazil: 
Origins, Politics and Future, ed. Alford Stepan (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 3-46. 
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deals with technocrats, their background, emergence, and 
role in Brazilian society. Left sees them as elements that 
give internal cohesion and stability to the decision making 
process; and believes that their prominence contributes to 
raising the quality of economic policy. He adds, "techno¬ 
crats. . -play a crucial role in dealing creatively with 
some of the difficult economic problems. . . ." Writing in 
the same vein, Skidmore examines, among other things, the 
alliance between the military and technocrats. He argues 
that the military needs the technocrats to make the economy 
work and that the technocrats need the military for the 
implementation of their policies. The same alliance, he 
added, can be said to exist between the politicians and the 
technocrats in a civilian regime. 
3 . . 
Terisa Turner points out that in Nigeria, like m 
most Third World capitalist economies, there exist three sets 
of actors who participate in a commercial triangle, namely, 
businessmen, local middlemen from indigenous private sector 
and government officials who carry out a gatekeeper or com¬ 
prador function. In addition to these three groups, the 
political economies of these developing capitalist 
3 
Terisa Turner, "Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 
Coup," in Soldiers and Oil; The Political Transformation of 
Nigeria, ed. Panter-Brick (London: Frank Cass, 1978), p. 176. 
82 
countries are influenced by another group--technocrats. 
It is this last group (technocrats) that play a 
major role in the formulation and implementation of major 
government economic policies. "The key defining features of 
technocratic state officials is their ability to produce...; 
this ability stems not only from training, but also from mem- 
4 
bership on a team of professionals. ..." 
Technocrats and Other Actors in Policy-Making 
Technocrats' jobs in the various public establish¬ 
ments involve combining technology, finance and managerial 
skills to produce tangible results. The division of labor 
requires an interdependence among various functional groups 
that make up the public service. Individual technocrats by 
virtue of their technical training and (for some) experience 
in foreign based industry, are accustomed to rational, imper¬ 
sonal and universal criteria for making decisions and for 
assessing their own accomplishments. Professional standing, 
the ground for job mobility, depends on cooperation with 
others in the organization. 
The policy of economic nationalism and state-led 




and to statist compradors but also to disaffected middlemen 
who were excluded from the triangular relationships by the 
direct deals established in what are usually the most lucra¬ 
tive areas of the economy. Besides the tension between 
technocrats, compradors and the so-called middlemen, there 
existed another type of tension which developed around 
issues of policy between technocrats and statist compradors— 
the two groups of civil servants in charge of implementing 
state-led capitalist production plans. Both oppose the in¬ 
volvement of middlemen in strategic areas and are therefore 
divided from local businessmen. Technocrats are hired to 
make functional ventures in state capitalism. But these are 
under the ultimate control of traditional comprador admin¬ 
istrators who have the opportunity to form bilateral rela¬ 
tionships with foreign firms. In so doing they threaten to 
divert the policy of economic nationalism from increasing 
local capabilities to intensifying links with foreign capital. 
Such a diversion leaves technocrats with little role 
to play and this in turn leads to frustration and opposition. 
Technocrats (or the professional officers) bitterly resented 
what they considered to be their subordination to the com¬ 
pradors (or administrative class). One of the main 
complaints was that permanent secretaries, who are heads of 
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ministries are "always" chosen from the administrative class. 
Other grounds of resentment include the fact that in most 
cases the highest salaries of professional officers were 
lower than that of permanent secretaries. These rivalries 
between the different groups within the civil service caused 
suspicion and distrust which in turn affected policy making. 
They (the rivalries) were more pronounced during the first 
civilian regime.^ 
Though the structure and functions of the civil 
service under the military remained basically the same as 
they were in the civilian regime, several important quali¬ 
fications regarding the context of their operations caused 
some changes in public perception. P. C. Asiodu outlined 
the following reasons responsible for the change. He wrote: 
With the suspension of parliamentary institution and 
the ban on party activity, there has been no place for 
party bureaucracies in formulation and highly public 
manoeuvres which often characterize such party 
activities.... This was the period of deepening 
crisis and of the gathering storm of seccession. . . 
it was easy to see the advantages, economic and 
political, of remaining one country, federal but 
united, but the federal argument was going by default. 
This was therefore a period which required public de¬ 
fense of the federal unifying ideal, with promises of 
^Stephen 0. Olugbemi, "The Civil Service: An Out¬ 
sider's View," in Nigerian Government and Politics Under 
Military Rule, ed. Oyeleye Oyediran (New York: St. Martin 
Press, Inc., 1979), pp. 96-109. 
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reform and greater justice. In the absence of ministers 
(or later commissioners) on both sides, and in a situa¬ 
tion where the protagonists were the military leaders 
themselves, it fell to the leaders of the federal civil 
service to undertake the task of defending the federal 
cause.^ 
With party politics out of the way and the military 
having given almost a blank check in policy-making and execu¬ 
tion to the civil service, respect, trust and cooperation 
replaced the rivalries and distrust that existed between the 
different functional groups within the system. The role of 
technocrats was enhanced, in that the military relied very 
much on their expert advice. This reliance can be seen from 
the plethora of commissions, boards, task forces and other 
study groups (made up in most part by technocrats) that were 
set up by the government. 
Technocrats and the Indigenisation Decree 
During the five years of civilian administration 
(1960-1965), there was little or no interest and/or attempt 
to indigenise the economy hence no policy was initiated. 
Foreign firms that had entered Nigeria under a favorable set 
of regulations inherited from the colonial period stood to 
gain from a continuation of the status quo. 
. c. Asiodu, "The Civil Service," in Nigerian Gov¬ 
ernment, pp. 82-83. 
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Nevertheless, with the emergence of the military in 
the Nigerian scene, the country adopted a program of indi¬ 
genous participation in virtually all sectors of the 
7 
economy. The government undertook to promote indigenous 
private enterprise and to establish public control over the 
8 
"commanding heights" of the economy. Several parastatals 
were established by 1975. Some were to provide local 
enterprises with funds and guidance. Others were state 
corporations which were designed to operate as public enter¬ 
prises. Each of these government extensions had a budget, a 
purpose, and an interest to defend, and a staff who because 
of their technical training and functional expertise, played 
significant roles in the indigenisation policy-making 
process . 
The Political Role of Technocrats 
In order to obtain certain amount of support for pro¬ 
grams, technocrats may have to play not only technical but 
also non-technical roles as well. This raises the issue of 
technical versus political roles—a subject that has been 
7 
Second National Development Plan 1970-74, p. 134. 
g 
P. 0. Proehl, Foreign Enterprise in Nigeria, Laws 
and Policies (Chapel Hill: N. C. University Press, 1965), 
p . 163 . 
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discussed by several authors. It is possible that if tech¬ 
nocrats are regarded by political and military leaders as 
individuals having technical expertise in specified areas, 
then technocrats will be expected to behave in specified 
ways. The expectations about their roles are created by 
those hiring or appointing them. This means that a certain 
type of behavior pattern will be considered acceptable one, 
and in some ways, technocrats may have to conform to that 
expected behavior, which may not be compatible with the way 
they perceive their roles. This obviously creates a problem. 
There is a technical aspect of the technocrat's role where 
he or she uses his or her knowledge to determine a particular 
economic policy or a course of action. But there is also 
the political aspect of the technocrat's role which is not 
clearly understood. Sometimes technocrats tend to give too 
much emphasis on one or the other of these roles . For ex¬ 
ample, in the case of the indigenisation policy, some 
9 
Michael A. Quinn, "Technicians Versus Politicians, 
Administrative Reform of Local Government in Developing 
Country: A Case Study of Porto Alegre, Brazil" (Ph.D. dis¬ 
sertation, University of Illinois, 1972; Guy Benveniste, 
Bureaucracy and National Planning: Sociological Case Study 
of Mexico (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970); Gary Wynia, 
Politics and Planners: Economic Development Policy in 
Central America (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1972); 
Merilee S. Grindle,"Power Expertise and the Technocrats," 
Journal of Politics 39:2 (May 1977): 399-426; Mahmud Tukur, 
Reform of the Nigerian Public Service (Zaria: Gaskiya Cor¬ 
poration, 1971) . 
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observers maintained that the failure of the policy in the 
first phase which culminated in a wholesale review in 1976 
was the result of less attention to the political dimension 
, .. 10 
of the program. 
All economic programs and plans have problems but 
some are overcome more easily than others. Some are tech¬ 
nical problems associated with the design of the plan, but 
program implementation implies more than the technical 
activities. Programs are part of the broad policy-making 
process and reflect most of its characteristics. As such, 
changes in the economic organs of the government, in poli¬ 
tical leadership, or disagreement between technocrats and 
other officials, and legislative opposition (in the case of 
civilian governments) can adversely affect policy implemen¬ 
tation and the position of technocrats. To this end, the 
technocrats are well conscious of the fact that they are 
actors in social and political environments where they can 
only explain what they believe need to be done. In other 
The usual Nigerian politics of ethnic rivalries 
played an adverse role in the indigenisation process. The 
fear of continued economic domination by one group over the 
other was a factor. For instance, some states refused non¬ 
state origins to acquire businesses. Also see Editorial 
Comment: "Failure of Phase I" Business Times. 10 August 1976; 
Taju Damole, "New Scramble for Alien Enterprises," Business 
Times, 10 August 1977. 
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words, in most cases, they are only called in to advise and 
recommend. 
It is interesting to note the extent to which tech¬ 
nocrats work for their superiors and the extent to which 
they get embroiled in politics. However, those associated 
with the military regimes portrayed themselves as being 
apolitical, always stressing elements of rationality and 
efficiency, and not particularly interested in political 
activities. Most of the technocrats who belong to this 
group believe that party politics and political activities 
in general are a distraction from their real interests and 
job concerns. Those associated with civilian regimes, on 
the other hand, feel that their role was not only technical 
but also political because they constantly attempt to in¬ 
fluence the setting of public policy objectives even when 
the policy broadly defined had already been determined. 
In an attempt to provide information on how techno¬ 
crats viewed and carried out their roles in the indigenisa- 
tion process, how they worked in group action, and how they 
related to other decision makers, some technocrats were 
interviewed. 
Given the shifting patterns of power in Nigeria 
during the period under study, fairly extensive changes can 
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be expected to occur in the principal figures shaping high 
level policies. Recognizing this, efforts were made to get 
a sample that was representative of the different adminis¬ 
trations, past and present. The data used in this study 
were obtained through interviews of fifty persons, most of 
whom were government officials. Some of them had connec¬ 
tions with all the administrations—Balewa through Shagari. 
These include ministers, officials of the Ministries of 
Economic Development, Trade, Industry, and Finance, the 
Central Bank, the Enterprises Promotion Board, Lagos Stock 
Exchange. 
Data obtained from the interviews showed that the 
majority of the technocrats were between forty and sixty 
years old. In addition, those appointed as ministers or 
commissioners were older than the professional staffs. All 
but five of the persons interviewed were males. All indi¬ 
viduals interviewed were born in Nigeria by Nigerian parents. 
Over two-thirds of the technocrats interviewed had completed 
some form of higher education or training comparable to 
degrees in such fields as economics, planning, civil engineer¬ 
ing, public or business administration, and law. About half 
had college degrees, while a good percentage of them had 
studied in universities and colleges outside Nigeria, mainly 
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in Britain and the United States. 
Since experience on the job is related to the devel¬ 
opment of a technocratic outlook, part of the interview was 
focused on the technocrats' occupations, past and present, 
and on identifying those activities which they would consider 
more appropriate or ideal, given their education and train¬ 
ing. Of those interviewed, about one-third earn their in¬ 
come from more than one source. Less than half reported 
that their total income come from a full-time position in 
which they are able to use their education, training and 
experience. 
The following pages are drawn principally from the 
interviews. One aim of the interview was to obtain their 
perceptions, attitude and values concerning their action in 
the making of the indigenisation policy. The focus is on 
action and evaluation of performance in the context in which 
they (the experts) participated directly in the process. 
In the interviews, technocrats provided information 
about their own actions and participation in the activities 
of the institutions or agencies they directed or the programs 
they designed. In the quotations that follow, it is impor¬ 
tant to note the extent and depth of some of the changes 
pursued by the civilian and military governments, and the 
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difference in these changes. The plans and projects these 
officials worked on were never fully implemented but their 
feelings convey commitment to the tasks they were set to ac¬ 
complish . In this respect there are some differences between 
the information given by technocrats associated with the 
military regimes and those associated with the civilian gov¬ 
ernments . 
The first group of technocrats responded as follows 
with respect to their individual roles within their respec¬ 
tive ministries, agencies, commissions, boards or task 
forces . 
I h ad an important position in my organization. 
I believe my power was derived from my sense of com¬ 
petence and my capacity to introduce measures that I 
consider good and efficient for the economic survival 
and well being of the country. 
I feel I have a lot of experience in government. 
I have had the opportunity to serve in both military 
and civilian governments. I served in both the Gowon 
and Muhammed/Obasanjo regimes. I am now still serving 
in the present Shagari Administration. In the past 
regimes I headed an organization that had to do di¬ 
rectly with the indigenisation thing. In my present 
position, I don't deal directly about the indigenisa¬ 
tion policy which is an on-going thing, but my 
ministry has some connections with the policy. I 
have been good and well known in my area of speciali¬ 
zation; I knew what I wanted and what is good for the 
country. 
Several other technocrats who were directly associated 
with the making of the indigenisation policy had this to say: 
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I worked with a government that had everything 
necessary to bring development to Nigeria. I worked 
with friends in the ministries. We all knew each 
other and we would meet and discuss issues of eco¬ 
nomics, politics, etc., We maintained friendly en¬ 
vironment . 
Indig enisation program, like most government 
policy programs was designed by groups. Many inter¬ 
ested groups actively participated in the planning 
of the policy. They articulated the interests of 
individual groups. It was definitely a popular 
plan.11 
From my discussion with different levels of techno¬ 
crats, those who have been associated with both military and 
civilian governments felt they could work more as individ¬ 
uals in the military administration than they could in 
civilian government (Table 1 on page 94 shows categories of 
respondents and the regimes with which they were associated). 
In addition, technocrats of the military regimes felt their 
positions in the military government constituted an important 
base from which economic policies could be designed and form¬ 
ulated. Hence, they felt the strength of their bargaining 
positions and utilized them to exert pressure in their rela¬ 
tion with other actors. On the other hand, technocrats of 
the civilian government appear to act more as a group that 
worked collectively and formed coalitions in determining 
One of the many statements made by technocrats in 
answer to interview questions. 
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Table 1 
FORMER TECHNOCRATS AND THEIR CATEGORIES 





cent Civilian Military 
Civilian- 
Military 
Civil Servants — 5 15 20 40 
Businesspersons 9 — 6 15 30 
Politicians — 8 — 8 16 
Others — 7 — 7 14 
Total 9 20 21 50 100 
Source: Author of the paper. 
The table shows the breakdown of the 50 persons interviewed: 
a. Out of 20 civil servants interviewed, 5 had 
worked only with the military administration, 
while 15 served in both civilian and military 
administrations. 
b. For businesspersons, 9 served in civilian and 
6 in both civilian and military administrations. 
c. All the 8 politician respondents served only in 
military administrations. 
d. The category of others interviewed include 
2 farmers, 2 teachers, 1 lawyer and 2 students. 
economic policy. In the same vein, technocrats associated 
with the military governments were in some ways more com¬ 
mitted to their positions and actions and were more confident 
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of their capacity to act effectively in economic policy 
making as individuals. 
A different set of interview questions covered the 
aspect of organizational life; dealing with descriptions of 
aims and structures, of alliances, achievements, set backs, 
and problems with other groups. In this way, it was pos¬ 
sible to cover a broader range of power related activities 
and at the same time provide information on how they (the 
technocrats) get involved with other groups, as well as how 
they relate to other authoritative individuals and groups. 
Most technocrats spoke of the problems and experience 
in positions where they determine policy objectives and co¬ 
ordinate the implementation of activities with groups other 
than their own. A great many agencies or groups with which 
they work are mostly concerned with the design of policy and 
the implementation of procedures. Technocrats see them as 
lacking the capacity for implementation. 
With respect to roles and satisfaction in their pro¬ 
fessional activities, the technocrats stressed their moral 
responsibilities. A sense of engagement in a complex task 
of national reconstruction in economic policy making seems to 
mask their expression. They also show concern for internal 
unity and purpose, and external support in pursuit of the 
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goals they were set out to achieve. There were also a 
general sense of practicalism and realism among the techno¬ 
crats, especially those who worked with the military regimes. 
I am realistic, practical, rationalistic and like to 
work towards things that are possible even if they re¬ 
quire great sacrifice, but they have to have a realistic 
base. The orientation of the military governments to¬ 
wards indigenisation of the country's economy was 
realistic and rational. 
The above quote represents the thoughts and orientation of 
eighty percent of the technocrats who served with the mili¬ 
tary. However, most of the accounts portray technocrats as 
viewing themselves as protagonists but not as main actors or 
object of action in the making of the policy. 
Technocrats in general realize they do not have all 
the answers to the economic problems. They have ideas and 
technical expertise that allow them to diagnose and perceive 
certain problems that may arise. They know that some 
specific economic policies cannot meet the needs of the 
nation and they are capable of proposing possible solutions. 
The question, however, is whether their proposals and 
recommendations are usually translated into effective actions. 
They can give advice according to their knowledges, experi¬ 
ences and values, but are these the only ingredients that 
shape economic policy? Technocrats are actors in the politi¬ 
cal arena when they influence or make policy. If they do 
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influence policy, they exercise some kind of power. So the 
question of how they act and what are their sources of power 
become critical. Their views and actions are shaped by 
images held by various groups in society and by the images 
prevalent in the professional groups with which they were 
associated prior to entering government. These reference 
outside groups continue to shape their perceptions of the 
problem of economic policy. Technocrats like any other people, 
have the personal interest in continuing to be respected and 
accepted by their reference groups. Personal experiences 
also play a role, some technocrats have a deep involvement 
in economic issues beyond official policy. 
The question of power of the technocrats, or rather 
the exercise of power by them is closely associated with 
their relations to other groups, more specifically, with 
military and political leaders. To this end, some part of 
the interview questions were designed to probe the respon¬ 
dents ' feelings about their relationship to higher level 
leaders and how this relationship influenced their participa¬ 
tion in the economic policy making, more specifically in the 
indigenisation policy. In general, the technocrats believe 
that when their proposals are not successfully or totally 
implemented, it is the result of built-in deficiencies of the 
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political system or of the elites (military or civilian) who 
are in charge of overseeing the general implementation of 
the programs. In addition (as it became clear through some 
of the officials' remarks), technocrats believe that the 
heterogenous nature, and divergent positions of social and 
political groups in Nigerian society often work at cross 
purposes and tend to make efforts at preparing programs and 
projects difficult. They believe that it is the actions of 
"other groups" (even the government elite) in some way that 
undermind genuine constructive attempts at the policy-making 
process . 
When technocrats are appointed a certain amount of 
power is delegated to them. In the case of the military 
regimes, technocrats were quite influential. In the 
civilian regimes the economic programs were basically pre¬ 
pared by leaders of different groups and a minimum of dif¬ 
fused delegation of power took place. In both cases, how¬ 
ever, the amount of power delegated seems to be limited 
because politicians as well as military leaders want to 
maintain control over the technocrats. 
Technocrats who were associated with the first ci¬ 
vilian government and those of the present civilian govern¬ 
ment acknowledge that they worked together with different 
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groups representing varied interests. This constitutes an 
important source of power and support. The indigenisation 
policy process sailed through smoothly because it was 
popular, many groups supported its objectives. 
One of the differences between the military and 
civilian administrations is the extent of centralization of 
authority. While the military based its administration on 
highly centralized authority, the civilian administration 
generally is decentralized and thus lacking the swift and 
prompt adoption and implementation of policy as characterized 
by the former. Although problems have risen as regards the 
indigenisation decree, it has been argued that in principle, 
it (the promulgation of the decree) was a laudable effort by 
the military regime that civilian administration could have 
hesitated to do for selfish interests. 
When respondents were asked why in their opinions 
the indigenisation policy was easily executed by the military, 
majority of them pointed to the fact that the military 
administration was centralized and as such it was easier to 
take decisions. 
I believe that centralized action is best for 
policy making. For the civilian administration, there 
are different interest groups and all want to benefit 
selfishly from government policy. It all fall apart, 
groups are unable to compromise. This makes it dif¬ 
ficult to adopt and execute a policy. In a system 
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where authority is highly centralized, such as the 
military regime, it is quite easy to formulate, adopt 
and execute a given policy promptly without much ado. 
Another question as to whether indigenisation ac¬ 
complished much in terms of economic independence, engen¬ 
dered a negative response from 100 percent of respondents. 
No. I don't think so because the economy of Nigeria 
still largely depends on outside control. The worst 
thing is that the most important and lucrative sectors 
of the country's economy are directly or indirectly 
owned or controlled by foreigners. The government's 
recruitment of highly-paid foreign personnel to man 
enterprises, including parastatals and corporations, 
has also helped to perpetuate the state of dependency 
on outside control. 
On the question of beneficiaries, most of the persons 
interviewed named military officers as chief beneficiaries, 
followed by politicians and civil servants. They include 
military governors, federal and state commissioners, perma¬ 
nent secretaries and other top government officials. Re¬ 
spondents also pointed out that most lucrative businesses 
generally went to the most influential and powerful persons. 
Respondents were asked to give an assessment of the 
Nigerian indigenisation exercise in respect of the proportion 
of the transfer of ownership and control of foreign enter¬ 
prises to Nigerians, and the pattern of share acquisition by 
Nigerians. Majority of them shared the following view: 
Share ownership in, and control of foreign enterprises 
open to Nigerians are two distinct variables, as the 
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indigenous equity participants were soon to realize. 
Central and sensitive issues pertaining to these 
foreign firms, such as what technology to employ, re¬ 
search to be undertaken, the location and diversifica¬ 
tion of investments, engineering and patenting of 
technology and equipment, market strategies, capitalist 
exploitative tactics and manoeuvres, etc., are usually 
decided at the metropolitan headquarters of the firms, 
not in Nigeria.-*-2 
It is the opinion of 96 percent of the respondents 
that indigenisation has not in actual sense accomplished 
much in the transfer of ownership and control of foreign 
businesses to Nigerians. They argued that the only areas of 
the economy Nigerians own and control fully are the least 
lucrative ones. Besides, these areas were already in the 
hands of Nigerians before the indigenisation decree was pro¬ 
mulgated. Indigenisation is seen as a device whereby the 
Nigerian bourgeoisie is used to protect imperialist economic 
domination in the country. Instead of the government ac¬ 
quiring alien enterprises for the people, an elitist, sel¬ 
fish and discriminatory method of private acquisition 
through public loans was adopted. These loans are fraudu¬ 
lently used to transfer numerous enterprises to domestic 
capitalists who are extensions of foreign capitalist 
exploitation. 
12 
This statement echoes the views of most of the 
people who were interviewed. 
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On the question of the pattern of share acquisition, 
88 percent of the respondents think it is discriminatory. 
They identified certain areas of concentration of share al¬ 
location. These are urban/rural, high and middle income/low 
income groups in urban areas. The pattern of share acquisi¬ 
tion between the urban and rural areas, between high and low 
income groups, and between military and civilian population 
is anything but just and egalitarian. The rural/urban dis¬ 
parity became more aggravated as a result of indigenisation. 
The rural population fell far behind the more politically 
articulate and effective urban dwellers in the acquisition 
of shares in foreign enterprises. The well-placed elite, 
who purchased shares of stocks in foreign-owned companies, 
and who have other connections with affluent foreign firms, 
and have strategic positions in the Nigerian polity, con¬ 
tinue to forge further ahead of the non-elite low-income 
groups . The concentration of share acquisition in the urban 
area is generally justified by the argument that, from the 
political and economic point of view, it is the most signif¬ 
icant sector of the social structure in the country. It is 
here that the social groups which control the post-colonial 
state are to be found. It is also the principal medium of 
interactions with the dominant metropolitan centers to which 
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the Nigerian economy is tied. 13 
13 Even the technocrats made statements that the con¬ 
centration of shares acquisition in the urban areas and 
among the elite groups was a result of the fact that the 
urban areas are the nerve centers of political and economic 
activities. And the elite groups, not the masses, are the 
actors. 
CHAPTER V 
MECHANISMS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NIGERIAN 
ENTERPRISES PROMOTION DECREE 
The mechanisms for the implementation of the Decree 
can be found in the Decree itself. The Decree comprises 
twenty-five sections and each of them deals with a particular 
aspect of the mechanism. For example, Section 1 provides 
for the establishment of a Promotion Board whose functions 
are clearly outlined in the Decree, namely: (1) to advise 
the Commissioner on clearly defined policy guidelines for 
the promotion of Nigerian enterprises, (2) to advise the 
Commissioner on measures that would assist in ensuring the 
assumption of the control of the Nigerian economy by 
Nigerians in the shortest possible time, and (3) to deter¬ 
mine any matter relating to business enterprises in Nigeria 
generally in respect of commerce and industry that may be 
referred to it. . . 
Membership of the Board appointed by the Federal 
^Decree (1977), A19, Section 1. 
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Executive Council was drawn from the following: 
1. Five Nigerians from outside the Public Service of 
the Federation or the States. 




(c) Economic Development 
(d) Trade 
(e) Internal Affairs 
3. The Secretary of the Capital Issue Commission. 
4. The Director of the Stock Exchanges in Nigeria. 
Section 1 (4) of the Decree provides for a Secretary 
of the Board who "shall be appointed by the Commissioner on 
the recommendation of the Board and who shall be the head of 
the Board's secretariat, and who shall be responsible to the 
Chairman for the efficient implementation of the Board's 
decisions. . ." Section 1 (5) vests the Board with the power 
to coopt any member to attend its meeting. This is done so 
that persons whose expert advice is needed could be utilized. 
For example, the legal adviser to the Federal Ministry of 
Industries is an ex-officio member of the Board by cooptation. 
At the same level the Decree made provisions for a 
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"Promotion Committee" in each state. The Chairman of the 
Committee is the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry respon¬ 
sible for industrial and trade matters in each state. Other 
members of the State Committee are: 
1. An officer in the Ministry of Trade 
2. The Registrar of Co-operatives 
3. Six other persons appointed by the State Commis¬ 
sioner for trade or industries. 
Section 2 (5) of the Decree outlines the functions of the 
State Committee: 
—to assist and advise the Board on the implementa¬ 
tion of the Decree, 
—to ensure that the provisions of the Decree are 
complied with by aliens resident or carrying on 
business in the state, 
—to recommend to the Board such other measures as 
may be necessary in the opinion of the Committee 
to enable full effect to be given to implementation 
of the Decree, and 
—to perform other functions as may be assigned to it 
by the Board. 
The Secretariat of the Board comprises the following 
units : 
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1. The Administrative Unit headed by an Administra¬ 
tive Officer at the level of under Secretary who 
functions as the Secretary to the Board and head 
of the Secretariat. He also coordinates the 
activities of the Secretariat and is directly 
responsible to the Chairman of the Nigerian Enter¬ 
prises Promotion Board. 
2. The Inspectorate Unit comprises the inspectors of 
enterprises (Section 12 of the 1977 Decree). It 
is the responsibility of the inspectors to ensure 
that each affected enterprise complies fully with 
the provisions of the Decree. Before the deadline 
date, the inspectors undertook extensive inspec¬ 
tion exercise aimed at reminding affected enter¬ 
prises of their obligations under the Decree. 
After the deadline date, their duties were mainly 
to concentrate on monitoring the progress of the 
implementation of the Decree by undertaking inspec¬ 
tion exercises and submitting reports high¬ 
lighting the extent of compliance. They perform 
one of the most vital functions in the implementa¬ 
tion exercise. 
3. The Valuation Unit is made up of experts from 
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various disciplines like engineering, accounting, 
law, architecture, land officers, etc. Section 
14 of the Decree vests the Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Board with the power, where on or after 
the appointed day any alien continues to be the 
owner or part owner of any enterprise in contra¬ 
vention of Section 4, 5 or 6 of the Decree to: 
(a) take over, sell or otherwise dispose of the 
enterprise 
(b) distribute the proceeds of such sales or dis¬ 
posal (if any) 
(i) in the case of partnership to the pro¬ 
prietors of the duly registered as such 
under the Registration of Business Name 
Act 1961. 
(ii) in the case of companies registered 
under the Companies Decree 1968, to the 
shareholders of the company. 
(iii) in any other case, in such manner as 
may be directed by the Board. 
The Valuation Unit is responsible for the valuation 
of enterprises which may have to be taken over by the Board. 
Besides the statutory functions, the valuation Unit also 
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functions in advisory capacity to Nigerian businessmen who 
may wish to purchase businesses which, under the Decree must 
pass to Nigerians. 
Another important mechanism for implementation pro¬ 
cess was the establishment of the Capital Issues Commission 
under Section 9 of the Decree. It composed of the follow¬ 
ing: 
1. The Central Bank of Nigeria 
2. Federal Ministry of Finance 
3. Federal Ministry of Trade 
4. Federal Ministry of Industries 
5. Federal Ministry of Economic Development and 
Reconstruction 
6. Lagos Stock Exchange 
7. Three independent members selected with an eye to 
business and financial experience. 
The Commission was responsible for the determination 
of : 
(a) the price at which shares or debentures are 
to be sold to the public either through offer 
for sale or direct issue; 
(b) the timing and amount of sale; 
(c) in the case of a company whose shares are 
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already quoted on any recognized Stock Ex¬ 
change, the timing and amount of any subse¬ 
quent issue or supplementary offer for sale 
and the price at which the shares and deben¬ 
tures are to be sold; 
(d) such other matters incidental or supplemen¬ 
tary to the foregoing as the Commission may 
at its discretion determine. 
The provision of the decree apply to all public 
companies that is, all companies which do not by their 
Articles of Association specifically prohibit the sale of 
their shares and debentures to the public. Provision for 
determining amount of issue is intended to ensure that 
issues are brought into the market in such installments as 
can be conveniently absorbed. 
One of the most far reaching steps taken by the 
government to implement the indigenisation decree was the 
establishment of the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Indus¬ 
try. The bank's main functions include: 
1. Financing Nigerians' purchases of foreign-owned 
companies. 
2. Acting as the "buyer of last resort" of shares 
of foreign-owned companies of which no immediate 
Ill 
Nigerian buyer could be found. 
3. Making commercial loans to the newly Nigerianized 
businesses to ease cash flow problems which were 
expected to arise during the transition period. 
The bank's regulations require purchasers of busi¬ 
nesses to put up 30 percent of the price. The bank will not 
acquire more than 40 percent interest in any company nor 
2 
make a loan of under N20,000. Besides the Nigerian Bank of 
Commerce and Industries, private commercial banks were also 
encouraged to make loans to "deserving" Nigerians who sought 
to assume ownership of existing enterprises or start new 
3 ones . 
Problems of Implementation 
Since 1972 Nigeria adopted indigenisation plans as 
a strategy of accelerating economic independence. The plans 
appear "excellent" since they were drawn up with expert 
assistance. Yet the magnitude of economic, industrial and 
social development which the indigenisation plans were to 
make possible has not been realized. The planning process 
involved political decision makers and their technical 
p 
Nigerian Business Digest, (November) 1973, p. 8. 
A. E. Ekukinam, "Opening Address," Indigenisation: 
Proceedings of the 1974 Symposium, p. 2. 
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experts. But implementation of the plans posed problems and 
complexities and required several inputs of various kinds of 
resources which are often in short supply in an undeveloped 
country, such as Nigeria. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to identify 
and analyze some of the main problems which constrained the 
implementation of the indigenisation decree. These problems 
are related to contradictions in the decree itself, the role 
of government administration, indigenous skills and access to 
capital, the politics of the indigenisation measures, and 
political instability. 
Contradictions 
Inyang Eteng has pointed out some of the contradic- 
4 
tions of the indigenisation policy m Nigeria. These 
contradictions, he stressed, can more appropriately be tied 
to "Western ideology of development" and therefore have 
their roots from the firm belief by the Nigerian governments 
that "indigenisation will foster technological transfer from 
Western industrialized nations." Quoting Ominiyi Adewoye, 
the then Commissioner for Economic Development, Eteng argued 
4 
Inyang Eteng, "Indigenisation for Lumpen-Bourgeois 
Development in Nigeria," in Path to Nigerian Development, 
ed. Okwudiba Nnoli (London: Zed Press, 1981), pp. 217-240. 
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that the government's preoccupation with the indigenisation 
of the private sector was predicated on the issue of trans¬ 
fer of technology from the advanced industrialized nations 
to develop local technology. Eteng further points out that 
underlying the various arguments and "theories" of develop¬ 
ment and analyses of Nigeria's indigenisation problems are 
certain prevailing assumptions. Foremost among these as¬ 
sumptions is the belief that Nigeria would benefit from 
several decades of scientific and technological advances 
made by industrialized nations through massive technological 
importation, rather than establishing an autonomous science 
and technology base of its own. He argued that the capi¬ 
talist mode of investment and capital formation in Nigeria 
during the colonial and post-colonial era, as well as the 
role of multinational corporations in the Third World in 
general, suggest that indigenisation as an instrument for 
engineering development oriented technological transfer is a 
typical bourgeois myth.^ Thus it is largely argued that the 
continued underdevelopment of the Third World is the result 
of their continued incorporation as dependent satellites 
within the capitalist system. To this end, Frank points 
out that : 
5Ibid. 
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In reality, the new underdeveloped countries have since 
been incorporated and integrated into the single world 
embracing capitalist system, to whose development they 
contributed with cheap labor, raw materials or, in a 
word, with investible surplus capital. In this process 
—that is, in the process of capitalist development and 
of the economic development of the capitalist metropolis 
in Europe and North America—the social physiology of 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America has been totally and 
uniformly changed into what it is today, the structure 
of underdevelopment which was. . .created and still is 
consolidated by the development and structure of the 
world capitalist system.^ 
Thus Eteng echoing Frank's point, argues that the 
assignment of a development role in Nigeria to foreign 
technology is based on erroneous assumption by Nigerian 
leaders. Furthermore he emphasizes that since international 
mobility of monopoly capital is primarily guided by the 
search for higher profits, the scientific and technological 
underdevelopment of non-industrialized countries normally 
renders them easily susceptible to capitalist manipulation 
and exploitation. 
In this regard, technologies imported into Nigeria from 
Western capitalist countries have generally included 
obsolete and scrapped materials, often repainted and 
then exported as newly-manufactured equipment; machinery 
which is often inappropriate for the prevailing ecolog¬ 
ical, adaphic and tenurial conditions in Nigeria; 
equipment which perpetrates existing contradictions 
between the country's urban growth enclaves and impov¬ 
erished rural areas; technologies which enable controlling 
^Andre Gunder Frank, Latin America; Underdevelopment 
or Revolution? (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 
p. 128. 
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foreign interests to take full advantage of the govern¬ 
ment's ultra-liberal incentives and concessions usually 
designed to safeguard foreign establishments incor¬ 
porated in Nigeria against stiff external competition; 
foreign patented, low-cost capital goods generally in¬ 
vested in high profit but low capital formation ven¬ 
tures (assembling, processing, packing, distribution 
and other import substitution establishments), and 
consumer durables like radios, television sets, ve¬ 
hicles, etc. which are frequently subject to inelastic 
demand and whose increased importation. . .has contri¬ 
buted immensely to the country's present trade 
imbalance and foreign reserve depletion; and capital 
goods which facilitate the diversification of foreign 
investments in order to avoid or contain local 
7 competition. 
Eteng continues : 
There are several (other) deleterous consequences which 
result from Nigeria's continued dependence on foreign, 
particularly Western technology; these are often 
glossed over by the country's policy-makers. They in¬ 
clude the inextricable subjection of Nigerian skilled 
workers to the dictates of foreign technology required 
by externally-oriented work organizations operating in 
Nigeria; the constant depletion of Nigeria's scarce 
resources, especially foreign reserve, partly due to 
the high cost of imported equipments and high interest 
rates on foreign loans borrowed to finance the impor¬ 
tation of expensive mechanical equipment; the subjec¬ 
tion of Nigeria's educational, scientific and general 
research and services orientations to the restrictive 
logic of foreign science and technology; the continued 
dependence of local industries, including the completely 
indigenized ones on foreign material and human inputs 
required by foreign technology, thus creating booming 
markets not only for the imported technologies and spare 
parts but also for the foreign resources required to 
operate them. . .8 
7 
Eteng, "Indigenisation for Lumpen-Bourgeois," p. 228. 
8Ibid. 
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In the colonial days, the traditional pattern of 
economic relationships in Nigeria in particular (and Africa 
in general) were largely destroyed and in their place were 
created satellite economies whose primary function was the 
production of one or a few cash crops or raw materials for 
export to the colonial mother country. Today, despite all 
the policies designed toward economic independence, African 
economies are still largely tied to outside control and open 
to exploitation. Under colonialism, Africa was opened up to 
foreign investors anxious to make quick profit on their in¬ 
vestment. As a result, foreign investment is today still an 
important feature of the economies of all countries of 
Africa. In spite of the fact that the impact of these 
foreign investments have not led to the industrial develop¬ 
ment of African economies, but rather to continued structural 
imbalance and external dependence of the economies, little 
or nothing is being done to change the situation. The few 
changes (if any) that have taken place are only mere window 
dressing, designed in fact to open African economies to dif¬ 
ferent forms of exploitation. As Giovanni Arrighi has 
pointed out, a new pattern of foreign investment and conse¬ 
quently exploitation has emerged in Africa in recent years. 
He writes: 
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The upshot of these changes has been the emergence of 
a new pattern of foreign investment in which financial 
and merchant interests and small-scale capital (mainly 
in agriculture but also in secondary and tertiary 
industries) have declined in importance relative to 
large scale manufacturing and vertically integrated 
mining concerns. The typical expatriate firm operat¬ 
ing in Tropical Africa is more and more what has been 
called the multinational corporation or the 'great 
territorial unit,1 i.e., an organized ensemble of 
means of production subject to a small policy-making 
center which controls establishments situated in 
several different national territories.^ 
In Nigeria, indigenisation was no real and obvious 
solution to the problem of dependence. Nigeria's indigeni¬ 
sation policy was purportedly designed to effect the trans- 
fering of control over small-scale businesses to Nigerian 
entrepreneurs; reduce the incidence of profit repatriation 
by foreign investors operating in the country; effect the 
transfer of technology and managerial expertise to Nigerians 
and raise the level of goods production in the country. But 
in the same breath, Nigeria's economic policy has been an 
open door one—a policy that contradicts the purpose of the 
indigenisation decree. 
Some few years after the decree became operational, 
there was expressed satisfaction that the decree was 
^Giovanni Arrighi, "International Corporation, Labor 
Aristocracies, and Economic Development in Africa," in 
Imperialism and Underdevelopment, ed. Robert T. Rhodes (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 225. 
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successful judging from the degree of compliance. According 
to government source, of 306 businesses under schedule one, 
about 237 complied, and similarly, of 628 businesses under 
schedule two an estimated 503 also complied.By 1975, 
evidence showed the contrary. Government's initial claims 
of high degree of compliance were highly exaggerated. The 
government itself was forced to appoint a high-powered 
Industrial Enterprises Panel to look into the indigenisation 
exercise. The panel confirmed that the 1972 indigenisation 
program failed woefully with regard to national policies and 
objectives.^ It particularly noted that besides many 
defects in the indigenisation decree, foreigners with the 
collaboration of Nigerians used various devices to circum¬ 
vent provisions of the decree. 
Pronouncements by high government officials at home 
and abroad have also contradicted to a very large extent, the 
12 
intent of the decree. Bade Onimode has pointed out several 
■*-°Ekukinam, "Opening Address," pp. 1-2. 
"'■'''Editorial Comments, "Majority without Control," 
Business Times, 19 July 1977, p. 3; "Failure of Phase I," 
Business Times, 10 August 1976, p. 3; Akintunde Asalu, 
"People ' s Capitalism, " Business Times, 22 February 1977 , pp. 3 & 5 . 
12 
See statement by General Yakubu Gowon, quoted in 
Nigerian Capitalism, ed. Sayre P. Schatz (Los Angeles: Uni¬ 
versity of California Press, 1977), p. 41; Joseph Garba, 
Africa Research Bulletin, July 15-Aug. 14, 1976, pp. 3973-3974. 
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contradictions in the Nigerian indigenisation policy. He 
argued that such pro-imperialist policies as the so-called 
"open door" policy on foreign investment, foreign trade 
links with capitalist countries, reliance on capitalist 
"aid," cultural subservience to imperialism, and the general 
choice of capitalist development strategy, in spite of its 
empirical disaster every where in the Third World are con¬ 
tradictory to the indigenisation decree. He went on: 
The indigenisation exercises were financed by the 
State's Bank for Commerce and Industry and the Nigerian 
Development Bank, as well as other public and imperial¬ 
ist banks. The ambivalence towards the imperialist 
bourgeoisie emerges clearly in these indigenisation 
programs, which in 1972 were to exclude, the imperialist 
monopoly firms in crucial sectors of the economy; these 
were half-heartedly implemented and even in 1976 con¬ 
sistently fell short of a total takeover of the major 
foreign enterprises. . . . Another ambivalence. . .in¬ 
volved the commitment to free inflow of foreign capital 
under fiscal incentives and the export of national 
surplus overseas.^ 
Indigenisation, a creature of the Second National 
Development Plan, was based on a strong and assertive exprès 
sion of nationalism, it was a decision taken to free the 
country from dependence upon foreign investors. To quote a 
passage from the Second National Development Plan: 
Experience has shown through history, that political 
independence without economic independence is but an 
13 Bade Onimode, "Class Struggle as a Reality of Niger 
ian Development," in Path to Nigeria, ed. Nnoli, p. 179. 
120 
empty shell. . . . The interests of foreign private 
investors in the Nigerian economy cannot be expected 
to coincide at all times and in every respect with 
national aspirations. . .a truly independent nation 
cannot allow its objectives and priorities to be dis¬ 
torted or frustrated by manipulations of powerful 
foreign investors.^ 
There were fierce national yearnings for far greater "econ¬ 
omic independence," but these were diluted by the continued 
and intensified internationalist or dependent tendency. 
Indigenisation constituted the means of increasing the 
Nigerian role in the private sector of the Nigerian economy, 
and despite it, foreign businesses were relied upon for the 
major share of private investment during the Third Plan 
period, and particularly for the more development-propelling 
investments. 
Government Administration 
Perhaps one of the most intractable problems of the 
indigenisation implementation is the one posed by inadequate 
organizational resources. This lack is reflected in the 
shortages of all levels of manpower, poor organizational co¬ 
ordination and the inability of organizational structures to 
adapt to the spirit of a given policy such as the indigeni¬ 
sation plan. 
14 
See Second National Development Plan, p. 289. 
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In Nigeria, there is a short-fall in the supply of 
trained and experienced manpower at management, professional 
and intermediate levels. This shortage of management staff 
which affects both the federal and state governments posed 
a great set back to plan implementation. As the economic 
and planning functions of the federal and state governments 
have substantially increased, the federal and state services 
required therefore the availability of more dedicated 
administrative "entrepreneurs" who are experts in combining 
development inputs in innovative ways, in order to translate 
the ob j ectives contained in paper plans into concrete 
achievements. But there is a dearth of such innovative and 
dedicated administrative entrepreneurs in the Nigerian 
federal and state governments. The catalog of failures in 
various projects and programs that have to do with the 
nation's economic development attests to the fact that the 
problem of lack of dedication, experience and innovativeness 
is pervasive.^ The permanent secretaries and other high 
ranking state and federal functionaries who constitute the 
bulk of "administrative entrepreneurs" by their training and 
experience lack the expertise and most importantly, the 
15 
Nigeria's major parastatals such as Nigerian Ports 
Authority, Nigerian Railways, Nigerian Airways, etc. are in 
one form or another managed by foreigners . 
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orientation which implementation and management of such 
technical projects as vehicle assembly plants, petro¬ 
chemical industries and liquefied gas call for. The prob¬ 
lems are even compounded by such constraints as pressures on 
these functionaries by friends, relatives, ethnic affiliates 
and townspeople to disregard or sidetrack rules and regula¬ 
tions in order to extend to them favors such as employment 
and contracts.^ Yielding to such pressures has a telling 
effect on the efficiency and effectiveness of government 
administration in any given situation. 
The implementation of programs is further constrained 
by the fragmentation which exists in the internal structure 
of both federal and state civil services. The civil services 
are divided into various conflicting groups such as adminis¬ 
trative, professional, intermediate and lower groups. There 
is further polarization into senior and junior civil ser¬ 
vants. These internal divisions and conflicts inhibit co¬ 
ordination . They do not facilitate the role of the civil 
services as coherent organizations engaged in a cooperative 
national action in order to achieve societal objectives. 
Besides, the machinery charged with implementation is 
16 
See Africa Today, Vol. 24, No. 4, October-December, 
1977, p. 31. 
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characterized by a high degree of centralization to the 
Federal Enterprises Promotion Board in Lagos. As a result, 
the processing of applications for the purpose of enter¬ 
prises takes a considerable time given Nigerian attitude to 
work. Also, some of the ambiguities in the Decree have 
necessitated State Enterprises Promotion Committees to refer 
individual cases to Lagos. Tardiness in the state level to 
inform indigenous businessmen about opportunities has been 
a common phenomenon that one would attribute to poor admin¬ 
istration . 
The most threatening problem which can have adverse 
effect on government administration in the implementation 
of a given program is corruption. Unfortunately, corruption 
is a widespread malaise in Nigeria, to the extent that it is 
practiced virtually in all government institutions and by 
functionaries at every level. Even at the village level, it 
is commonly practiced, though with less of the sophistication 
of the city. For instance, a village farmer or fisherman 
may take a keg of palm-wine and some yam or fish to a local 
chief in order to influence him to decide a case in his 
favor. Even relatives of a very sick person will give "kola" 
to a doctor in order to get him to attend to their sick. An 
entire community may give "kola" in the form of a goat or 
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cow to influence the location of a government project or 
institution in their area. Similarly a foreign business 
could give "dash" to keep officials from taking prompt and 
effective action to implement the decree. The dismissal of 
a large number of public officials for corruption (including 
state governors, head of federal and state ministries and 
departments, army officers, customs officers, police offi¬ 
cers, etc.) in 1975 when General Murtala Muhammed took 
office, illustrate how the "disease" is endemic in the 
17 
Nigerian society. Incidence of corruption in government 
institutions leads to organizational goal displacement. In 
pursuit of private goals, public officials in public insti¬ 
tutions form cliques and informal groups in order to maxi¬ 
mize their benefits at the expense of the attainment of 
institutional goals. To a large extent, some of the prob¬ 
lems of implementation of Nigeria's indigenisation program 
were caused by corruption which rendered government admin¬ 
istrative machineries much less efficient and effective. 
Indigenous Skills 
The problems of unskilled labor in Africa as a whole 
17 
The dismissals by the Muhammed government were re¬ 
ported widely in both local and foreign newspapers : See for 
example, The Nigerian Sunday Times, Sept. 28, 1975, p. 1; 
and, also, the New York Times, Feb. 15, 1976, p. 1. 
125 
is so pervasive that it is not however peculiar to just one 
country. It is a problem that contributes to Africa's con¬ 
tinued dependence and underdevelopment. Peter Kilby has 
concluded that a number of problems are commonly respon¬ 
sible for impeding the progress of industrialization in 
Africa. These include problems of labor recruitment, 
partial commitment to wage-earning, adverse effect of labor 
migration, impaired capacity as a result of excessive 
absenteeism, and barriers to the development of a skilled 
18 
labor force as a result of labor instability. 
Besides those factors outlined above, African labor 
productivity is adversely affected partly because of mana¬ 
gerial and supervisory deficiencies, and partly because of 
inexperience, illiteracy, language problems which hamper 
communication with fellow nationals of different ethnic 
19 
groups, inter-tribal friction, debilitating diseases, etc. 
High-level manpower constitutes a serious problem and 
skilled labor is in short supply because of deficiencies in 
18 
Peter Kilby, "African Labor Productivity Reconsid¬ 
ered, " Economic Journal LXXI:282 (June 1961): 273-291. 
19 
See West Africa, 8 March 1976, p. 322, and 26 Janu¬ 
ary 1976, p. 122. Also see Yesufu "Employment, Manpower and 
Economic Development in Nigeria: Some Issues of the Moment," 
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies XVI : 1 (March 
1974) : 58. 
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training, education and the societal problems mentioned 
20 
earlier on. Supervisory and managerial personnel involve 
an even more serious problem. "With few exceptions among 
firms employing over twenty-five people, the inadequacy of 
Nigerian supervisory performance was reported by management 
21 
to be their chief problem in the labor field." 
One of the greatest problems that faced the imple¬ 
mentation exercise of the Nigerian indigenisation decree was 
the lack of skilled manpower, know-how, dedication and im¬ 
personality for the operation of the businesses to be 
indigenized. The sad nature of some of the problems is 
illustrated by the experience of an electronics firm in 
Lagos. Their production was interrupted by their production 
control supervisor who, after several quarrels with the fore 
22 man, petulantly withheld parts from the assembly line. As 
for Nigerian managerial personnel, there is virtually uni¬ 
versal testimony by businessmen, indigenous and foreign, as 
well as by scholars, that it is deficient in supply and 
20 Yesufu, "Economic Development in Nigeria," p. 57. 
21 Peter Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 224. 
22 Robert Waite, "Establishing an Electronics Industry 
in Nigeria," (MBA thesis, New York University, 1964), p. 104 
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23 
inadequate in quality. Overseas sources of high-level 
personnel are often resorted to, and this has hampered the 
progress of the implementation of the indigenisation pro¬ 
gram . 
Access to Capital 
Indigenisation policy could presumably function as 
an instrument of economic growth as well as economic devel¬ 
opment—one which would allow Nigerians to share in their 
country's economic growth. If operated at its best, indi¬ 
genisation could make it possible for the working class and 
others to be absorbed into the ownership class. But this 
has not been possible in Nigeria because of the highly 
pervasive rate of poverty, illiteracy, unskilled manpower 
and most of all corruption. These problems have made it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible for a preponderance 
of Nigerians to gain access to capital that would enable 
them to participate in the indigenisation exercise. This 
situation therefore make the process of implementation dif¬ 
ficult in that because only a microscopic few could gain 
access to resources necessary to take over foreign 
2 3 Wayne Nafziger, "Nigerian Entrepreneurship: A Study 
of Indigenous Businessmen in the Footwear Industry" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Illinois, 1967), pp. 149-150. 
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enterprises, indigenisation became a less meaningful re¬ 
distributive tool of economic opportunities in the country. 
Rather it replaced foreign monopolists with a new class of 
domestic imperialists made up of the ruling group and its 
petty bourgeois allies in government, private sector, cor¬ 
porations, armed forces, the police and universities. 
It has been argued that indigenisation was a class 
thing since it virtually excluded the majority of the 
Nigerian population, and since the government refused to 
socialize or undertake the purchase of foreign enterprises 
24 
on behalf of the generality of the population. Given that 
the government included the majority of the Nigerian popu¬ 
lation or purchased foreign enterprises on behalf of the 
total population, the problem of redistribution would still 
be very great. If on the other hand, after purchasing the 
enterprises, the government succeeded in redistributing them 
among the general population, a great majority of recipients 
would not have the know-how and other resources to manage 
and maintain a given business. Even the bourgeois groups 
who benefitted from the indigenisation program did not 
24 
R. H. Green, "Political Independence and the Na¬ 
tional Economy," in African Perspective, eds. C. Allen and 
R. W. Johnson (Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 306- 
307 . 
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present a success story as Table 2 shows. The share of ex- 
par iates in total share-capital, as shown in the table, 
tells the story of how the indigenisation program failed to 
Table 2 
SOURCES OF SHARE CAPITAL IN NIGERIAN REGISTERED 












1 146 113 259 56 .4 43.6 100 
1 - 1,000 267 418 683 39.0 61.1 100 
1,001 - 5,000 182 193 375 48.5 51.5 100 
5,001 - 10,000 62 124 186 33.3 66 .7 100 
10,001 - 20,000 46 82 128 35.9 64.1 100 
20,001 - 50,000 47 128 175 27.9 73.2 100 
50,001 - 100,000 28 80 108 25.9 74.1 100 
Above 100,000 43 120 168 26.4 73 .6 100 
Total 821 1,258 2,079 39.5 60 .4 100 
Source: O. Teriba, et al, "Some Aspects of Ownership and 
Control Structure of Business Enterprise in a 
Developing Economy: The Nigerian Case, " Nigerian 
Journal of Economic and Social Studies 14:1 (1972). 
The shares of expatriates and Nigerians in total 
share-capital in Table 2 show that the larger the capital 
investment, the greater the foreign share, which varies 
between 51 and 74 percent for shares over 1,000 pounds. 
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achieve its desired goal given the resources or (lack of 
resources) available to the great majority of Nigerians to 
acquire shares. As a result Nigerians participated more in 
areas of less capital investments. The bigger and more 
lucrative the area of capital investment, the greater 
foreign shares. 
The Politics of Indigenisation 
One of the many problems that impeded the implemen¬ 
tation process of the Nigerian Indigenisation Decree was the 
politics it generated. The implementation exercise gave 
rise to the articulation of conflicts among various levels 
and sections of Nigerian society. As Green points out: 
It seems abundantly clear that neither laissez-faire 
nor ad hoc 'pragmatic' intervention in the support of 
private enterprise will lead very far toward the at¬ 
tainment of economic independence. . . .Ad hoc inter¬ 
ventionism on a case by case basis is likely to be 
inefficient and often inconsistent. It opens up a 
plethora of avenues for individual interest groups to 
distort resource allocation to their particular benefit, 
and for the inculcation of widespread corruption to a 
degree that leads to massive resources misallocation.^5 
The conflict of interests that had been articulated in the 
course of the indigenisation exercise has also sectional and 
geographical base. Political rivalry between states became 
25 
Eteng, "Indigenisation for Lumper-Bourgeois," 
224. 
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a factor for indigenisation program to reckon with. Indi- 
genisation rekindled the fire of the fear of political and 
economic dominance by one state over another. There was 
also the old politics of North-South polarization and a re¬ 
newed fear by the Northern states of Southern industrial and 
commercial "imperialism." These fears culminated in some 
state governments buying up shares or acquiring businesses 
to block the chances of "outsiders" filling any vacuum that 
otherwise would have been created by the inability of state 
origins to acquire businesses. 
One of the expressed goals of development plans in 
Nigeria was the creation of a just and egalitarian society. 
But the implementation of the indigenisation policy did not 
fulfill that objective, rather it aggravated class politics. 
Eteng has this to say: 
. . .It is an historical and holistic fallacy to assume 
that indigenisation as an economic program has no social 
and political implications, even when its consequences 
for entrenching class distinctions are relatively ob¬ 
vious. After all, the assumption of political authority 
by the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie. . .rather than eli¬ 
minating social equalities and their attendant class 
antagonisms, has intensified these tendencies. . 
The elite class in the public and private services 




others, by forming associations and making or influencing 
government policies through which it can successfully main¬ 
tain the status quo. The elite class take decisions af¬ 
fecting the lives of the majority of the people without 
their consent (in most instances), because the masses of the 
people are illiterate, poor and therefore powerless. 
Nigeria's development continues within an ethnic/ 
elite framework. This framework is reinforced by biased 
employment which is operated by both the public and private 
sectors of the economy. This development has left a large 
gap between the few who are able to possess the means of 
advancing themselves through their ethnic ties, education, 
occupation, political power and wealth; and the many who are 
not able to employ those stepping stones for their benefit. 
The experience of Nigeria in the First Republic in particu¬ 
lar, and most recently of the politics and conflicts of 
interests that the indigenisation exercise generated, con¬ 
firms that ethnicity is used as an instrument of unequal 
political and socio-economic development in the country. Be¬ 
cause the Nigerian society is made up of several ethnic groups, 
each of the major groups ban together to advance its own 
interests. The other groups who lack economic and political 
power relative to those of the major groups face unequal 
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treatment, supression and oppression in all national 
activities. Because ethnicity is so dominant and emphasized, 
the Nigerian elite class itself is therefore not homogeneous. 
Ethnicity hence becomes a much more serious problem than 
class in the Nigerian society. It is a formidable phenome¬ 
non which prevents an equitable and just distribution of 
opportunities in Nigeria, thereby promoting and encouraging 
the politics of "survival of the fittest." 
Instability 
One last but very outstanding problem that faces 
Third World countries in the implementation of their policies 
is instability. Disorganization, dislocation, breakdown, re¬ 
gression, coups, countercoups, border conflicts, civil wars— 
words such as these constitute the vocabulary of Third World 
politics. Eisenstadt has maintained that the major problem 
facing developing nations is the necessity to develop an 
27 
institutional structure capable of preventing instability. 
Rivkin argues that "the endemic political instability, the 
widespread economic stagnation, and epidemic in military 
coups d'etat. . .are direct manifestations of African 
27 Samuel Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and 
Change (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. v. 
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institutional problem." 
Most of the problems encountered by African coun¬ 
tries in the implementation of their policy programs could 
be as a result of unstable systems. A nation that has ex¬ 
perienced series of coups, rebellions, civil wars, racial 
conflagration, riots, etc., would find it difficult to carry 
out its economic programs successfully. 
Between 1960 and 1980 (the period covered in this 
study), Nigeria experienced most of the conditions mentioned 
above. There were coups, countercoups, coup attempts, border 
conflicts between neighboring states and/or between ethnic 
groups, etc. Whenever there was a successful coup, there 
was a change of government; and a change of government more 
often than not affected implementation processes of already 
adopted policies. 
The indigenisation decree itself was promulgated 
shortly after Nigeria had just ended a civil war, and the 
process of rehabilitation, reconciliation and reconstruction 
was still a problem to reckon with. This type of situation 
adversely affected efficient and effective implementation of 
the program. The changes of governments within the period 
2 8 
Arnold Rivkin, ed., Nations by Design (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1968), pp. xii-xiii. 
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were particularly disruptive to implementation exercise of 
the indigenisation program in that many officials because of 
the violence that accompanied such changes either fled the 
country, were killed, or fired by the new government. For 
example, the Mohammed regime fired several government func¬ 
tionaries across the country on assumption of office. Many 
who were involved in the indigenisation implementation 
process were affected. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate four major 
points. These are: (1) the problems encountered in the 
process of implementation of indigenisation because of con¬ 
tradictions present in the policy; (2) the importance of 
the role of government administration and how its ill- 
equipped, ill-manned establishments impact adversely the 
implementation exercise; (3) lack of adequate manpower and 
skills plus inaccessibility to capital that pose serious 
problems to successful implementation; and (4) the promulga¬ 
tion of the decree itself that gave birth to conflicts of 
interests among various sections of the Nigerian society, 
and between levels of governments. 
It was indicated that the four factors played a 
crucially adverse role in the course of the implementation 
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of the indigenisation policy. Most significantly, it was 
argued that the problems of implementation were exacerbated 
largely by the absence of a large indigenous entrepreneurial 
class capable of undertaking a serious and patriotic economic 
transformation of the Nigerian society. And that besides, 
many indigenous entrepreneurs suffer from lack of capital 
or capital shortage (especially "working" capital) and this 
affect their performance adversely. It was also argued that 
ethnicity was an impeding factor in the implementation pro¬ 
cess . 
This chapter has also given a brief outline of the 
socio-economic and political backdrop of indigenisation. 
The Nigerian political economy is characterized by extreme 
dependence on mineral exports, the tremendous role of state 
capitalism in economic production and distribution, great 
social and economic inequalities. Indigenisation, it was 
argued has not made any pronounced dent on these features. 
Instead, they seem to have become accentuated in recent years. 
The next chapter will outline measures as established 
by the decree for the implementation process. It will then 
look at such sectors of the economy as agriculture, manu¬ 
facturing, petroleum, trade and service industries with 
reference to the problems of implementation. 
CHAPTER VI 
MEASURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NIGERIAN 
ENTERPRISES PROMOTION DECREE 
In its broadest sense, the term "implementation 
measures" is used here in reference to all the steps taken 
with the intention of reducing or barring foreign participa¬ 
tion in the country's economic activities. It include also, 
the instruments of implementation discussed in chapter four. 
In a narrower sense, "implementation measures" means just 
those measures or provisions in the decree that specify 
guidelines for the implementation process. 
The 1977 Decree amended the earlier (1972) Decree, 
and so its provisions imply an important revision of the 
latter. For example, while the 1977 contained three schedules 
of businesses with 100, 60, and 40 percent Nigerian owner¬ 
ship, the 1972 decree had only two schedules with 100 and 40 
percent Nigerian ownership. Discussion on implementation in 
the rest of the chapter will be based on the 1977 Decree. 
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Sales and Transfers 
The decree provided that no enterprise which was 
being operated by aliens "shall be sold or in any manner 
transfered to Nigerian citizens or associations unless the 
terms and other conditions of and pertaining to the sale or 
transfer have been approved by the Enterprises Promotion 
Board.""*' It also specified that no foreign business could 
sell or in any way transfer shares to Nigerian citizens 
unless the approval of the Capital Issues Commission has been 
obtained. It went on to specify that in the event of any 
sale or transfer of enterprises or shares without the appro¬ 
priate approval, such sale or transfer "shall be void and 
2 
shall be of no effect." 
General Guidelines 
The decree established the following guidelines for 
the Board and other bodies created for the implementation 
3 
and administration of the indigenisation process: 
1. Beneficial ownership of the enterprises affected 
by the decree shall be as widespread as the 
^Decree 1977, Section 7, A22 . 
2 
Ibid., Section 10, A23. 
3 
Ibid., Section 11, A23. 
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circumstances of each case would justify, and 
deliberate efforts must be made to prevent the 
concentration of ownership in a few hands. 
2. Except in the case of owner-managers, no enter¬ 
prise should be sold or transfered to a single 
individual and in no case is a single individual 
to be allowed to have control of more than one 
enterprise. 
3. No person holding more than five percent of the 
equity of an enterprise should be alloted further 
portion of the equity in that enterprise. 
4. Consideration in a form acceptable to the Board 
or the Commission should pass from the transferee 
to the transferor or from the seller to the buyer 
in the case of transfer or sale of enterprises or 
shares. 
Offenses and Penalties 
The decree also specified the following as offenses 
4 
and penalties: 
1. Any alien who continued to be the owner or part 
owner of any enterprise in contravention of the 
4 . 
Ibid., Section 18, A26. 
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decree shall be deemed to have committed an of¬ 
fense and thus would be lawful for the Board to 
take over, sell or otherwise dispose of the 
enterprise, and distribute the proceeds to the 
proprietors or shareholders accordingly, or the 
Board may dispose of it in any such manner that 
it deemed necessary. 
2. Any person who acts as a front, or operates any 
business for or on behalf of any alien who is not 
permitted to operate the enterprise; disqualified 
from operating; and/or not permitted to own wholly 
or partly such enterprise shall be guilty of an 
offense and shall be liable upon conviction to a 
fine of N15,000 or imprisonment for 5 years or 
both. 
The decree made it unlawful for "any Nigerian 
citizen or association to employ, whether on full time or 
part time, any alien for the operation of any enterprise 
previously owned wholly or partly by that alien which the 
alien has disposed of, except with the prior approval of the 
Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs. . ." 
5 
Ibid., Section 17, Subsection 2, A26. 
5 
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So far we have briefly gone through some of the 
guidelines the decree set out for all the agencies and/or 
persons charged with the implementation of the indigenisa- 
tion policy. But before discussing the measures, a brief 
survey of some of the important sectors of the Nigerian 
economy will be made to determine the impact they had on 
indigenisation and its implementation. Lastly, we analyze 
implementation procedures and actions vis-a-vis the measures 
or guidelines with reference to political significance, 
private/public acquisition of business, types of businesses 
acquired, and categories of recipients. 
Agriculture 
At the time of independence in 1960, Nigeria's GDP 
was estimated at N2493.4 million, with a bulk of 64 percent 
from agriculture, forestry and fishing. Other areas of 
economic activities contributed the remaining 36 percent. 
These were from mining and quarrying, manufacturing, craft, 
etc., which means about two thirds of Nigeria's Gross 
Domestic Product were derived from agricultural related 
activities . 
By the turn of the decade, Nigeria had witnessed a 
dramatic fall in its domestic product from agriculture. 
Around the middle of the 1970s, agriculture generated only 
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about 22.6 percent of the total GDP, while mining activities 
and quarrying contributed about 44.6 percent (see table 2). 
Agriculture though uses most of the country's work-force, 
produces less than one-fourth of the national income. 
Traditional agricultural exports have been mainly groundnuts 
(peanuts), cocoa palm kernels, palm oil, cotton and rubber. 
But exports of most of these have fallen considerably. 
Groundnut exports dropped from 200,000 tons in 1973 to 
almost zero. Palm kernels also plummeted from 242,000 tons 
in 1971 to 137,000 tons in 1973. As for palm oil and cotton 
exports, by 1974 they had disappeared. Rubber export also 
fell dramatically from the height of 50,000 tons to 39,000 
in 1976.6 
In the late 1960's Nigeria had about 11 million 
heads of cattle, 25 million sheep, 21.5 million goats, 
7 
66 million chickens and 300,000 pigs. Today the country 
imports meat and various items of food for local consumption 
because its agriculture has barely expanded beyond the 1960 
^"Nigeria: Africa's Economic Giant," Business Inter¬ 
national (January 1979): 23. 
^Tims Wouter, World Bank Country Economic Report: 
Options for Long-Term Development—Nigeria (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 128. 
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g 
level. While the population of Nigeria has almost doubled 
9 
since the 1960's (55 million in 1963 to 80 million), agri¬ 
culture has not developed at the same pace, thereby making 
the country depend to a large extent on imported food. 
Some of the contributory factors to the persistently 
sluggish and almost static state of growth in agriculture 
have been drought in the Northern states where most of the 
grains in the country are produced, and the fact that agri¬ 
culture is left almost entirely to be developed by peasant 
farmers with very little or no state assistance. A few 
plantations of mainly export crops, such as cocoa, palm 
kernels, palm oils, rubber, etc. were originally established 
by foreign trading companies, government and a very few 
indigenous private businesses.^ 
Manufacturing 
Nigeria's manufacturing enterprise is still in an 
early stage of development. However, its impact is felt in 
the economy, even though it accounts for a very small 
Q 
The Deutsche Bank, "The Financial Report on 
Nigeria, 1975 . " 
g 
Federal Office of Statistics, Agricultural Sample 
Survey Bulletins, Nos. 4 and 5, and Rural Economic Survey, 
Lagos, 1973. 
10 
Central Bank Monthly Report, 1977. 
144 
percentage of the overall economy as compared to light 
industries and consumer goods (see table 2). The table also 
reveals pronounced changes in the relative importance of dif¬ 
ferent industries since 1972. Though beer and textiles head 
the list, soaps and detergents and soft drinks also hold 
important shares. In the other sectors, auto assembly and 
pharmaceuticals reveal a fast growth trend. The rise in 
ownership of both private and commercial vehicles attest to 
the trend. For instance, according to the Central Bank 
Report, the total number of vehicles rose by 58 percent in 
1977.^ Since the objective was to sell as many locally 
assembled vehicles as possible, the government took steps 
to protect the auto industry from foreign competition by 
restricting importation. But Nigerians taste for imported 
goods, coupled with the unfortunate poor quality of the 
locally assembled vehicles made the measures less effective. 
Rather, the measures precipitated an unprecedented wave of 
smuggling and corruption (especially in the Customs and 
Excise Department). As the "smuggling industry" thrived on 
non-payment of customs duties, the government suffered from 
loss of income. As one writer put it: 
■'""LJosef Omorotionwan, "Over-indigenisation and Its 
Problems" Daily Times, Saturday, 16 January 1982, p. 2. 
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Any time you ban the importation of any commodity which 
the people desire, you succeed in securing a kind of 
monopoly profit for the entrepreneur who is willing to 
break the law. In fact all the smuggler is told is, 
we shall create a barrier to entry into this line of 
trade by making it illegal, and therefore, very risky. 
As long as you are ready to bear the risk, you will be 
protected from the competition of those who are not 
willing to do so, but don't get caught.^ 
In the Nigerian scene, getting caught does not make much 
difference to the "smuggler—entrepreneurs," who are highly 
revered among high government officials. 
Besides the problems of smuggling, corruption and 
poor performance of local producers, the manufacturing 
industry per se still has a long way to go. Manufacturing 
still only represented 8 percent of the GDP which compared 
unfavorably with many developing countries whose manufac¬ 
turing sectors stood at between 15 and 20 percent. Nigeria 
has virtually no engineering industry and few of the sub¬ 
sectors that go with such an industry. The sector is 
dominated by assembly activities while its import content is 
high. There are a number of constraints upon this sector, 




nology Transfer (New York: 
Capital Accumulation and Tech- 
Praeger, 1975), p. 4. 
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The improvement of the infrastructure is vital to 
the development of heavy industry. Because of shortage of 
industrial manpower, the government has despite indigenisa- 
tion sought to attract foreign investors and expertise to 
help establish manufacturing industries for local consump¬ 
tion and export. 
The manufacturing industry has remained remarkably 
small so far because industrialization has consisted of 
topping up and finishing products that have substantially 
been made elsewhere. Foreign private investment "remains 
13 
the life-line of the Nigerian manufacturing industries..." 
One other problem in the manufacturing sector is that it is 
"still largely characterized by high-tariff, high-cost 
industrial structure dominated by a few consumer goods, 
geographical concentration in few cities, low technology and 
14 
low labor absorption." Although demands for most manu¬ 
factured goods are not met by local production, and there 
are serious shortage of most basic commodities, there are 
import restrictions due to government attempts to conserve 
13 
Oyeleye Oyediran, Nigerian Government and Politics 
Under Military Rule (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 
p . 58 . 
14 
Nigeria," Business International, p. 38. 
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foreign exchange. Some imports have been absolutely pro¬ 
hibited such as beer bottles and all cars above 2,500 cc 
engine capacity. Others such as carpets, furniture, canned 
beer, soft drinks and passenger cars of 2,000—2,500 cc 
engine capacity can only be imported under license. And 
cars within this range will attract a 150 percent duty. 
Other internal measures such as the indigenisation 
exercise and other curbs on foreign businesses have dis¬ 
couraged long-term new investment in the manufacturing 
plants or the expansion of existing ones. Inflation has 
also taken its toll in the economy. Foreign investments 
tend therefore to continue to concentrate in lucrative areas 
of activities. Manufactured items tend more and more to 
correspond closely with the items of similar goods imported. 
They appear to be mainly manufactured overseas and merely 
assembled in Nigeria. There are however few exceptions in 
which the raw materials are manufactured locally, namely, 
rubber, tobacco, food, drinks, etc. The largest manufactur¬ 
ing items are food, drinks and tobacco. These have main¬ 
tained about 30 percent share of the Nigerian market for 
several years. Textile manufacture expanded in the early 
1960's to the 1970's, with tax incentives and import duty 
relief on imported yarn until it commanded 16 percent of 
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the sector. Other fast growing areas are clothing and foot¬ 
wear, paper products and metal goods. 
Nigeria's industries are located in a few principal 
towns and cities. Growth has therefore not spread beyond 
the urban centers. 
Petroleum 
Oil drilling in Nigeria could be traced as far back 
as 1937. However, it was not until in the 1960's that the 
oil wealth of Nigeria started to attract world attention. 
By the early part of the 1970's, many more oil prospecting 
companies had entered the oil business in Nigeria. To ap¬ 
preciate the rapid development of the oil industry in 
Nigeria, one only need to look at the following statistics: 
In 1964, Nigeria produced 43.9 million barrels and realized 
N64 million from the sale of 43.4 million barrels. In 1973, 
the production increased more than ten times to 750.6 
million barrels. Out of this, 752.1 million barrels were 
exported for Nl,841.7 million. By 1976, with out-put run¬ 
ning at over two million barrels per day, oil revenue rose 
to N7.9 billion, accounting for 45 percent of the GDP.^ 
15 Digest of Statistxcs and Statement of Accounts, 
Vol. 21 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics, 1976). 
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The federal government oil revenue in 1964 was 
16 
N24.4 million and N3,792.4 million m 1976. Contributions 
17 
from oil to the GNP rose to N5,350 million in 1977. The 
federal government total revenue during the period was 
N6,765.9 million and N6,440.3 million or about 95 percent 
came from oil. The income from oil facilitated increasing 
public expenditure on infrastructural and social investment: 
roads, ports, communication, education and health. The oil 
revenue also largely contributed to the quick recovery from 
the civil war of 1967 to 1970. 
The oil industry has led to the development of such 
oil-related enterprises like gas, plastics, fertilizers, etc. 
It remains still in large part as an oil extracting industry. 
However, the industry spurred the federal government into 
taking such initiatives that led to the establishment of the 
refinery at Port Harcourt, and subsequently, two more at 
Warri and Kaduna. Oil revenue was also responsible for the 
federal government's bold venture as the establishment of the 
iron and steel mill at Ughelli and many other projects. 
^Central Bank of Nigeria, "Annual Report and State¬ 
ment of Accounts," Lagos, 1975. 
17 Federal Office of Statistics, "Annual Abstract of 
Statistics," Lagos, 1977, p. 77. 
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Some of these projects have been completed, while others are 
in advanced planning or construction stages. A liquified 
petroleum and gas plant at Bonny is one of the important pro¬ 
jects yet to take off. The oil income also stimulated rapid 
expansion of imports of consumer goods. There was not much 
increase or improvement in employment opportunities as a 
result of the booming oil industry. The reason being that 
the industry is capital and technology intensive. 
Trade 
Nigeria's trade has developed under what one would 
call the mercantilist principles. Trade is expected to 
promote economic growth directly. Most of the profits from 
trade are supposed to be used for further expansion and 
economic development generally. Similarly, a favorable 
balance in trade, is supposed to create a reserve of foreign 
exchange with which a country can increase its productive 
investments and its standard of living, or it can temporarily 
increase its standard of living by the purchase of more im¬ 
ports of consumer goods. It is considered also as a means 
of increasing productive potentials, in the long run, through 
investment in infrastructural development. 
Following these principles, the tremendous increase 
in oil production and revenue raised Nigeria's capacity for 
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public and private investment considerably during the period 
under study. The evidence is in the growth of the import 
and export trade. In the early 1960's, Nigeria's total ex¬ 
port was N420.9 million, made up primarily of 75 percent 
agricultural produce. Mineral export was only about 16 per¬ 
cent. Mineral exports however rose from N67.4 million in 
18 
1964 to N6,709.8 million in 1976-77. In 1979-80 oil alone 
19 
accounted for N7.9 billion. All non-oil sector trading 
recorded a deficit of N4,613.4 million. The sector alone 
20 
recorded a surplus of N6,183.5 million. Crude oil ac¬ 
counted for more than N6,281.1 million while non-oil exports 
accounted for only N428 million. Imports in 1964 were 
21 
N507.7 million and in 1976-77 they were N5,042.1 million. 
The increase in oil revenue made it easy and possible for 
Nigeria to increase its import bill and still have a favor¬ 
able balance trade. Agricultural exports fell in quantity 
while imports of agricultural commodities increased rapidly 
during the period, although Nigeria is predominantly an 





"Nigeria," Business International, p. 3 
Central Bank, Annual Report. 1980. 
Federal Office, Abstract of Statistics. 1977 . 
Central Bank, Annual Report. 1975 p. 60 . 
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22 engaged in agriculture. 
Service Industries 
Nigeria's services sector is fairly developed as 
compared to those of most African countries. Of the various 
service industries, distribution accounts for 6.9 percent of 
the GDP, transportation and communication for another 2.4 
percent. Other services like government, education and 
health together provide for 10.6 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (see table 3) . 
Banking is very important and crucial to any economy, 
and Nigeria's banking system, though still developing, is 
making some good progress. The central Bank heads a three¬ 
tiered banking structure. Of the various commercial banks, 
including Barclays and Standards with branches all across 
the country, indigenes can boast of a substantial number. 
There are also some merchant banks, government owned banks 
and a post office savings bank. 
The insurance system is another crucial area in the 
services industry. There are many companies doing insurance 
business in the country. These include such big names of 
2 2 Economic Commission for Africa, Statistical Yearbook 
Demographic and Social Statistics (New York, 1970), pp. 4-5. 
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Table 3 
STRUCTURE OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY 1976 
Origin of Goods 
and Services 
Domestic N billion 
Percentage 
of GNP 
Mining and Guarrying 6.89 44.6 
Agriculture 3.49 22.6 
Distribution 1.07 6.9 
Government 1.04 6.7 
Construction 0.94 6.1 
Manufacturing 0.75 4.9 
Education 0.45 2.9 
Transportation and 
Communic ation 0.37 2 .4 
Other Services 0.23 1.5 
Health 0.15 1.0 
Electricity and Water 0.06 0 .4 
Total GDP 15 .44 100.0 
Imports 
Total Goods and Services 
4.98 
20.42 
Allocation of Goods 
and Services N billion 
Percentage of 
Total Allocation 
Private Consumption 8.09 39.6 
Public Consumption 2.08 10.2 
Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 4.80 23.5 
Exports 5 .45 26.7 
Total Allocation 20.42 100.0 
Source: Business International Corporation, January, 1979. 
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the insurance world as C. T. Bowring, British American, 
Legal and General, Norwich Union, Royal Exchange, etc. 
Transport businesses are fairly numerous. There are 
however, very few printers and publishers, but there are a 
great many agents, wholesalers, general merchants, forward¬ 
ing, clearing and warehouse operations. Of the few super¬ 
market-store companies, Kingsway and Leventis operate nation 
wide. Advertising agencies and contractors are fairly numer 
ous. Building and civil-engineering contractors are among 
the most crucial organizations in this sector. Here, again, 
there are many international names such as Taylor Woodrow 
and Costain. 
There is in Nigeria, as it is elsewhere in Africa, 
the great emphasis on placing the economy firmly in the 
hands of indigenous citizens. Yet, the extent to which this 
is done has varied enormously from one area of economy to 
another, and one area of sensitivity to another. 
In our brief survey of some of the sectors of the 
Nigerian economy, we saw that these sectors are still 
directly or indirectly controlled by foreigners. Most of 
the enterprises allow for convenient quota systems to allow 
expatriate expertise and investment. To this end, a busines 
may bring in a high proportion (relative to its total 
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workforce) of expatriates. Thus, indigenisation in theory 
is often passed over in practice. Despite "indigenisation," 
the government wants to attract foreign investors and tech¬ 
nology to help "develop" the economy. 
Of utmost importance is perhaps the realm of indus¬ 
try where far too many decisions are made and taken by 
expatriates. Such decisions are more likely than not to be 
neo-colonial in form and shape. Thus, Oni and Onimode point 
out that: 
Imperialists now essentially make most decisions about 
what lines of industry to develop, the pricing of in¬ 
dustrial output as well as the overall direction of 
industrial growth. As a result of all these, indus¬ 
trial surplus gets appropriated by imperialists for 
overseas development. Fraudulent indigenisation is 
no solution to this neo-colonial domination.^ 
Indigenisation therefore, as sarcastically put by observers, 
only succeeded in entrenching Nigerians "to take over the 
sale of gari, palm oil, akara loaves, tuwo and other special¬ 




Ola Oni and Bade Onimode, Economic Development of 
Nigeria: The Socialist Alternative (Ibadan: Nigerian 
Academy of Arts, Science and Technology, 1975), p. 174. 
^Sunday Times, 3 August 1975, p. 5. 
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Implementation Measures 
In order to understand the administrative and 
political problems associated with the implementation mea¬ 
sures, it is useful to examine the nature of the Nigerian 
administrative process, and the principal features of the 
Nigerian administration. 
The authoritarianism of the military regimes, 
administrative ineptitude, and the generalized quest for 
rapid self enrichment at all levels of Nigerian society com¬ 
bined to create an atmosphere of administrative corruption 
and arbitrariness that reminds one of what Fred Riggs calls 
25 
"prismatic" administration. Riggs attributes the rise of 
"primatic" administration to the cultural clash between 
modernity and tradition. In the case of Nigeria, the main 
causes of this administrative phenomenon are to be found in 
the heterogenous nature of the Nigerian society where each 
group strives to maintain its cultural tradition alongside the 
efforts toward "modernization." 
According to Riggs, another characteristic of pris¬ 
matic administration, include ambiguity of laws, regulations 
? C 
Fred W. Riggs, Administration m Developing Coun¬ 
tries (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 4. 
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and rules and their corresponding enforcement- He calls 
this characteristic "double-talk." A further definition of 
prismatic administration can be extracted from Ntalaja 
Nzongola's study of the Zairian City of Kananga. In this 
study Nzongola found that many of the economic regulatory 
functions of the city administration were either not per¬ 
formed at all or only partially performed. Among the rea¬ 
sons for this "inefficiency" he points out, was the pressure 
from the higher authorities applied on the city officials 
"to spare their relatives and clients from the established 
2 6 
procedures and regulations." He found that the collection 
of license fees and taxes from businessmen, for instance, 
offered very good opportunities for city officials to enrich 
themselves. He writes: 
The interaction between collectors and traders resulted 
in a mutually-advantageous relationship by which par¬ 
tial tax evasion by the latter was made possible, while 
the former obtained the revenues needed to meet their 
superiors' goal of keeping the administrative machinery 
running and to satisfy some of their own private needs.27 
Nigerian government officials, in federal, state or local 
levels are no less "prismatic" in the exercise of their 
°Ntalaja Nzongola, "Urban Administration in Zaire: 
A Study of Kananga 1971-73" (Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Wisconsin, Madison, 1975), p. 67. 
27 Ibid. 
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duties than the officials of the city of Kananga. Studies 
of the implementation measures of the Nigerian Indigenisa- 
tion Decree have revealed the "Kananga" pattern. Guy 
Arnold found that: 
A good number of secret business deals were translated. 
There exists the subsequent belief in Nigeria that a 
new class of nouveaux riches may have been created by 
the process of indigenisation: top Nigerian executives 
in the expatriate companies bought in secret; not having 
to pay immediately; or close associates of the foreign 
businessmen did so, while some aliens remained undis¬ 
closed directors of the new companies. In some cases 
the state governments bought shares when companies went 
public; few Nigerians became share-holders as the com¬ 
panies changed hands.28 
Okwudiba Nnoli's "A Short History of Nigerian Underdevelop¬ 
ment" is also revealing. According to Nnoli: 
An increasingly important method of acquiring vested 
interests and wealth in the economy has been the com¬ 
prador elements' practice of inviting and joining 
foreign firms as junior partners, field representatives, 
or high executives. In this way they join the foreigners 
in their exploitation of national resources. Such prac¬ 
tices reached their most perfidious extremes in the 
cement scandal of 1974-75, when Nigerian businessmen 
colluded with foreigners to exploit the port congestion 
for the purposes of defrauding the country of large 
sums of money. But on a much lesser scale, through the 
receipt of commissions and the acceptance of positions 
in foreign firms, Nigerian compradors are carrying on 
the same practice legitimately. 9 
? ft Guy Arnold, Modern Nigeria (London: Longman Group 
Ltd., 1977), p. 88. 
2 9 
Okwudiba Nnoli, "A Short History of Nigerian Under¬ 
development, " in Path to Nigerian Development (Dakar, 
Senegal: Cordesria B .P., 1981), p. 130. 
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Other studies of the regulations and laws regarding the 
decree, various articles and observations on the indigenisa- 
tion exervise reveal contradictions and ambiguities which 
30 
accompanied the implementation measures. Despite indi- 
genisation, Nigeria is very keen to attract foreign inves¬ 
tors into the country. Besides, in some fields, Nigerians 
have almost virtually left foreigners carte blanche right to 
operate. For example, the Bight of Benin (formerly Bight 
of Biafra) is one of the richest fishing areas in the world, 
swarming with Russians, Japanese, Norwegians and many other 
foreign fishing vessels and factory ships. Nigerians do 
very little or no business at all in this lucrative area. 
Political Significance 
Two major issues of political significance concern¬ 
ing the implementation of the indigenisation measures need 
discussion. The first involved deciding between private and 
public acquisition of the foreign businesses. This question 
was significant because the more enterprises taken over by 
the government, the fewer there would be for the private 
A. Akinsanya, "Egalitarianism and the Sale of 
Shares," Business Times, 8 March 1977, p. 7; Editorial Com¬ 
ment, "Majority Without Control," Business Times, 19 July 
1977, p. 3; Akintunde Asalu, "People's Capitalism," Busi¬ 
ness Times, 22 February 1977, p. 325; Taju Danmole, "New 
Scramble for Alien Enterprises," Business Times,10 August 
1977, p. 16. 
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applicants for the takeover of these businesses. Moreover, 
from the point of view of the general public, the more 
businesses the state acquired, the better the public good 
would be seen (rightly or wrongly) to be served. In con¬ 
trast, the more businesses that went to private hands, the 
more the whole exercise was seen to have carried out in the 
interests of the few at the expense of the majority. 
The government's insensitivity to the dangers of 
concentrating wealth in the hands of a few Nigerians result¬ 
ing from the indigenisation exercise was reflected in the 
manner in which the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board 
dismissed the program's anti-egalitarian issue. First, the 
Board regarded wealth concentration at the expense of the 
masses as purely social rather than an economic question, 
thereby implying that both are only incidently related, with 
the social question assuming tangential importance. Second, 
it argued that although the problem of concentration of 
wealth is a legitimate one, it was the Board's task to en¬ 
sure the smooth takeover of businesses by Nigerians, no 
matter their state of origin or their numerical strength. 
Finally, it argued that if inegalitarian share ownership 
eventually carried the potential for dangerous class con¬ 
flict, this danger would ultimately dissipate as Nigeria 
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became increasingly industrialized and the scope and size of 
businesses grew beyond the competence and capability of the 
31 
family clan. 
The second question which had more relevance to the 
applicants for the acquisition of foreign businesses con¬ 
cerned the determination and application of appropriate 
criteria for the distribution of businesses. Was objective 
criteria set? Were they strictly applied? The answer to 
these questions are important to the success of the indigeni- 
sation and its implementation measures, and hence the poli¬ 
tical consequences of the whole exercise. 
Private Versus Public Acquisition 
of Businesses 
32 
The commercial sector, as outlined in the Decree, 
posed no special problems with regard to the form of acqui¬ 
sition. It was understood right from the beginning that 
these businesses were to be acquired by individual or col¬ 
lective entrepreneurs. However, the sector of the economy 
which was considered crucial and sensitive and which 
31 
V. I. Bello, Proceedings of the November, 1974, 
Symposium Organized by the Nigerian Economic Society on the 
subject, "Indigenisation: What Have We Achieved?" p. 16. 
32 See Indigenisation Decree, Section 11, and Sched¬ 
ules 1 and 2, 1977. 
162 
objective indigenous entrepreneurial activity was not ac- 
33 
corded high priority, posed a number of problems with im¬ 
portant political implications. 
For one thing, many of the equity shares made avail¬ 
able to Nigerians were not acquired by private individuals 
but by various state governments. For example, over 60 per¬ 
cent of the shares offered by the United Africa Company were 
34 
purchased by state governments. Several state governments 
are involved in such other businesses as supermarkets, boat 
building, distribution, servicing of motor vehicles, road 
haulage, inter-city transport, etc. One was thus left 
wondering what objectives the various governments were 
trying to achieve by acquiring shares in private companies. 
It appeared such government activities worked against the 
objective of encouraging private indigenous investment. 
The promise of the Indigenisation Decree in 
encouraging private indigenous investment was also lessened 
by the manner in which share capital offered publicly was 
distributed. 
33 
Ibid., Section 6, and Schedule 3. 
34 
Olu Okinkugbe, Proceedings of the 1974 Symposium, 
p. 41. 
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Thus in two areas of crucial importance in developing 
a strong indigenous private sector; the creation of 
sophisticated entrepreneurial opportunities for 
Nigerians and the encouragement of indigenous private 
investment, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 
exercise fell short of achieving its full promise. 
I would like to suggest there are two major reasons 
for the Decree's shortcomings. First, in my opinion 
there was either confusion or indifference at the 
highest levels of government regarding the specific 
objective the Decree should seek to achieve. Secondly, 
the Decree's provisions were established and the Decree 
itself implemented by the government with the virtual 
absence of meaningful dialogue with representatives of 
the private sector. This excessive isolation of the 
decision making process is most alarming. Not only 
was the voice of the private sector largely ignored, 
but the advice or counsel of various State Committees 
of the N.E.P.D. was often unheeded and in numerous 
instances these committees were bypassed altogether in 
the decision process.^ 
In brief, it is clear that no consistent guidelines were es¬ 
tablished for deciding which businesses were to be taken over 
by the state or parastatal bodies and which businesses were 
to be acquired by private citizens. Since they stood to 
gain, administrators, political leaders (military or civil¬ 
ian) reacted to this ambiguous situation by simply inter¬ 
preting government policy in ways that were most benefitial 
to themselves and their cronies. 
In order to find out the types of businesses in¬ 
volved in the indigenisation exercise, and the kind of 
35 Ibid., p. 42. 
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people who acquired shares, a sample of businesses and 
recipients in Lagos was analyzed. The city of Lagos and 
its surburbs constitute the single largest concentration of 
enterprises in Nigeria. Besides, Lagos is the capital of 
the federation of Nigeria. It is therefore the political 
and economic center of the country, hence Lagos constitutes 
a representative sample of the types of businesses in the 
country that were involved in the indigenisation program. 
Types of Businesses 
The businesses on the list of our Lagos sample have 
been divided into manufacturing, commercial and service 
enterprises. Table 4 gives the break-down of the businesses. 
Table 4 
TYPES OF BUSINESSES IN LAGOS CASE 
Activities Number Shares Percentage 
Manufacturing 516 608,831,000 54.2 
Commercial 292 124,987,000 33.3 
Services Industries 120 115,233,000 12.5 
Total 928 849,051,000 100.0 
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Annual 
Abstracts of Statistics (Lagos), Third 
National Development Plan, 1975, p. 80. 
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The largest number, 516 (54.1 percent), was manufacturing 
industries. These include bottling of soft drinks, canning 
and preserving of fruits and vegetables, construction, 
bicycle manufacturing, manufacture of food products like 
yeast, starch, baking powder, coffee roasting, etc.; manu¬ 
facture of plastic products such as dinnerware, tableware, 
kitchenware, bottles, plastic tubes, etc. The next largest 
group of businesses was commercial, 292 (33.3 percent). 
The third category of businesses taken over in our Lagos 
cample was services industry, 120 (12.5 percent). These 
include banking, transport, clearing and forwarding, rental 
and leasing, distribution and servicing, insurance, etc. 
Categories of Recipients 
Five basic categories of recipients of businesses 
were as follows: (1) military officers, (2) politicians, 
(3) businessmen, (4) civil servants, and (5) residual 
category of "others." 
Military officers are defined as all those who were 
serving members of any of the branches of the Nigerian Armed 
Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) and the Police. This category 
included all military persons who held political/administra- 
tive posts, such as governors, federal ministers, members 
of boards, etc. 
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Politicians would be defined as all those who other 
than military officers held political offices, such as 
ministers» commissioners, members of National and State 
legislatures, former ministers and commissioners, State 
governors, local government councillors, etc. 
Civil Servants were defined as all those whose roles 
were involved with federal and state apparatus but below the 
politico-administrative levels. The line between civil 
servants and politicians is thin but one major distinguish¬ 
ing factor would be the extent to which a position is 
dependent on professional rather than political criterion. 
Another distinguishing characteristic would be the degree 
of direct involvement in overt political activities, such 
as organizing party meetings, campaigning for political 
parties, or demonstrations in support of a political party, 
etc. 
Businessmen were defined as all those who were not 
known to engage in any other full time activity except 
business. Many of those under this category had at one time 
or another worked as civil servants or employees of private 
firms before starting their own business careers. 
The category of "others" come under the definition 
of all those individuals who did not fit into the four other 
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categories. They included wives and other relations of 
military officers, politicians, civil servants. It also 
included people who were alleged to be "fronts" for politi¬ 
cians and military officers, etc. A number of businesses 
were alleged to belong to persons in the first and second 
categories, but were officially listed under different 
individuals. For example, the case of Dr. Adetoro, (a 
federal commissioner at the time) who secured a loan worth 
N118,972 which enabled him to purchase some 60,201 shares in 
3 6 
thirteen different companies. Other cases included Joseph 
Gowalk (Military Governor of then Benue-Plateau State, who 
was executed in 1976 for being implicated in the attempted 
coup that led to the death of Murtala Muhammed) was supposed 
to have bought 1500 shares in UAC, 1300 shares in John Holt, 
910 shares in Incar Motors. Smanuel Ogbemudia (Military 
Governor of then Mid-West State) had investment shares worth 
N28,940.37 
These types of businesses were classified within the 
category of "others." Some of the businesses supposed to have 
3 6 
Billy Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Govern¬ 
ment and Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1982), pp. 118-119. 
37 
New Nigerian, 12 March 1975; and New Nigerian, 
2 September 1976. 
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been acquired by businessmen were also said to be in actual 
fact controlled by military and political leaders, with the 
so-called businessmen only acting as "fronts." Although 
these types of cases were difficult to verify, they raised 
enough suspicions about the proportion of businesses that 
went to the privileged groups. Many other businesses were 
attributed to these groups through their various relations, 
such as wives, brothers, cousins, nephews, nieces, etc. 
Another important factor that emerged from the study 
of the indigenisation measures, was the role of ethnicity. 
It is believed that political support and even demonstrated 
loyalty and friendship were less determinants of who got 
businesses than ethnicity. This confirms Billy Dudley's 
general observation that the government tended to have 
failed or refused to downplay ethnicity in favor of other 
38 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
Chapter one discussed the concept of indigenisation, 
its application to the analysis of the political economy of 
post-colonial Africa in general, and post-colonial Nigeria 
in particular. For the most part, the discussion of the 
concept of indigenisation and its application revolved 
around the acceptance or rejection of the utility of indi¬ 
genisation as a relevant policy of salvaging African eco¬ 
nomies from foreign domination. However, whether the 
emphasis on the value, utility or relevance of indigenisa¬ 
tion policies in Africa was over- or under-played, analysts 
and students of indigenisation in Africa tend to agree 
generally that: (1) Indigenisation of African economies has 
been problematic partly because the African bourgeoisie has 
fundamental vested interests in the exploitative relations 
of production. (2) Indigenisation has been a token measure 
calculated to legitimize African bourgeoisie rule and 
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consolidate their class domination. (3) Indigenisation 
policy is essentially a process of creating an indigenous 
bourgeoisie and of neo-colonizing a colonial economy. 
In chapter two, we examined two areas, namely, the 
history of the political economy of Nigeria and the making 
of indigenisation, and chapter three discusses indigenisa¬ 
tion as it involved technocrats. 
The political economy dates back to the colonial 
days, yet its structure has not changed. A small ruling 
class still exists, and this group preserves the political 
and economic power of the system through education, income 
and status. It encourages the expansion of an externally 
based economy by acquiring the tastes for imported manu¬ 
factured goods. Inequality has been exacerbated because of 
the continued colonial economic structure. 
Despite the differences in the types of political 
systems that ruled the country (one characterized by lack of 
representative institutions, by power concentration, and by 
a pyramidal type of political organization and the other by 
a system of open competing interests, and by representative 
forms of political organization), there were no substantive 
changes in the economic policy orientation. As for the 
technocrats, both political systems (civilian and military) 
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delegated to them varying degrees of power. In other words, 
the acquisition of power and influence depended to a certain 
extent on personal qualities, education, and/or degree of 
expertise. By the very nature of their assignments, often 
times, technocrats got embroiled in politics. But neverthe¬ 
less, they devoted their main efforts to the professional or 
technical aspect of their role. 
In chapter four, we analyzed the contents of the 
decree and concluded that the structure of the document 
itself was a factor responsible for possible circumvention 
of the implementation process. Besides structural built in 
loop-holes, there are several other defects in the decree 
that made it easy and practicable for aliens and indigenes 
alike to circumvent provisions of the decree. For example, 
the centralization and concentration of decision-making on 
the Board, and the responsibility of the Board to the Com¬ 
missioner of Industry and/or the Executive Council, create 
the ground for red-tapism, corruption, and consequently slow 
and inefficient implementation process. It also opens indi- 
genisation to a lot of political and self-serving influence. 
In chapter five, we examined the general framework 
for the accomplishment of the objectives of the decree with 
reference to the instruments set up to administer the process 
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of implementation. For the federal government in Lagos, a 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board was established, while 
at the states level, provision for a Nigerian Enterprises 
Promotion Committee in each state was made. The functions 
of the Committee were mainly to advise the Board. Besides 
these, several other agencies were associated with the impie 
mentation process. Despite these arrangements, implementa¬ 
tion was hampered by lack of indigenous manpower, lack of 
indigenous capital, contradictions in the policy itself, 
and the politics it engendered. 
Chapter six is concerned also with the framework of 
the implementation process, focusing mainly on the guide¬ 
lines for implementing agencies and individuals. The decree 
also under the guidelines, specified penalties for non- 
compliance. Again, despite all the measures, such ugly 
phenomena as corruption, discrimination, greed, avarice, 
nepotism to name but a few, plagued the implementation 
process, and thus the objectives of the decree. 
Conclusion 
The implications of the 1972 and 1977 Nigerian indi- 
genisation decrees can be analyzed from three angles, namely 
economic, political and social. It has been argued that the 
decree was the beginning of the end to economic dependence 
173 
by Nigeria on outsiders, and that the promulgation of the 
decree would go down in history as one of the boldest 
achievements of the Nigerian government.'*' The above state¬ 
ment or point of view begs for serious debate because there 
was nothing in the various attempts, including the indigeni- 
sation decrees that indicated to end the dependent nature of 
Nigeria's economy on outside influence. Instead, a careful 
examination of the indigenisation exercise showed further 
aggravation of dependency of the Nigerian economy on outside 
sources through a newly created indigenous bourgeoisie who 
are neither productive, creative, initiative, nor innovative, 
but rather had to depend on the metropolitan bourgeoisie. 
The real thrust of the indigenisation policy was the 
issue of shares to professional, managerial and bureaucratic 
class. This further strengthened the bond between the 
metropolitan capitalist elite and the indigenous elite, whose 
consumption pattern and incomes became closely identical be¬ 
cause of the new wealth acquired through indigenisation. 
Thus the question as to what extent the implementation of 
■*"V. I. Bello, "The Intentions, Implementation Process 
and Problems of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree, 
1972," Proceedings of the 1974 Symposium Organized by the 
Nigerian Economic Society on Indigenisation (Ibadan: Nigerian 
Economic Society, 1975), pp. 7-18. 
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the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree helped to change 
the dependency status of the country's economy can be 
answered with a straight-forward no. All it succeeded to 
do in the main, was to create a new class of economic elite 
which served as a nucleus of foreign capitalism. One need 
only look at the sources supporting the indigenisation 
policy to find out that the government never attempted or 
intended to end dependency on outside capital, skill, manage¬ 
ment, etc. 
Besides official policies, statements made by high 
government luminaries about the Nigerian economy did not 
indicate that the economy was heading for a change. For 
example, Dr. Azikiwe (while he was premier of the Eastern 
Region) once said that "the only way of attracting these 
industrial development prerequisites from overseas is to 
ensure for those who provide them unstinted cooperation, 
confidence security and opportunities to earn adequate re¬ 
wards for their capital and skill. . .and we are against 
2 
arbitrary nationalisation." Saying almost the same thing 
in different words, General Yakubu Gowon (then Nigeria's 
2 
Nnamdi Azikiwe, quoted in Eno J. Usoro, "Government 
Policies, Politics and Industrial Development Strategy in 
Nigeria." Paper presented to the 1973 Nigerian Economic 
Society Conference, Enugli, p. 245. 
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Head of State) during a state visit to Britain said: 
We are consolidating our political independence by 
doing all we can to promote more participation by 
Nigerians in our economic life while attracting more 
investments in sectors of the economy where Nigerians 
are not yet able to rely on themselves.^ 
He went on to emphasize that the Nigerian Enterprises Pro¬ 
motion Decree was intended to encourage "genuine foreign 
investors" whose contribution in terms of capital and know¬ 
how Nigeria still needed and would "continue to welcome most 
4 
fervently." Of equal import was the statement of Brigadier 
Joseph Garba (Nigeria's External Affairs Commissioner at the 
time) to Ambassadors of industrialized countries on July 23, 
1976. He assured his audience that: 
Although our policy is now 60 percent participation in 
certain enterprises, the government still wants, and 
indeed expects, full involvement of foreign partners in 
these enterprises. . .our policy on participation is 
not right or left, capitalist or communist, it is 
purely and simply designed to benefit Nigeria and friends 
of Nigeria.^ 
Indigenisation was therefore an attempt to secure a 
certain position for the local elite while at the same time 
preserving the dominant place in the nation's economic 





Africa Research Bulletin, 15 July - 14 August, 1976, 
pp. 3973-3974. 
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activities for foreign investors in ventures with high tech¬ 
nology, management and risks, and thus highly lucrative. 
There were four broad groups that indigenisation favored. 
These were the state, bureaucratic and management groups, 
and businesspersons. Among the enterprises in schedule one 
that are exclusively reserved for Nigerians, there is the 
tendency of dominance by a small circle of wealthy business¬ 
men and women associated with the chambers of commerce, and 
who have good contacts with government officials. They also 
have easy access to credit institutions because of their 
connections. Civil servants bought shares either in their 
names or names of friends, wives or relatives of varying 
descriptions. Many state governments also bought shares and 
later sold them to indigenous businessmen and bureaucrats. 
In the final analysis, those who acquired businesses 
and/or bought shares were the small elite groups of high 
executives, civil servants, members of the armed forces, 
university dons, professionals, and businessmen and women. 
The teeming millions of poor urban workers, peasants and 
6 
other rural persons were left out. 
There were two areas of concentration of share acqui¬ 
sition in the Nigerian indigenisation program, namely, 
. 0. Nwankwo, "The Success and Failure of a National 
Development Plan," Sunday Times (Lagos), 15 Dec. 1974, p. 7. 
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(1) among urban population versus rural population, (2) 
among high and middle income groups versus lower income 
groups in the urban areas. Comparison of share acquisitions 
showed that shares were almost totally sold to urban dwellers, 
and to persons of high and middle income groups. 
In transfering the bulk of the shares into the hands 
of the so-called elite groups rather than to the masses, the 
already yawning gap between the haves and have-nots became 
further widened. Thus, economic inequalities and social 
polarization in the Nigerian society became a trend that 
tend to want to move or turn the society into a situation 
where access to wealth (or poverty) would be hereditary. 
One would say without fear of contradiction that the 
indigenisation exercise helped to legitimize the capitalist 
pattern of development. Thus, the problem with the country's 
development is that the national means of production are 
still in the hands of foreign capitalists. Despite the so- 
called indigenisation policy, Nigerians, to a very large 
extent, are still on the periphery of economic activities in 
their own country. As has been mentioned earlier, the areas 
that were reserved exclusively for Nigerians, were those 
that Nigerians were already fully involved in before indi¬ 
genisation. Nigerians were still kept out of the lucrative 
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areas of economic activities. For example, in the fishing 
industry, indigenous fishing remains mainly at the artisan 
level, with local fishermen using mostly motorized canoes 
which cannot venture far away from shores. Thus, deep sea 
fishing becomes exclusive preserve of foreign fishing 
vessels. In the transport system, the situation is the 
same. Transport is one of the most vital sectors of the 
economy of any country. Yet, "foreigners and their agents 
dominate virtually every facet of the transport sub-sector 
7 
of the national economy." In the heavy duty commercial 
vehicles like tractors and trailers where indigenous busi¬ 
nessmen and women are supposedly doing well, it is now an 
open secret that quite a sizeable number of the real owners 
are non-Nigerians whose faces have been masked by one device 
or the other, just to evade the demands of the indigenisa- 
tion decree. 
The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree put great 
emphasis on majority representation. But how much control 
does majority ownership have? It is true that majority 
representation on the Board of a given company or corporation 
may give the "local interests" dejure control, but could 
7 
M. K. 0. Abiola, "Dilemma of Foreign Grip and Con¬ 
trol on the Transport System of Nigeria," Daily Times, 
6 November 1981, p. 21. 
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this control be effectively exercised where management is in 
the hands of foreigner partners or consultants? The answer 
is "no." Another important factor of control in economic 
activities is monopoly of technology. Since technology is 
such an important aspect of any development strategy, 
Nigeria's heavy dependence on foreign technological know-how 
help place the economy under outside control. 
Nigeria had again and again, during the course of 
the indigenisation exercise, reassured foreign investors 
that the government's decision to "indigenize" businesses 
was not an action directed against foreign interests. 
Nigeria's open-door policy (a direct contradiction of indi¬ 
genisation) made it quite feasible for foreign investors to 
have a grip on the nation's economy. Foreign investment and 
control have a number of structural implications on the 
economy : 
1. An unplanned, subsidized process of "import 
substitution" which creates a manufacturing 
sector dominated by consumer goods and assembling 
activities. 
2. A very lucrative commercial sector oriented to the 
international market, and supported by an open 
import policy and a vigorous advertising industry 
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which agravates the dependency syndrome and en¬ 
courages a consumption pattern alien to Nigeria. 
3. A large transfer of capital overseas. Nigeria's 
annual deficit is a sad story. 
4. An infant state capitalist sector, weak national 
capitalist class that is overwhelmed by its over¬ 
sea partners or rather masters. 
5. Limited transfer of technology which if and when 
transfered at all is not usually the useful aspect 
of technology that would suit local condition and 
needs. 
The vast drain on foreign exchange earnings, the 
slow pace of development, the continued foreign control of 
the economy, and the ever widening gap between the rich and 
poor, which these structural features place on the country's 
economy, still form a major part of Nigeria's economic and 
social tradition because the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion 
Decree as well as other policy of economic independence 
failed to touch the heart of the problem. 
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1. Age: 18-28 ( ) 
29-39 ( ) 
40-50 ( ) 






Place of Birth  
Sex  
State of Origin  








( ) Explain 
7. Type of Work  
8. Present Position  
9. How long on the Job  
10. Where else have you worked?  
How long  
What position?  
11. Was the organization involved in the making of the 
Indigenisation Policy? 
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12. If yes, explain 
13. What part did you play? 
14. If you played any part, do you think your formal train¬ 
ing and/or experience prepared you for the responsibili¬ 
ties you were called upon to share? 
15. Which do you believe makes for greater efficiency in the 
course of government implementation of its programs? 
Centralization ( ) Decentralization ( ) 
Explain  
16. Indigenisation has been hailed as the boldest attempt at 
achieving economic independence. Do you agree? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
Explain  
17. How much did indigenisation accomplish in terms of 
economic independence? 
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18. To what extent did official directly responsible for the 
development of Nigeria's indigenisation policy use pro¬ 
cedures to stimulate and expand public opinion in support 
of the policy? 
19. To what extent were different individuals and groups in¬ 
volved in the making of the indigenisation policy? 
20. Was there a central office to which all officials had to 
report? 
21. (If yes) Did that affect your efficiency and your pro¬ 
fession? 
22. Rivalries and differences between administrative and 
professional personnel are not uncommon. Did such 
incidents (if any) affect your ability to function at 
any time? 
23. Under which administration did civil servants function 
with more discretion? 
Civilian Administration ( ) 
Military Administration ( ) 
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24. How would you describe your organization with reference 
to structure? 
Horizontal ( ) 
Vertical ( ) 
25. How would you describe yourself with reference to working 
with other people and groups? 
Cooperative ( ) 
Un-cooperative ( ) 
26. Who in your opinion gained most from the indigenisation 
exercise? 
Politicians ( ) Civil Servants ( ) 
Businesspersons ( ) Military Personnel ( ) 
Others ( ) Explain  
27. How would you access Nigeria's indigenisation policy in 
terms of the following? 
A. The proportion of transfer of ownership and control 
of foreign enterprises to Nigerians. 
B. The pattern of share acquisition. 
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NIGERIAN ENTERPRISES PROMOTION DECREE 1977 (DECREE No. 3) 
Arrangement of Sections 
Sections : 
1 - Establishment of Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Board, etc. 
(1) There shall continue to be a body to be known as 
the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Board (in this Decree 
hereafter referred to as "the Board") which shall have 
and may exercise such functions as may be conferred on 
it by or under this Decree. 
(2) The Board shall have general power to advance 
and promote enterprises in which citizens of Nigeria 
shall participate fully and play a dominant role and in 
particular, without prejudice to the generality of the 
foregoing, the Board shall have power: 
a. to advise the Commissioner on clearly defined 
policy guidelines for the promotion of 
Nigerian enterprises; 
b. to advise the Commissioner on measures that 
would assist in ensuring the assumption of 
the control of the Nigerian economy by 
Nigerians in the shortest possible time; 
c. to determine any matter relating to business 
enterprises in Nigeria generally in respect of 
commerce and industry that may be referred to 
it in accordance with any direction of the 
Commissioner and to make such recommendations 
as may be necessary on those matters in such 
manner as may be directed by the Commissioner; 
and 
d. to perform such other functions as the Com¬ 
missioner may determine or as may be conferred 
on it by this Decree or any other enactment. 
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(3) The members of the Board shall be appointed by 
the Federal Executive Council and shall comprise: 
a. five Nigerians from outside the Public 
Services of the Federation or the States who 
shall be persons of proven integrity (one of 
whom shall be appointed as the Executive 
Chairman of the Board); 
b. a representative each of the following 
Federal Ministries, that is: 
(i) Industries; 
(ii) Finance; 
(iii) Economic Development; 
(iv) Trade; and 
(v) Internal Affairs, 
who shall be persons of the rank of Deputy 
Secretary or above; 
c. the Secretary of the Capital Issues Commis¬ 
sion; and 
d. the Director of each of the Stock Exchanges 
in Nigeria. 
(4) (a) The Executive Chairman of the Board referred 
to in subsection (3) (a) above shall be appointed by the 
Federal Executive Council on the recommendation of the 
Commissioner and shall hold office on such terms as the 
Federal Executive Council may from time to time approve. 
The Executive Chairman shall preside over the meetings 
of the Board and shall be responsible for the day-to-day 
management of the affairs of the Board. 
(b) There shall be a Secretary of the Board who 
shall be appointed by the Commissioner on the recommen¬ 
dation of the Board and who shall be the head of the 
Board's Secretariat and shall be responsible to the 
Chairman for the efficient implementation of the Board's 
decisions. The Secretary shall be in attendance at all 
meetings of the Board. 
(5) The Board shall have power to co-opt any person 
to attend its meetings. 
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(6) A member of the Board shall hold office for such 
period as may be specified in his instrument of appoint¬ 
ment . 
2 - Establishment of Enterprises 
Promotion Committees for the States, etc. 
(1) There shall continue to be for each State a 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Committee (hereafter in 
this Decree referred to as "the Committee"). 
(2) The Committee in each State shall consist of: 
a. the Permanent Secretary responsible for 
Industries in the State who shall be chair¬ 
man of the Committee; 
b. an officer in the Ministry of Trade; 
c- the Registrar of Co-operative Societies; 
d. six other persons to be appointed by the 
State Commissioner or State Commissioners, as 
the case may be, for trade and industries, 
and of the six persons at least three shall 
be Nigerians from outside the Public Service 
of the Federation or the States who shall be 
persons with proven experience in commerce 
or industry; 
e. and members of such Committee shall hold 
office for such period as may be directed by 
the Military Governor of the State. 
(3) The Committee shall have power to co-opt any 
person to attend its meetings. 
(4) The Secretary of the Committee shall be an 
officer in the Ministry of Trade or Industry of the 
State or any other fit and competent person in the 
public service of the State appointed by the Military 
Governor of that State. 
(5) The principal functions of the Committee shall 
be: 
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a. to assist and advise the Board on the imple¬ 
mentation of this Decree; 
b. to ensure that the provisions of this Decree 
are complied with by any alien resident or 
carrying on business in the State; 
c. to recommend to the Board such other measures 
as may be necessary in the opinion of the Com¬ 
mittee to enable full effect to be given to 
the provisions of this Decree; and 
d. to perform such other functions as may be as¬ 
signed to it by the Board. 
(6) If in any State any office mentioned in this 
section does not exist or is combined with another 
office the reference in any provision to the office 
mentioned there shall be construed as a reference to 
that office or the offices so combined in the State 
which in the opinion of the Military Governor most nearly 
corresponds to the office so mentioned, and the decision 
of the Military Governor in this regard and as to the 
number of members of the Committee shall be final. 
3 - Supplementary provisions with respect to 
proceedings of the Board or of State Committees. 
(1) Subject to such directions as may be given by 
the Commissioner, the Board or any Committee established 
by this Decree may determine its own quorum, and may, 
subject as aforesaid, otherwise regulate its own pro¬ 
ceedings . 
(2) There may be paid to the members of the Board 
or any Committee remuneration and allowances payable in 
accordance with the current regulations of the Govern¬ 
ment of the Federation. 
(3) The validity of any proceedings of the Board or 
of any Committee shall not be affected by: 
a. any vacancy in its membership; 
b. any defect in the appointment of any member; 
or 
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c. the fact that any person not entitled to do 
so took part in the proceedings. 
(4) The expenses of the Board in the exercise of its 
functions shall be paid out of funds provided by 
the Government of the Federation. 
4 - Enterprises exclusively reserved 
for Nigerians. Schedule 1. 
(1) All enterprises specified in Schedule 1 to this 
Decree are hereby, subject to this Decree, exclusively 
reserved for Nigerian citizens or associations and ac¬ 
cordingly : 
a. as from the appointed day no person, other 
than a Nigerian citizen or association, shall 
be the owner or part owner of any such enter¬ 
prise in Nigeria; and 
b. no such enterprise shall be established in 
Nigeria by an alien on or after the commence¬ 
ment of this Decree. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall as from the com¬ 
mencement of this Decree and before the appointed day 
preclude the sale or transfer in accordance with the 
provisions of this Decree by any person of any of the 
enterprises affected by this section. 
5 - Enterprises in respect of which 60 per cent of 
the equity must be owned by Nigerians. Schedule 2. 
Subject to this Decree, as from the appointed date no 
alien shall be the owner or part-owner of any of the enter¬ 
prises specified in Schedule 2 to this Decree unless the 
equity participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in 
the enterprise is not less than sixty per cent. 
6 - Enterprises in respect of which 40 per cent of 
the equity must be owned by Nigerians. Schedule 3. 
Subject as aforesaid, as from the appointed date no alien 
shall be the owner or part-owner of any of the enterprises 
specified in Schedule 3 to this Decree unless the equity 
participation of Nigerian citizens or associations in the 
enterprise is not less than forty per cent. 
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7 - Special provision in respect of certain 
enterprises; holding companies. 
(1) Notwithstanding sections 4, 5 and 6 above, any 
alien who immediately before the commencement of this 
Decree was the owner or part-owner of any body corporate 
carrying on an enterprise the business of which comprised 
enterprises specified in Schedules 1, 2 and 3 to this 
Decree or in any two of those Schedules may after the 
appointed date continue to be owner or part-owner of any 
such body corporate if: 
a. the annual turn-over of the body corporate 
was less than N25,000,000; 
b. the business of the body corporate was being 
carried on in not less than 10 States in the 
Federation ; 
c. the equity participation of Nigerian citizens 
or associations is by the 30th June 1977 not 
less than sixty per cent. 
(2) Sections 4, 5 and 6 above shall not apply in the 
case of any non-trading holding company the subsidiary 
companies of which have in respect of the applicable 
enterprises by the appointed date, complied with the pro¬ 
visions of this Decree. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) above, the ex¬ 
pressions "holding company" and "subsidiary company" have 
the meanings respectively assigned thereto in section 147 
of the Companies Decree 1968. 
8 - Definition of expressions used 
in section 4. 
For the purposes of section 4 above, an enterprise shall 
be deemed to be an alien enterprise unless the entire capital 
or proprietary interest, whether financial or otherwise, j_n 
the enterprise in so far as it concerns any of the enter¬ 
prises in Schedule 1 to this Decree is also owned and con¬ 
trolled by Nigerian citizens or associations. 
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9 - Sales or transfer of enterprises to be subject 
to approval by the Board and the Capital Issues 
Commission. 
(1) As from the commencement of this Decree no enter¬ 
prise to which section 4 of this Decree applies (whether 
or not operated by or as a company) and no enterprise to 
which section 5, 6 or 7 of this Decree applies which is 
being operated otherwise than by or as a private company 
shall be sold or in any manner transferred to Nigerian 
citizens or associations unless the terms and other con¬ 
ditions of and pertaining to the sale or transfer have 
been approved by the Board. 
(2) As from the commencement of this Decree as afore¬ 
said no shares in or in respect of any enterprise to which 
section 5, 6 or 7 of this Decree applies which is an 
enterprise operated by or as a public company shall with 
a view to securing compliance (to any extent whatsoever) 
with the provisions of section 5, 6 or 7 of this Decree 
be sold or in any manner transferred to Nigerian citizens 
unless the approval of the Capital Issues Commission 
(hereafter referred to as "the Commission") has been ob¬ 
tained with respect to: 
a. the price at which the shares are to be sold 
or transferred and the timing of the sale; and 
b. the terms and other conditions pertaining to 
the sale or transfer, including the manner of 
the selection of the buyers or transferees 
or, where applicable, the manner of the 
allotment of the shares among the buyers or 
transferees. 
(3) This section shall have effect notwithstanding 
any other requirement in any law (including, where ap¬ 
plicable, the Companies Decree 1968) and such other law 
shall be construed subject to this Decree. 
(4) Without prejudice to subsection (3) above, the 
powers conferred on the Commission under the Capital 
Issues Decree 1973 shall be construed as including power 
to grant approvals for the purposes of this Decree and 
any rules made by the Commission may be adapted or other¬ 
wise modified by the Commission for the purposes of this 
Decree. 
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(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this 
section, the Commission shall be charged with the func¬ 
tion of determining the prices of shares in enterprises 
to which the Decree relates and in the case of public 
companies there shall be an Allotment Committee of that 
Commission which shall consist of the following persons 
that is : 
(i) a representative of the Board, 
(ii) a representative of the Lagos Stock Exchange, and 
(iii) a representative of the appropriate issuing house. 
10 - Provisions supplementary to Section 9. 
(1) Where approval of the Board or, as the case may 
be, of the Allotment Committee of the Commission has not 
been obtained as required under section 9 of this Decree 
or if any application in relation thereto has been 
refused : 
a. any sale or transfer of any enterprise con¬ 
cerned or of any shares or other proprietary 
interest in or in respect of any affected 
enterprise shall be void and shall be of no 
effect; and 
b. any moneys received in relation to or connect¬ 
ed with any of the transactions referred to in 
the section shall forthwith be repaid without 
interest by the vendor or transferor, and if 
any such money is not repaid within 14 days 
after the date of the notification of the re¬ 
fusal to give the approval the directors of 
any company concerned shall be jointly and 
severally liable to repay that money with 
interest at the rate of five per cent per 
annum from the expiration of the 14th day. 
Provided that a director shall not be liable 
if he proves that the default in the repayment 
of the money is not due to misconduct or 
negligence on his part, and that all the moneys 
involved had been kept in a separate bank ac¬ 
count to facilitate repayment. 
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(2) The reference in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) 
above to "directors of a company" shall: 
a. in the case of a partnership be construed as 
a reference to the partners of the body con¬ 
cerned; and 
b. in the case of any other unincorporated body, 
be construed as a reference to the person in 
whom is vested the beneficial ownership of 
the enterprise concerned. 
11 - General guidelines regarding approval of 
sales or transfer by the Board or Commission. 
(1) In considering applications for approval pursuant 
to section 9 of this Decree the Board or, as the case 
may be, the Allotment Committee of the Commission shall 
have regard to the following general guidelines, that is 
to s ay : - 
a. Beneficial ownership of the enterprises af¬ 
fected should be as widespread as the circum¬ 
stances of each case would justify and 
deliberate efforts must be made to prevent 
the concentration of ownership in a few hands. 
b. Except in the case of owner-manager, no enter¬ 
prise should be sold or transferred to a 
single individual and in no case is a single 
individual to be allowed to have control of 
more than one enterprise. 
c. Where appropriate, allotment rules made or 
approved by the Board or the Allotment Com¬ 
mittee of the Commission as appropriate shall 
be such that would ensure that: 
(i) no individual holding more than 5 per 
cent of the equity of an enterprise or hold¬ 
ing a portion of the equity valued at more 
than N50,000, whichever is the higher, is 
alloted any further portion of the equity 
in that enterprise; 
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(ii) no individual shall be alloted more 
than 5 per cent of the equity of an enter¬ 
prise or any portion of the enterprise 
valued at more than N50,000, whichever is 
higher; 
(iii) no individual shall be alloted any 
portion of the equity of an enterprise that 
would make any holding of that individual 
of the equity of the enterprise concerned 
to exceed 5 per cent of the total equity of 
that enterprise or to attain a value ex¬ 
ceeding N50,000, whichever is higher. 
d. Not less than 10 per cent total equity shares 
of any Schedule 2 or 3 enterprise or where 
only a fraction is being sold not less than 
10 per cent of the amount of sale is reserved 
for the employees of the enterprise concerned 
and of the 10 per cent not less than one half 
shall be reserved for the non-managerial 
staff. 
e. Consideration is a form acceptable to the 
Board or the Commission should pass from the 
transferee to the seller or transferor and, 
where appropriate, all rights including agency 
rights, sole representation and all other 
ancillary rights should pass to the buyer or 
transferee. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, the 
Allotment Committee shall have regard to information as 
to the existing shareholdings of individuals seeking to 
acquire further interests in enterprises to which this 
Decree relates. 
12 - Inspectors of enterprises. 
(1) Without prejudice to the operation of any enact¬ 
ment, there shall continue to be for the purposes of this 
Decree a number of inspectors of enterprises (in this 
Decree hereafter referred to as "inspectors") who shall 
be designated as such by an order published in the 
Federal Gazette by the Commissioner from among members 
of the public services of the Federation and of the 
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States, and when so designated the inspectors shall, as 
respects any exercise of the functions conferred upon 
them by virtue of this Decree be responsible to the 
Board and no other person or authority. 
(2) The inspectors shall, subject to this section, 
have such powers and carry out such functions as the 
Board may confer on them. 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) above, for the 
purpose of carrying out any of their functions, such 
inspectors : 
a. shall have a right of access at all times as 
may be necessary to any building or premises 
where any enterprise is being carried on or 
which they reasonably suspect is being used 
for any purpose to which this Decree relates; 
b. may inspect such building or premises, or 
business in order to determine whether or 
not the building or premises is being used, 
or as the case may be, the business is being 
carried on, for the purposes authorized by 
this Decree, and may require the production 
of all books of account or other documents 
and inspect them for ensuring that the pro¬ 
visions of this Decree are being complied 
with; and 
c. shall be entitled to require from the directors 
or other officers of the enterprise such in¬ 
formation and explanation as may be deemed 
necessary. 
(4) Any person, who - 
a. without lawful excuse the proof of which shall 
lie on him: 
(i) refuses to admit into his building or 
premises any inspector appointed under this 
section; or 
(ii) denies such inspector the right to in¬ 
spect the building or premises or the business 
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for the determination or the matter specified 
in subsection (3) (b) above; or 
(iii) refuses or neglects to give any infor¬ 
mation which any inspector may require from 
him; or 
b. in respect of any request for information 
from any inspector, makes any statement which 
he knows to be false or which he has no 
reason to believe to be true; or 
c. in any way obstructs any inspector in the dis¬ 
charge of such functions as may be conferred 
on him by this section, shall be guilty of an 
offense under this Decree. 
13 - Powers to seal up premises. 
(1) If the Board is satisfied that: 
a. an alien has been engaging in any of the enter¬ 
prises specified in Schedule 1 to this Decree ; 
or 
b. that an alien enterprise is being carried on 
in contravention of section 5, 6 or 7 or any 
other provision of this Decree, the Chairman 
of the Board may direct an inspector to seal 
up any premises in which the offending enter¬ 
prise is being carried on. 
(2) Whenever an inspector has sealed up any premises 
he shall be deemed to have been duly directed to do so by 
the Chairman. 
(3) Every police officer shall if called upon by an 
inspector give all reasonable assistance to the inspector 
necessary to effect the sealing up of any affected 
premises and to prevent unauthorized persons from having 
access to or interferring with the premises or any goods 
contained therein. 
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14 - Additional penalty for contravention 
of the Decree. 
(1) Where, on or after the appointed day, any alien 
continues to be the owner or part owner of any enter¬ 
prise in contravention of section 4 of this Decree, it 
shall be lawful for the Board: 
a. to take over, sell or otherwise dispose of 
the enterprise, and 
b. to distribute the proceeds of such sale or 
disposal (if any) - 
(i) in the case of partnerships, to the pro¬ 
prietors of the enterprise duly registered 
under the Registration of Business Names Act 
1961 or any other applicable law; 
(ii) in the case of companies, to the share¬ 
holders of the company; and 
(iii) in any other case, in such manner as 
may be directed by the Board; and any ex¬ 
penses incurred by the Board in relation to 
the exercise of any of the powers conferred 
by this subsection shall be a charge upon 
and be defrayed by the Board from the pro¬ 
ceeds of such sale on disposal. 
(2) It shall be sufficient for the purposes of taking 
over any enterprise under subsection (1) (a) of this 
section - 
a. in the case of partnerships, if the certificate 
of registration or business permit of the 
enterprise is cancelled; and 
b. in the case of a company, if the certificate 
of registration or business permit of the 
company is cancelled; 
c. in other case, if the assets of the associa¬ 
tion are registered by the Registrar of 
Business Names, or as the case may be, the 
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Registrar of Companies or any person duly 
authorized to do so, in the name of Federal 
Military Government. 
(3) In this section "business permit" means any 
business permit issued pursuant to section 8 of the Im¬ 
migration Act 1963. 
15 - Supply of information. 
(1) The Board may by instrument in writing, request 
any person carrying on any enterprise to which this 
Decree relates to furnish such estimates, returns or 
other information as may be specified and he may by that 
instrument specify the time, manner and form in which 
such estimates, returns or information are to be 
furnished, and it shall be the duty of any such person 
to comply with the request. 
(2) Any person, who - 
a. refuses or neglects to give any information 
which the Board may require pursuant to sub¬ 
section (1) above; or 
b. in respect of the information so required 
makes any statement which he knows to be 
false or which he has no reason to believe to 
be true, shall be guilty of an offense and 
shall on conviction be liable to a fine of 
Nl,000 or to imprisonment for three years. 
16 - Alteration of lists of enterprises. 
The Commissioner may with the prior approval of the 
Federal Executive Council as from the commencement of this 
Decree and before the appointed day or such other day as may 
be specified for the purposes of any particular order (or in 
respect of any enterprise) by order published in the 
Gazette : 
a. alter the list of enterprises specified, 
respectively in Schedules 1, 2 or 3 to this 
Decree by way of addition, substitution or 
deletion; 
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b. as respects section 6 or 7 above, vary the 
extent of the equity participation of 
Nigerian citizens or associations in the 
enterprise ; 
c. make such different provisions in relation to 
different enterprises or as respects different 
areas of the Federations, and impose such 
terms as he may deem necessary. 
17 - Penalty for acting as a front. 
(1) Any person who - 
a. acts as a front or purports for the purpose 
of defeating or in manner likely to defeat 
the object of this Decree to be the owner or 
part owner of any enterprise; or 
b. operates any enterprise for or on behalf of 
any alien who is under this Decree; 
(i) not permitted to operate the enter¬ 
prise; or 
(ii) disqualified from operating the enter¬ 
prise; or 
(iii) not permitted to own or be part owner 
of such enterprise, 
shall be guilty of an offense under this section, and 
shall be liable on conviction to a fine of N15,000 or 
to imprisonment for a term of 5 years or to both such 
fine and imprisonment. 
(2) It shall not be lawful for any Nigerian citizen 
or association to employ, whether on full time or part 
time basis, any alien for the operation of any enter¬ 
prise previously owned wholly or partly by that alien 
which the alien has disposed of pursuant to the provi¬ 
sions of this Decree, except with the prior approval of 
the Federal Commissioner for Internal Affairs after con¬ 
sultation with the Board. 
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18 - Offenses and penalties. 
(1) Any person found guilty of an offense under this 
Decree for which no penalty is provided shall upon con¬ 
viction be liable to a fine of N10,000 or imprisonment 
for 5 years or to both such fine and imprisonment. 
(2) Where an offense under this Decree is committed 
by a body of persons, therein - 
a. in the case of a body corporate, every direc¬ 
tor or officer of that body shall be deemed 
to be guilty of the offense; 
b. in the case of a partnership or other associa¬ 
tion, every partner or officer of that body 
shall be deemed to be guilty of the offense. 
(3) No person shall, however, be deemed to be guilty 
of an offense under subsection (2) above, if he proves 
to the satisfaction of the court that the offense was 
committed without his consent and that he exercised all 
due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense 
having regard to all the circumstances. 
19 - Power of inspector to conduct prosecutions, etc. 
(1) Subject to section 104 of the Constitution of 
the Federation (which relates to the power of the 
Attorney-General of the Federation to institute, continue 
or discontinue criminal proceedings) any inspector or 
officer of the Board may in a court of competent 
jurisdiction prosecute an offender for an offense under 
this Decree. 
(2) It shall not be an objection to the competency 
of an inspector to give evidence as a witness in any 
prosecution for an offense under this Decree that the 
action is prosecuted or conducted by that inspector. 
20 - Regulations and reports. 
(1) The Commissioner may make regulations generally 
for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of 
this Decree, and may in particular, without prejudice to 
the generality of the foregoing provision, make regula¬ 
tions : 
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a. prescribing the forms for returns and other 
information required under this Decree; 
b. prescribing the detailed powers and functions 
of inspectors; 
c. prescribing the procedure for obtaining any 
information required under this Decree ; 
d. requiring returns to be made, within the period 
specified therein, by any enterprise to which 
this Decree applies; 
e. prescribing any fees payable under this Decree; 
and 
f. prescribing such other matters as may be re¬ 
ferred to him by the Federal Executive 
Council. 
(2) Any regulations made pursuant to subsection (1) 
above shall be presented to the Federal Executive Council 
for the approval of that Council together with any report 
and recommendations of the Board including any measures 
which the Commissioner proposes in relation thereto. 
21 - Right to petition. 
Any person aggrieved by any decision of the Board or by 
the exercise of any power under this Decree shall have the 
right to forward a petition on such grievance to the Commis¬ 
sioner who may notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
this Decree and subject to the approval of the Federal 
Executive Council, confirm or reverse the decision of the 
Board or take such further measures in relation to the 
petition as he may think just and reasonable. 
22 - Exclusion of rights. 
Except as otherwise prescribed by this Decree, there 
shall be no right of appeal against any act, matter or thing 
done or purported to be done by or under this Decree; and 
without prejudice to the operation of any other enactment 
excluding the jurisdiction of a court of law in respect of 
certain proceedings, and for the avoidance of doubt, no 
proceedings by way of originating summons, certiorari, 
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mandamus, prohibition, injunction or any other prerogative 
writ shall lie or be instituted on account of or in respect 
of such act, matter or thing done or purported to be done. 
23 - Interpretation. 
(1) In this Decree, unless the context otherwise 
requires, the following expressions have the meanings 
respectively assigned to them: - 
"alien" means a person or association whether 
corporate or unincorporate other than a Nigerian 
citizen or association; 
"appointed date" (a) in the case of any enter¬ 
prise to which section 7 applies means 30th June 
1977; and 
(b) in every other case, means 31st December 
1978. 
"Commission" means the Capital Issues Commission 
established by section 1 of the Capital Issues 
Decree 1973; 
"Commissioner" means the Federal Commissioner 
charged with responsibility for industries; 
"company" means any company registered under the 
Companies Decree 1968 or under any enactment 
replaced by that Decree; 
"enterprise" includes any industrial or commercial 
undertaking; 
"Nigerian citizen or association" means - 
(a) a person who is a citizen of Nigeria by 
virtue of the Constitution of the Federation; 
(b) any person of African descent, not being a 
citizen of Nigeria, who is a national of any 
country in Africa which is a member country 
of the Organization of African Unity, and 
continues to reside and carry on business in 
Nigeria, if the country of which he is a 
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national also permits citizens of Nigeria to 
establish and operate businesses or enter¬ 
prises in that country on the basis of 
reciprocity; and 
(c) any company registered under the Companies 
Decree 1968, partnership, association or 
body (whether corporate or unincorporate), 
and except as otherwise prescribed under 
this Decree, the entire capital or other 
financial interest of which is owned wholly 
and exclusively by citizens of Nigeria; 
"ownership" in relation to any enterprise in¬ 
cludes any proprietary interest in the enterprise 
beneficially, and any derivative of that word shall 
be construed accordingly; 
"prescribed" means prescribed by this Decree or 
by regulations ; 
"shares" includes stocks. 
(2) The reference in this Decree to "equity partic¬ 
ipation of Nigerian citizens or associations" is a 
reference to stocks and shares which Nigerian citizens 
or associations have in such industry which do not bear 
fixed interest or dividend. 
(3) Section 22 of this Decree shall not be so 
construed as to exclude the right to appeal against any 
decision of a court in connection with any criminal 
offense created under this Decree. 
24 - Repeals and saving. 
(1) The Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972 
is hereby repealed and the following enactments, that is 
to say: 
a. the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amend¬ 
ment) Decree 197 3; 
b. the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amend¬ 
ment) Decree 1974; 
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c. the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion (Amend¬ 
ment) (No. 2) Decree 1974; and 
d. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1976, 
are hereby, consequentially, repealed. 
(2) Without prejudice to section 6 of the Interpre¬ 
tation Act 1964 the repeal of the enactments specified 
in subsection (1) of this section shall not affect any¬ 
thing done under or pursuant to those enactments. 
25 - Citation and commencement. 
(1) This Decree may be cited as the Nigerian Enter¬ 
prises Promotion Decree 1977. 
(2) This Decree shall be deemed to have come into 
force on 29th June 1976. 
Made at Lagos this 12th day of January 1977. 
LT. GENERAL O. OBASANJO, 
Head of the Federal Military Government, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, 
Federal Republic of Nigeria 
